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Abstract 
David J Blackmore 
Degree: PhD 
Destructive and Formidable: British Infantry Firepower, 1642 – 1765 
This work is an examination of the effectiveness of British infantry firepower from 
1642 to 1765, it establishes the manner in which that firepower was organised and 
managed and how it developed. In order to achieve this it has been necessary to 
develop and propose a new approach to the study of military history; practical 
military history, which uses a thorough understanding of the practices and 
procedures of the army to interpret and analyse contemporary writings on the 
subject.  
 
In doing so it has been possible to identify and analyse the effectiveness of the 
tactical doctrine and combat techniques of British infantry during the English Civil 
Wars and then to trace a continuous line of development of doctrine and technique 
from then until 1765, in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War, when this 
study concludes. It has also been possible to analyse the battlefield effectiveness of 
those techniques and to identify previously unrecognised aspects of them. It has also 
been possible to correct some long held misconceptions and to pinpoint times when 
key changes were brought about, such as the introduction of the organisation of 
platoons into firings. 
 
As well as identifying, for the first time, a single underlying tactical doctrine it has 
also been possible to clarify the manner in which the methods used to execute that 
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doctrine changed. The work has identified the origins of platoon firing, its earliest 
form and its subsequent developments during the War of Spanish Succession, 
thereby correcting the long standing misidentification of the form that it first took and 
the idea that it remained largely unchanged from the 1680s to the 1740s. It has also 
identified when changes occurred and analysed the implications for the effectiveness 
of the firepower and, in some instances, been able to demonstrate in absolute terms, 
the effectiveness of that firepower. 
 
This work will enable military historians to achieve an understanding of how British 
infantry fought, how they achieved what they did, rather than simply what those 
achievements were. In using a practical military history approach it also proposes a 
new approach to military history that will enable an analysis of events to be given, 
rather than a simple narrative.  
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1: Introduction 
 
The objective of this work is to examine and analyse the use of firepower by British 
infantry from 1642 to 1765 in order to establish the tactical doctrine and the methods, 
or combat techniques, for applying that doctrine that were employed throughout that 
period. The year 1642 is taken as the starting point as it saw the outbreak of the 
English Civil War, in which conflict lie the origins of the British Army and the infantry 
that are the subject of this work. By 1765 and the end of the Seven Years War, 
British infantry had established a considerable reputation and become recognisable 
as the troops who would fight well, but in vain, in the American War of 
Independence, and most effectively against the forces of Napoleon. It is thus the 
formative period in the history of the British Army. This work will seek to establish if 
there were doctrinal changes from war to war as circumstances changed, or if there 
is one continuous, underlying doctrine that has underpinned the methods and 
combat techniques developed. It will also identify and explain the developments in 
the methods of delivery and organisation of firepower. Both doctrine and methods 
will be analysed to ascertain their effectiveness. 
 
This study is necessary because there is a consensus among modern writers of 
military history that the British infantry of the eighteenth century repeatedly achieved 
a high level of effectiveness and superiority over its enemies in firepower and relied 
on that firepower to win battles. Despite that consensus, however, no historian has 
yet traced to its beginning the development of the doctrine or the means by which 
that superiority was achieved and maintained over such a long period, in a variety of 
theatres, and against a wide variety of enemies.   
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Charles Spencer in his account of Blenheim, 1704, wrote how Anglo–Dutch 
firepower ‘cut down large swathes of their opponents in a moment’.1 Jeremy Black 
makes several similar observations about the British infantry at Dettingen in 1743, 
‘French cavalry attacked British infantry only to be cut to pieces by their firepower’, at 
Fontenoy in 1745, ‘the British infantry displayed their discipline and fire control’ and 
at Minden, ‘The courage and fire discipline of the British infantry won the battle’.2 
Frank McLynn has written of the British infantry at Minden in 1759, ‘A series of 
crashing volleys from the superbly disciplined British regiments tore the heart out of 
the French cavalry’.3 
 
However, none of these writers supplies an answer to the question of how this 
superiority was achieved and then maintained. One possible explanation for this 
omission is given by the eminent military historian of the late seventeenth century 
John Childs. In the introduction to his book The Nine Years War and the British Army 
1688-1697 he describes a ‘new military history’.4 This he describes as dealing with 
social, political and economic forces at the expense of traditional campaign history. 
His explanation for this development is the desire among ‘professional historians at 
universities to bring academic respectability to a branch of their discipline which has 
long been the poor relation of its political, religious, social and economic brothers’.5  
As the self confessed author of a trilogy of new military history dealing with the 
British Army from 1660 to 1702, Childs also states that an army’s campaigns, actions 
                                                          
1
 Charles Spencer, Blenheim, Battle for Europe (London, 2004), p. 255. 
2
 Jeremy Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1999), p. 162, p. 181 and p. 188. 
3
 Frank McLynn, 1759, The Year Britain Became Master of the World (London 2005), p. 276. 
4
 John Childs, The Nine Years War and the British Army (Manchester, 1991), pp. 2-3. 
5
 Childs, The Nine Years War, p. 3. 
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and methods are as important as the topics of the new military history. He claims 
that in The Nine Years War and the British Army, 1688-1697 he will don the coat of 
the ‘old military historian’ and observe the British Army in action.6 To some extent 
Childs achieves that aim, but what emerges from the book is a limited picture of an 
army in action and even less of its methods.  
 
Writing about military history books dealing with the period 1689 to 1763 Brent 
Nosworthy wrote: ‘The so-called higher levels of warfare, generally referred to as the 
“operational” and “strategic” levels, are particularly well covered.’7 However, he goes 
on to write: ‘Though we are given general information, such as the types of 
formations the troops employed and some of the methods they used to fire their 
weapons, the picture blurs as soon as we increase the degree of magnification.’8 
Elsewhere he has expressed his view more bluntly: ‘The traditional approach used to 
dissect and analyse battles which explains “what” occurred during a particular 
contest has unfortunately largely ignored the “how” and the “why”.’9 These are 
precisely the shortcomings of Childs in The Nine Years War. 
 
Nosworthy himself is not entirely successful in his stated aims: 
The goal of the present work, The Anatomy of Victory: Battle Tactics 1689-
1763, is to reconstruct each of the major tactical and grand tactical doctrines 
as they existed during the period under consideration, and to explore how 
these doctrines evolved to produce what could be called “Fredrician 
warfare”.10 
                                                          
6
 Childs, The Nine Years War, p. 3. 
7
 Brent Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763 (New York, 1992), p. xi. 
8
 Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, p. xi. 
9
 Brent Nosworthy, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and his Enemies (London, 1995), p. xv. 
10
 Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, p. xiii. 
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He does indeed explore the tactical doctrines of the European nations through the 
period, but is primarily concerned with France and Prussia with whom he deals in 
some considerable depth, looking at their doctrines and ongoing tactical evolution. 
However, his treatment of the British Army does not explain the origins of the British 
commitment to the doctrine of firepower or how and why it was so unwaveringly 
adhered to for so long, arguably to the present day. Furthermore, despite his stated 
goal he still fails to explain the detail of how and why events and actions unfolded as 
they did. Although he gives one of the better explanations of platoon firing in the 
British Army he does not address its development through the period as the British 
Army sought to increase its effectiveness.11 His treatment of its control and 
management is also superficial. He is over reliant on a single contemporary source, 
Brigadier Richard Kane, and makes no mention of the arguably more important work 
of Major General Humphrey Bland.12 In this respect there is little in Nosworthy that 
could not equally well be gleaned from the earlier work of David Chandler.13 What 
Nosworthy does provide is an excellent account of what was going on in the rest of 
Europe, which provides a useful source of information with which to compare 
developments in the British Army. 
 
Other books that deal with the whole or a greater part of this period provide little 
more information or explanation of British Army doctrine and tactics. Black’s Warfare 
in the Eighteenth Century contains the following on platoon firing: ‘Battalions were 
drawn up only three ranks deep, and firings were by groups of platoons, in a process 
                                                          
11
 Nosworthy, The Anatomy of Victory, pp. 55-57. 
12
 Brigadier-General Richard Kane, Campaigns of King William and the Duke of Marlborough, Also A New 
System of Military Discipline, for a Battalion of Foot on Action (London, 1745); Humphrey Bland, A Treatise of 
Military Discipline (London and Dublin, 1727) . 
13
 David Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (London 1976). 
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designed to maximize the continuity of fire and control.’14 As a description of what 
was the basic building block of infantry tactics throughout Europe during the Seven 
Years War, it is not very informative. Similarly Richard Holmes’ Redcoat deals with 
the British Army from the mid-eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century and it 
is a wonderful examination of the character and experience of the British Army, but 
not of technicalities like platoon firing.  When Holmes deals with musketry and 
platoon firing he gives the reader the sense of the experience, not the minutiae of 
how it was conducted.15 
 
One book that might reasonably be expected to address the minutiae of infantry fire 
systems is Firepower by Major General B. P. Hughes and which is subtitled 
Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850.16  What Hughes endeavours 
to demonstrate is the absolute effectiveness of weapons, that is how many hits a 
weapon or weapons might achieve. In doing so he considers the theoretical 
performance of a weapon and then how that might be affected on the battlefield by 
various factors, such as smoke. Scant attention is paid to how the weapons are 
handled and managed to generate the firepower he tries to assess. 
 
One might also expect much from the military historian, Christopher Duffy, who has 
written extensively about eighteenth century warfare and the Prussian Army in 
particular. His The Military Experience in the Age of Reason is a work that appears in 
                                                          
14
 Black, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century, p. 158. 
15
 Richard Homes, Redcoat, The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket (London, 2002, paperback), pp. 
195-99. 
16
 Major-General B. P. Hughes, Firepower, Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 1630-1850 (London, 
1974). 
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most bibliographies.17 In this he sets out to examine the characteristics of eighteenth 
century warfare. However, he writes almost exclusively from a Prussian viewpoint, 
giving some detail about Prussian platoon firing and its effectiveness or otherwise, 
but makes little mention of the British experience, with Minden hardly being 
mentioned. He also gives an inaccurate description of the process of loading and 
firing a musket, which leads one to question his understanding of the lower levels of 
infantry drill and tactics.18  
 
Possibly the best book on the British Army of the eighteenth century written in recent 
times is John Houlding’s Fit for Service, which looks at the training of the army 
between 1715 and 1795.19 Houlding’s intention, which he fulfils admirably, is to 
explore the levels of training and achievement of the army and the reasons that 
militated against regiments being declared fit for service. Tactical doctrine is not a 
theme of this work, but he does make a telling comment on this with regard to the 
British Army. He suggests that ‘a sound appreciation of the supremacy of firepower 
over all other forms of combat had been a lesson well learned by the end of 
Marlborough’s campaigns, and had been taken to heart in the army; hence the issue 
of shock- versus fire-tactics, which so stirred the French after 1714, was not 
significant in Britain’.20 He does not, however, explore the origins and subsequent 
development of this doctrine as it is outside the scope of his work. He does trace the 
history of drill books and records the changes in them, but without any explanation of 
how the changes work. For instance, he claims that the introduction of the 1756 
                                                          
17
 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London 1987). 
18
 Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (Ware, 1998, paperback), p. 114. 
19
 John Houlding, Fit for Service, The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 1981). 
20
 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 167. 
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Regulations increased the rate of fire by an additional round every two minutes, but 
without explaining how or from what to what.21 Houlding also traces the history of 
theoretical writing on military tactics and doctrine with particular reference to the 
British Army. He devotes a short section of his book to a brief discussion of platoon 
firing and its common variants, but it is a snapshot to help the reader understand 
what the infantry were training to do. It does not explain the management and 
development of it and does not address some of the difficulties implicit in it, but that 
is not its purpose.22  
 
Houlding, however, is one of the few authors to criticise the effectiveness of British 
infantry. His assessment of its performance at Dettingen, 1743, is scathing, but he is 
quite clear that this is due to a lack of training and practice at the beginning of a war, 
the War of the Austrian Succession, rather than any fundamental flaw in the 
underlying doctrine.23 Writing about Fontenoy, 1745, he describes the infantry as 
performing ‘brilliantly’ and adds: 
The controlled volleys were so effective that the Gardes Francaise panicked 
and fled; indeed, even before engaging the Gardes had feared to enter into ‘ 
une affaire de mousqueterie’ with the English foot, knowing that it would have 
‘trop d’advantage par sa superioritie’.24 
Houlding’s excellent book is essential for anyone with an interest in the British Army 
of the eighteenth century. His chapter The Drillbooks: Regulations by Authority and 
Private Publications is an invaluable guide to the contemporary literature on the 
subject. 
 
                                                          
21
 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 199. 
22
 Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 318-21. 
23
 Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 350-52. 
24
 Houlding, Fit for Service, p. 359. 
  
 
8 
 
It might be suggested that books covering a long chronology are not likely to go into 
the detail required to give an explanation of how British infantry achieved their 
superiority, nor to understand the intricacies and minutiae of platoon firing let alone 
the subtle changes and developments that take place over the period under 
consideration. This information might rather be found in specialist studies of narrow 
periods or specific wars and campaigns and also here might be found examples of 
the failure of the British doctrine of reliance upon infantry firepower with which to 
challenge the consensus view. It is this narrower, more focused work that will be 
considered next. 
 
 At the start of this period, 1642, Britain was entering into a period of civil war that 
effectively kept it out of involvement abroad, but in which were laid the foundations of 
the regular, standing army with the formation of the New Model Army. It is a period 
that is much written about, but mostly concerning the political, religious and social 
aspects of the war.25 The two most recent major works on the New Model Army have 
almost ignored the fact that it was a very efficient and effective army, concentrating 
more on the army as a radical, political influence in British history.26 What military 
history there is that deals with the conduct of the war is mostly of the ‘old’ sort, 
concerned with generals and their campaigns, battles and sieges. Two books, 
however, one written in 1902, the other in 2005, do seek to inform about the ‘how’ of 
warfare during the English Civil Wars and the New Model Army in particular. 
 
                                                          
25
 For example; Martyn Bennett, The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 1997), Antonia Fraser, The 
Weaker Vessel (London, 1984), Christopher Hill, The World Turned Upside Down (London, 1972), John 
Morrill, The Nature of the English Revolution (Harlow, 1993); Ivan Roots, The Great Rebellion (London1966). 
26
 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653 (Oxford, 1992); Mark A. 
Kishlansky, The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge 1979). 
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The first and older of the two is Firth’s Cromwell’s Army.27 Writing in 1992, in an 
introduction to the fourth edition, the civil war historian John Adair wrote: ‘Yet Firth is 
still unsurpassed on the tactics of infantry, cavalry and dragoons on the battlefield.’28 
The chapter on infantry contains a considerable amount of detail on the technical 
aspects of the musket and its associated equipment, but only a few pages giving a 
fairly superficial description of how infantry of the English Civil War went about firing 
their muskets, including a little on the developments introduced by Gustavus 
Adolphus. 29 Firth does touch upon the first signs of a decline in the numbers of 
pikemen and the contemporary arguments concerning this, but misses the 
increasing reliance on firepower rather than shock on the battlefield during the civil 
wars.30 
 
The second of the two books is Keith Robert’s, Cromwell’s War Machine.31 Robert’s 
covers much the same ground as Firth, but with considerably more detail on the 
ways armies formed and deployed for battle. However, he adds little to Firth when it 
comes to the delivery and management of infantry firepower, limiting himself to a 
basic description of the various ways of delivering fire as they appear in the 
contemporary military manuals. There is little analysis of actual combat. 
 
Another work dealing with the civil wars requires mention, if only as a lesson. This is 
Carlton’s Going to the Wars.32 This is primarily a social history of the wars, but one 
which deals comprehensively with the individual experience of war, for both civilian 
                                                          
27
 Sir Charles Firth, Cromwell’s Army (first published London 1902). 
28
 Firth, Cromwell’s Army (London, 1992), pp. ix. 
29
 Firth, Cromwell’s Army, 94-98. 
30
 Firth, Cromwell’s Army, pp. 76-78. 
31
 Keith Roberts, Cromwell’s War Machine, The New Model Army, 1645-1660 (Barnsley, 2005). 
32
 Charles Carlton, Going to the Wars, The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638-1651 (London, 1992). 
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and soldier. Carlton deals with the realities of war and how it was fought, drawing 
extensively on first-hand accounts. Unfortunately, when dealing with the detail of 
drill, tactics and the nature of combat he reveals a lack of basic knowledge 
concerning things military and the Civil Wars in particular. He confuses ranks and 
files, makes basic errors about arms and armour and misinterprets accounts 
because of this lack of understanding of drill and tactics. For instance, he interprets 
an account of infantry ‘charging their pikes’ as meaning they carried out an attack on 
enemy pikemen, whereas it is clear that the account refers to the pikemen bringing 
their own pikes to the charge position.33 It is only with a sound understanding of the 
military practices of a period that one can hope to accurately interpret and 
understand the contemporary accounts. 
 
The period between the restoration of the Monarchy in 1660 and the outbreak of the 
War of Spanish Succession in 1701, including the Nine Years War, has long been 
the domain of John Childs, and his books have already been referred to. When we 
move onto the War of Spanish Succession we are moving into the territory of one of 
the country’s most eminent military historians, the late David Chandler. Of his books 
the one that has most significance for this analysis is The Art of War in the Age of 
Marlborough.34 The book is organised into four themes: The Horse, The Foot, The 
Artillery Trains and The Engineering Services. The section on The Foot deals, 
amongst other things, with weapons and equipment, organisation and training and 
the tactical handling of the foot. In his introduction Chandler writes: ‘This volume is 
devoted to a fairly full examination of how the regimental officer and soldier fought 
                                                          
33
 Carlton, Going to the Wars, p. 134. 
34
 David Chandler, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough (London, 1976). 
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and manoeuvred, whether in the line of battle or siege trenches, and of the 
equipment, doctrine and training that enabled them to perform their duty.’35 
 
Chandler gives one of the clearest descriptions and explanations of platoon firing in 
any of the books mentioned here, but it is flawed. He bases his description on the 
work of Richard Kane, which was published some thirty years after the war and, as 
will be shown, does not reflect exactly how things were done during the War of 
Spanish Succession.36 It is true that Kane’s instructions apparently match the 
account of a fire fight at Malplaquet in 1709 where platoon firing was employed, but 
the account is somewhat vague on detail and could be from any battle up to the 
1750s.37 In fact, as will be shown, a lack of knowledge of the development of platoon 
firing has resulted in some misinterpretation of this event. There are also errors in 
the diagrams used to illustrate platoon firing.38 
 
Chandler does, however, draw attention to the ongoing debate in Europe on the 
merits of firepower as against shock-action, and gives a basic introduction to the 
thinking of the principle military theoreticians of the period, such as the Marquis of 
Santa-Cruz, the Chevalier de Folard and Maurice de Saxe, the latter being also a 
soldier of considerable ability. What he does not explain is how the British Army 
seems relatively unaffected by the debates between the supporters of ordre mince 
(linear tactics) and ordre profound (columnar tactics), which mainly concerned the 
French and Prussians for most of the eighteenth century.39 This is not to detract from 
                                                          
35
 Chandler, Art of Warfare, p. 9. 
36
 Chandler, Art of Warfare, pp. 116-19. 
37
 Chandler, Art of Warfare, p. 120. 
38
 Chandler, Art of Warfare, p. 118. 
39
 Chandler, Art of Warfare, p. 130. 
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what is a comprehensive and sound introduction to the nature of warfare and its 
conduct at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and which introduces some of 
the trends that would continue right through the century. 
 
Modern military history dealing with the wars of the middle of the eighteenth century 
that involved Britain is almost without exception straight narrative accounts or 
biographies.40 Rex Whitworth supplies more examples of British infantry superior 
firepower, echoing the comments of Black and McLynn. In his account of Fontenoy 
he writes: ‘Replying with disciplined and deadly volleys they shattered both French 
lines in succession,’ and that due to this firepower ‘two regiments of French cavalry, 
Noailles and the Carabiniers, were almost entirely destroyed’.41 In his biography of 
the Duke of Cumberland, Whitworth is not entirely uncritical of the British infantry. He 
writes that at Dettingen the first French cavalry charge ‘frightened the British Infantry 
into firing ineffectively and too soon,’ but he also attributes final victory to the 
‘discipline and courage’ of the same infantry and their ‘waiting to the last minute 
before firing’.42 When it comes to Cumberland’s role in the Jacobite rebellion of 
1745-1746 Whitworth makes an interesting statement. 
Cumberland was convinced that victory went to those who held their fire until 
the appropriate moment. It required nerve...it required training... Having 
analysed the enemy’s tactics at Prestonpans and Falkirk, Cumberland and his 
generals expected the rebels to adopt similar tactics again... Cumberland’s 
idea was...for the platoons to fire alternately.43  
Whitworth describes Cumberland’s analysis of the nature of the threat posed by the 
Jacobites’ tactics and his response to that specific threat, which was a variation in 
                                                          
40
 For example; Fred Anderson, Crucible of War (New York, 2000); Tom Pocock, Battle for Empire (London, 
1998); Rex Whitworth, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier (Oxford, 1958) and William Augustus, Duke of 
Cumberland  (Barnsley, 1992). 
41
 Whitworth, Ligonier, pp. 101-102. 
42
 Whitworth, Cumberland, p. 32. 
43
 Whitworth, Cumberland, p. 78. 
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normal tactics. This is one of the few statements by a modern historian not only of 
doctrine, but of tactical development. It also suggests that Cumberland played a 
significant role in determining how the British Army fought its battles. The implication 
of this is that whilst there was a steady development of the ways in which British 
Infantry delivered its fire, it was also capable of rapid adaptation to specific 
challenges. 
 
Of Britain’s wars of the middle of the eighteenth century, the one that has produced 
perhaps the most discussion is the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-1746. The most 
recent, major contribution to this work is that of Christopher Duffy in The ’45.44 This 
substantial study contains a wealth of information, including topological and 
meteorological, but adds little to our understanding of how the British Army, referred 
to throughout the book as the Hanoverian Army, defeated the Jacobite Army at 
Culloden. He claims, without any evidence, that ‘The Jacobites as a whole were 
better shots than their enemy,’ at the same time quoting a Jacobite as saying ‘the 
King’s troops having a great advantage over them in firing’.45 In his account of 
Culloden the devastating firepower of the British infantry is almost overlooked, Duffy 
being more concerned with extolling Jacobite achievements and bravery than giving 
the British Army any credit. Nor does he credit Cumberland with adapting the army’s 
standard tactics to deal with the specific threat posed by the Highland charge. 
 
                                                          
44
 Christopher Duffy, The ’45 (London, 2003). 
45
 Duffy, The ’45, pp.117-118. 
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A more detailed account of how the British Army conducted itself during the rebellion 
is to be found in Reid’s 1745, A Military History of the Last Jacobite Rising.46 He 
gives due credit to the firepower of the British Infantry at Culloden and gives a brief  
description of platoon firing, but says little about Cumberland’s innovations nor gives 
any real detail of the management of the infantry when delivering fire.47  However, 
this is a narrative history and the detail supplied is sufficient to assist the general 
reader more interested in what happened than in how or why. 
 
The ability of the British Army to adapt is a theme taken up and examined closely by 
Stephen Brumwell in his book Redcoats.48 This covers the period of the Seven Years 
War, but looking specifically at the experience of the British Army fighting in the 
Americas. Brumwell sets out to examine the ‘American Army’, as he calls it, and its 
development in the face of the challenges of campaigning in North America, an 
environment very different from the traditional fields of Flanders. In doing so he 
claims ‘the “American Army” acquired an ethos and tactical doctrine that set it apart 
from other British and European armies’.49 He examines the army’s early, disastrous 
setback at Monongahela and the tactical response to that.50 But for all the novelty of 
Indian fighting and developing skills in irregular warfare he still makes the statements 
that unlike France, ‘Britain had never doubted the superiority of fire over steel’ and 
‘the British Army in North America spared no pains to maximise its firepower’.51 
Indeed, he describes how the method of delivering fire was altered in the middle of 
the century, not least as a result of the influence of men such as James Wolfe. Wolfe 
                                                          
46
 Stuart Reid, 1745, A Military History of the Last Jacobite Rising (Staplehurst, 1996). 
47
 Reid, 1745, pp.190-192. 
48
 Stephen Brumwell, Redcoats, The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-1763, (Cambridge, 2002). 
49
 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 6. 
50
 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 201. 
51
 Brumwell, Redcoats, p. 195 and p. 247. 
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referred to platoon firing as ‘the impractical chequer’, but what he sought to replace it 
with also demonstrated a continued commitment to maximising effectiveness: ‘There 
is no necessity for firing very fast; a cool well-levelled fire, with the pieces carefully 
loaded, is much more destructive and formidable than the quickest fire in 
confusion.’52 The results of Wolfe’s doctrine were clearly demonstrated on the Plains 
of Abraham in front of Quebec where a French army was once again overwhelmed 
by the firepower of British infantry. Thus we have evidence of a writer not only 
sustaining the idea of British superiority in firepower, but arguing that while 
methodology might change, the objective remained the same and the commitment 
unwavering. 
 
The influence on the British Army of James Wolfe is also a theme of Reid’s Wolfe.53 
In his preface he states that he will be taking a different approach from Wolfe’s 
earlier biographers because, in order to understand Wolfe’s career it is ‘necessary to 
examine the British Army of the mid-18th century’. He adds: ‘Consequently this book 
is as much about the Georgian army and its officers and men as it is about James 
Wolfe.’54 With regard to how the Georgian army fought Reid writes that he has 
sought to establish, amongst other aspects of the army and Wolfe’s career, ‘what 
was the tactical thinking of his [Wolfe’s] day and how did he work within its 
constraints and go on to develop his own, ultimately very influential, ideas about 
infantry combat’.55 From this one might expect a fairly detailed analysis of the nature 
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of British infantry tactics and doctrine in the mid-eighteenth century, how they were 
applied and how they developed and changed.  
 
Reid opens his section on ‘Fighting Tactics’ with the statement that in the early 
1740s when Wolfe began his military career ‘British infantry tactics centred almost 
exclusively around the lethal application of firepower.’56 He subsequently gives a 
fairly superficial description of platoon firing but is rather scathing about its 
effectiveness, basing his opinion solely on events at Dettingen in 1743. It is to Wolfe 
that Reid attributes the introduction of alternate firing that replaced the use of 
firings.57 Whilst there is no doubt that Wolfe was an advocate of alternate fire, Reid 
does not make a compelling case for Wolfe being responsible for its, initially 
unofficial, adoption. However, Reid does discuss the way infantry tactics and 
doctrine were developing using Wolfe’s instructions to his own battalion as an 
example. More interestingly, in the light of comments by writers on later periods, to 
be discussed below, Reid makes a very definite statement about a change in 
doctrine with regard to the use of the bayonet.  
Increasingly during Wolfe’s time, British infantry tactics shifted away from 
platooning to a much more aggressive firing of just one or two big volleys, 
before charging with the bayonet.58 
Reid further states categorically that ‘it was Wolfe’s volley and bayonet tactics, first 
described in December 1755, which formed the cornerstone of British infantry tactics 
in the Peninsular War and at Waterloo’.59  
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The American War of Independence falls outside the scope of this work, but it is 
worth considering some of the writing about the war for the light it casts on modern 
views of the preceding periods. The theme of the use of the bayonet is taken up by 
Matthew Spring in With Zeal and with Bayonets Only. In his introduction he writes: 
Yet if the purpose of all armies is to fight, and if therefore the most 
fundamental task facing the military historian is arguably to study combat, it is 
perhaps ironic that we should still have relatively little detailed analysis of the 
way in which the respective armies operated on campaign and in action.60 
He then sets out to demonstrate that ‘the King’s troops won the vast majority of their 
battlefield engagements in America because they tailored their conventional tactical 
methods intelligently to local conditions – very much as they had done in similar 
circumstances during the French and Indian War’.61 He supports the view of British 
firepower held by many authors. 
Although most foreign commentators probably had a modest opinion of the 
eighteenth-century British Army as a whole, during the course of the War of 
the Spanish Succession, the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven 
Years War, the redcoats earned a reputation for being among the best 
infantry in the world. This reputation rested largely upon the relative 
effectiveness of their musketry.62 
And again: ‘By the end of the Seven Years War British Infantry regiments had 
cemented their long standing reputation for being among the most formidable 
practitioners of fire tactics in Europe.’63 Spring also identifies changes that had taken 
place in the doctrine of firepower: ‘The replacement of the complicated “platoon fire” 
system that had been used since Marlborough’s day by the simpler Prussian-
inspired “alternate fire” system during the early years of the Seven Years War can 
only have enhanced the effectiveness of British musketry.’64 
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 Having established the traditional British doctrine Spring goes on to demonstrate the 
sudden change from this to a reliance on the bayonet. He explains this as resulting 
from the tactics of the rebels: ‘Early in the war the rebels’ predilection for fighting 
behind hard cover triggered a shift in British infantry tactics from the traditional 
reliance on fire to speed and shock.’65 He then shows that this new tactic was 
adhered to even when battles were fought in the open. He explains that ‘it usually 
proved unnecessary to engage in costly fire fights to “soften” up rebel troops, most of 
whom lacked the discipline to repel bayonet rushes with firepower’. 66 
 
Spring observes that: 
few writers seem to be aware that the heavily shock-orientated tactics that the 
King’s troops employed against the rebels were distinctly at odds with 
contemporary European practice. Moreover when British officers in America 
strove “to inculcate the use of the bayonet, and a total reliance on that 
weapon” they were turning their backs on a long-standing British tradition of 
dependence on fire tactics as the primary element of infantry warfare.67 
Spring gives an excellent account of tactical doctrine and its development in a 
particular war. What he does not do is consider what effect, if any, this had on the 
rest of the British Army not engaged in the American War of Independence, but that 
is outside the scope of his work. 
 
Spring convincingly establishes the single, effective volley followed by the assault 
with the bayonet as a tactic that became established during the American War of 
Independence. In arguing this he is at odds with Nosworthy who claims the 
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development for the period of the Napoleonic Wars.68 But this also begs the 
question: is Spring correct in his assessment that a reliance on the bayonet was 
new? Is it possible that there was a much older, longer lasting doctrine that relied on 
firepower, of whatever duration required, to soften up an enemy before finishing the 
combat with a bayonet assault? Reid’s suggestion that this adoption of the bayonet 
took place during Wolfe’s time has already been mentioned. Earlier still, Bland in his 
1727 Treatise of Military Discipline quite clearly gives instructions on when and how 
a battalion is not to fire by platoons but to give all its fire at once and immediately 
charge with the bayonet.69 He also describes the Dutch method of alternate fire, 
concluding with ‘and when they come up close to the Enemy, they give them their 
whole fire, as the English do’.70 Writing in 1755 Wolfe instructed: ‘If the battalion is to 
attack another battalion of equal force, and of like number of ranks, and the country 
quite open, it is highly probable, that, after firing a few rounds, they will be 
commanded to charge with their bayonets, for which the officers and men should be 
prepared.’71 Since Bland based his writings on the experience of the War of Spanish 
Succession, and was a major influence on the tactics of the War of Austrian 
Succession and the Seven Years War, and given the clarity of Wolfe’s intentions, 
one has to consider the possibility that the application of effective firepower followed 
by an assault with the bayonet, if necessary, was always, during those wars, the 
British infantry’s preferred tactic.  
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This use of the bayonet by British infantry in the open field is something that 
Nosworthy does not mention in his book, The Anatomy of Victory, which deals with a 
period of three major wars, the War of Spanish Succession, the War of Austrian 
Succession and the Seven Years War. He does say that they used the bayonet, ‘but 
only when the enemy being attacked was ensconced in an entrenchment or 
otherwise-strengthened position’.72 He gives two examples, the attack on the village 
of Blenheim and the storming of the Schellenberg. The Schellenberg in particular 
was noted for the ferocity of the hand-to-hand combat.73 This suggests that there 
was no unwillingness to close with the enemy and it is difficult to accept that this 
could not be transferred to the open battlefield. Chandler in The Art of Warfare in the 
Age of Marlborough also makes no mention of the British making use of bayonet 
charges. One possible explanation for the overlooking of the use of the bayonet 
might be the lack of instruction in the manuals on how to fight with it. Houlding 
observes: ‘Bayonet drill was, curiously, rather neglected in the eighteenth century... 
From Marlborough’s campaigns onwards it was the touch-stone of British tactical 
thinking that heavy fire was all-important; and so it was doctrine perhaps, as much 
as indifference, that dictated the army’s approach.’74 Drill, however, does not equate 
with usage and in the light of this it must be asked if the doctrine, tactics and actions 
of the British infantry on the battlefields of those three wars have been correctly 
interpreted.  
 
The evidence provided by the military historians considered here is insufficient to 
make an assessment of whether or not the doctrine of effective firepower combined 
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with a readiness to close to close quarter combat was applied during the period from 
the start of the English Civil Wars to the end of the Nine Years War. However, the 
possibility would seem to exist that this doctrine could extend that far back. For 
instance, describing infantry combat during the English Civil Wars Sir Charles Firth 
wrote: ‘Usually the musketeers gave a couple of volleys, and then the pikemen 
levelled their pikes and charged home.’75 He makes it clear that the musketeers 
would also charge, using their muskets as clubs 
 
There is no doubt that, whether writing about a single battle, a particular war or a 
longer period, the firepower of British infantry is considered by military historians to 
be at the root of British success on the battlefield. It is also well established by those 
same historians that throughout this period British infantry enjoyed considerable and 
sustained success. There were setbacks, such as at Monongahela and Prestonpans, 
but these were under novel circumstances, which the infantry quickly adapted to and 
then triumphed over. In the case of Monongahela it has been argued that defeat 
resulted from a failure to apply current tactical doctrine properly, rather than a failure 
of the doctrine of firepower.76 Following Prestonpans the British infantry dealt very 
effectively with the Highland charge at Culloden. 
 
There is a wealth of modern published material concerning the firearms used by the 
British infantry giving detailed technical data including some information on 
performance, mainly theoretical under test conditions, and also ammunition.77 There 
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is, however, a lack of information about how these weapons were actually handled at 
an individual level, how they were loaded and fired. Above the level of the individual 
soldier and weapon there is also little sound information available about the way that 
individuals were brought together and drilled and managed on the battlefield in order 
to maximise the effectiveness of the firepower produced. When this is combined with 
the incomplete or even inaccurate information published on tactical and doctrinal 
development it is clear that the traditional view of British infantry dominating 
battlefields from 1642 to 1815 by the employment of superior firepower, whilst not an 
incorrect conclusion, is one reached on the basis of perceived performance rather 
than any deep understanding of how it was achieved. 
 
To summarise the evidence presented by modern historians, it would seem that 
British infantry firepower was a dominant force on the battlefield during the period 
under consideration. It is also clear that there is widespread confusion amongst 
those historians concerning the nature of the underlying tactical and combat doctrine 
that underpinned that dominance and little understanding, appreciation or analysis of 
the manner in which it was achieved. Not only is there confusion, but in fact, despite 
the claims of several historians, there has been little attempt to examine closely and 
to understand the origins, development, mechanics and management of combat 
techniques and any underlying tactical doctrine. In the light of this it must be asked if 
the doctrine, tactics and actions of the British infantry during this period have been 
correctly interpreted. For instance, it is clear that there is considerable confusion 
about the relationship between the use of firepower and the use of the bayonet 
throughout the period under consideration. 
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In order to identify the development of the tactical doctrine and combat techniques of 
British infantry through the period from 1642 to 1765, both doctrine and techniques 
will be analysed to ascertain their effect on the actual combat performance of the 
infantry. To do this it will be necessary to take a new approach as neither ‘old’ nor 
‘new’ military history have proved able to tackle the question of how things were 
done. 
 
Until the founding of the Royal Military College by the Duke of York in 1801 there 
was no formalised training for officers, a new young officer learnt his trade ‘on the 
job’ with his regiment. As Houlding puts it: 
With the assistance of brother subalterns or of a senior NCO he learned how 
to perform the manual and platoon exercises of the firelock or carbine, and 
the great variety of movements, commands, and posts it was the subaltern’s 
duty to learn, to perform, or to occupy when the unit was carrying on its basic 
training.78   
Wolfe considered Bland’s Treatise of Military Discipline ‘indispensible to the military 
education of young officers’.79 This is the knowledge that a junior officer in the British 
Army required in order to carry out his duties, but many historians endeavour to 
understand and explain the functioning of the army without a similar level of 
knowledge. Without this knowledge it is considerably harder to understand why 
things happened the way they did. This, of course, does not prevent the production 
of accurate narrative accounts of battles and campaigns, particularly as these tend to 
be based on the accounts of officers and men who did have the professional 
knowledge to understand events. Similarly other aspects of military history, such as 
training, finance, uniforms, equipment, strategy and social history aspects can be 
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effectively addressed without this knowledge. Yet military historians risk 
misunderstanding or even completely misinterpreting those accounts written by 
professionals because they do not share the same practical knowledge of how things 
were done and managed. In turn this gives rise to the danger of drawing incorrect 
conclusions about tactics and doctrine.  
 
What will be employed in this work is an approach that considers the procedures and 
practices of soldiers in a given period and analyses those in order understand how 
things were done and, in turn, why events unfolded as they did. In effect it requires 
the researcher to acquire a similar level of knowledge to that of, at least, a junior 
officer of the army under consideration. This practical military history approach 
provides the understanding of warfare that is required to be sure of correctly 
interpreting descriptions of events, of understanding not just what happened in a 
simple narrative way, but why particular actions were executed and why they were, 
or were not, successful. It allows the historian to be able to judge what courses of 
action were open but not followed and thus to analyse decision making. 
 
The knowledge necessary to this approach will be gathered by the study and 
analysis of the drill manuals and similar guides to the conduct of war relevant to the 
period dealt with in each chapter. Some of these were published and are readily 
accessible to military historians, although little used or understood. Others exist only 
in manuscript form. It is by a close analysis of the differences between successive 
manuals that developments can be identified, although the manuals do not tell the 
reader why the changes were made or what their effect was. That has to be deduced 
by understanding what the difference in the words translates into in differences in the 
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actions of an individual soldier or of a unit. Once that is achieved it becomes possible 
to analyse descriptions of combat that are to be found in the diaries and letters, 
published and unpublished, of combatants. This, in turn, allows an assessment to be 
made of the effectiveness of the doctrine and combat techniques of the infantry, 
leading to an explanation of how British infantry gained and maintained a battlefield 
superiority over their enemies. 
 
Between 1642 and 1765 British troops were engaged in six major wars, but it must 
be remembered that until the Act of Union of 1707 there was no British Army, rather 
there were two separate organisations, the English Army and the Scottish Army. 
However, after the English Civil Wars, and particularly following the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688, this separation was more of a political and financial one than an 
operational one. As each of the six wars saw its own particular developments and 
challenges each will be dealt with in turn. In addition, one chapter will address one 
particular, very important development for British infantry, but one that took place 
largely elsewhere in Europe, that is the introduction of platoon firing. 
 
The English Civil Wars is the first period of warfare dealt with and it is during that 
series of wars that a distinctly British tactical doctrine for infantry can first be 
identified.80 This chapter will consider the origins and nature of that doctrine, how it 
was employed during the Interregnum and after the Restoration of the Monarchy in 
1660, and how it subsequently developed only to be briefly abandoned. 
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The next chapter will deal with the origins of platoon firing. Until now these have 
been subject to some speculation, but these origins have now been identified, as has 
the earliest form that it took, which is described and analysed here for the first time. 
The following chapter will cover the period from the glorious Revolution and through 
the reign of William and Mary and the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, during which 
period British infantry were introduced to platoon firing as a way of delivering their 
firepower, and which was perfectly suited to their tactical doctrine. 
 
Chapter five will cover developments during the War of Spanish Succession, 1701-
1714, when the Duke of Marlborough won a succession of battles against the 
French: Blenheim, 1704, Ramilles, 1706, Oudenarde, 1708 and Malplaquet, 1709. 
Key developments in the organisation of platoon firing will be identified for the first 
time and their impact analysed. 
 
Chapter six will show how the long period of peace from 1714 to the outbreak of the 
War of Austrian Succession, 1740-1748, had a detrimental effect on the infantry’s 
firepower and the consequences of that in the Battle of Dettingen, 1743. Analysis of 
subsequent battles, Fontenoy, 1745 and Laffeldt, 1747, will show how the infantry 
recovered from that early difficulty and will establish the effectiveness of the tactical 
doctrine of the infantry and its application. Analysis of the actions of the Jacobite 
Rebellion of 1745-1746 and the Battle of Culloden, 1746, will demonstrate the ability 
of the infantry to adapt to challenge while continuing to adhere to the same 
underlying doctrine. 
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Chapters seven and eight will deal with the Seven Years War in Europe and the 
French and Indian War in North America. Although both part of the same global 
conflict, these two wars had very different characteristics. In Europe formal, linear 
battles in open countryside was the norm with the British infantry continuing to seek, 
and finding ways to further improve the effectiveness of their firepower, 
concentrating on the practical while in the rest of Europe there was considerable, 
theoretical debate on the best way to fight. By contrast, the North American theatre 
presented very different challenges, which were met with different techniques. It will 
be demonstrated, however, that despite those differences, British infantry in both 
theatres continued to hold to the same tactical doctrine that had been developed in 
the seventeenth century. 
 
Throughout this work the term British infantry is used to describe the subject of the 
work. This is, of necessity, something of a catch-all phrase. As already pointed out, 
until 1707 there were two separate army establishments in Britain. To further 
complicate matters, during the eighteenth century many regiments were posted to 
Ireland, on the Irish Establishment, a political and financial expediency. With regard 
to the regiments themselves, they contained men of all the four home nations and 
others. The terms used to describe the soldiers also varied throughout the period 
under consideration. Regiments of the English Civil Wars consisted of Pike and 
Shot, that is pikemen and musketeers. During the second half of the seventeenth 
century the pikeman gradually disappeared and the grenadier appeared. This was a 
soldier trained and equipped to use hand grenades and who quickly became the elite 
element of any regiment or army. They were distinguished by their tall mitre caps, 
not unlike a bishop’s cope, and within a regiment they were formed into a single 
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grenadier company. The men of the other companies wore broad brimmed hats, 
later cocked hats, and became known as hatmen and their companies as hat 
companies.
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2: The Age of the Matchlock, 1642 to 1688 
 
 
From 1618 to 1648 most of Europe was embroiled in the Thirty Years War, a war 
notable for its brutality. Whilst a significant number of individuals from the British 
Isles took part in this war as volunteers, particularly from Scotland, England and 
Scotland themselves were not overly involved. The last English military foray into 
Europe before the Civil Wars, the expedition to the Isle de la Rhe in 1627, was a 
complete fiasco. Nor were things any better in the Bishops Wars of 1639-40 between 
England and Scotland when Charles I’s English army suffered a humiliating defeat at 
Newburn in 1640.  At the outbreak of Civil War in Britain in 1642 there was no 
standing army North or South of the border. Neither England nor Scotland could be 
said to be countries with any sort of military standing. However, by the end of the 
Civil War Britain had produced an army that in a few campaigns in the 1650s won a 
considerable reputation amongst European neighbours who had been at war almost 
continuously since 1618. Fighting with the French against the Spanish in 1658 the 
English infantry were described as having ‘such a reputation in this army that nothing 
can be more’.81 This chapter will first examine the development of the application of 
firepower during the English Civil War and how that contributed to the establishment 
of that reputation. The second part will examine the development of fire tactics 
between the Restoration of 1660 and the Revolution of 1688, a period of relative 
military inactivity, but when it is possible to trace continuing attempts to further 
improve the ways in which infantry delivered their firepower. 
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The most common firearm of the infantry during the English Civil Wars, and 
throughout Europe in the mid-seventeenth century was the matchlock musket. In 
England in 1630 the dimensions of a musket barrel had been set at a length of 48 
inches and of 12 bore.82 Despite moves in 1639 to introduce a musket with a barrel 
length of 42 inches this was to remain the standard size of a musket barrel 
throughout the Civil Wars.83 The procedure for loading and firing a matchlock musket 
and how to organise and manage formed bodies of musketeers was described in a 
number of drill books. One of the most popular, running to a total of six editions 
between 1635 and 1661, was William Barriffe’s Military Discipline.84 The drill 
contained in Barrife was based on that developed at the end of the sixteenth century 
in the Netherlands by Maurice of Nassau and which was to become the universal 
drill of the Thirty Years War. The full matchlock musket drill as detailed by Barriffe 
consisted of sixty different movements, each with its own command, of which thirty 
dealt with the process of loading and firing. The gunpowder was carried in small, 
cylindrical wooden or tin boxes on a bandolier, usually twelve in number, with each 
box containing powder for one shot. Part of the complexity of the drill was due to the 
need to keep separate the powder and the means of igniting it, a length of burning 
slowmatch. The musketeer in Barriffe’s drill was also hampered by a musket rest, 
used to take the weight of the musket and steady it when firing.  
 
The drawbacks of the matchlock were itemised by the Earl of Orrery when he 
compared it to the fire-lock or flintlock musket that was in limited use at the time.  
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For with the Fire-lock musket you have only to Cock, and you are prepared to 
Shoot; but with your Match-lock, you have several motions [to fire it], the least 
of which is as long a performing, as but that one of the other, and oftentimes 
more hazardous; besides, if you Fire not the Match-lock Musket as soon as 
you have blown your Match, (which often, especially in Hedge Fights, and in 
Sieges, you cannot do) you must a second time blow your Match, or the 
Ashes it gathers, hinders it from Firing. 85 
 
Orrery was describing how the flintlock only required the cock, holding a flint, to be 
pulled back to full cock for it to be ready to fire. The matchlock, in comparison, 
required the end of the burning slowmatch to be blown to red hot and free of ash, it 
was then placed in the serpent or cock of the gun, the priming pan cover was 
opened by hand and only then could the trigger be pulled to fire the musket. He went 
on to enumerate the risks posed by the burning match, which could ignite the powder 
in the soldiers’ bandoleers or even in barrels of powder when they were refilling their 
bandoleers. Added to this the wooden boxes on the bandoleers clattered together 
noisily, giving away the presence of musketeers at night, and both the match and 
powder in an open pan were susceptible to the weather. Rain could dampen both 
causing a misfire and the wind could produce dangerous sparks from the match. 
With the flintlock pulling the trigger caused the flint to strike sparks and opened the 
pan instantaneously. With the matchlock there was an inevitable time delay while the 
priming pan was opened by hand and the trigger pulled to lower the burning end of 
the match into it. The match itself was a problem as considerable quantities were 
needed, it attracted moisture thus reducing its viability and it was difficult for soldiers 
to keep dry. 86 
   
                                                          
85
 Roger, Earl of Orrery, A Treatise of the Art of War (London, 1677), pp. 30-31. 
86
 Orrery, Art of War, pp. 31-32. 
  
 
32 
 
The resultant rate of fire was slow as the musketeer juggled musket, rest, priming 
flask, match, powder and ball. Some measures were taken to speed things up from 
the very beginning. On the battlefield soldiers carried musket balls in their mouths 
and just spat them down the barrel to avoid fumbling for them in the small ball bag 
on the bandolier and in action the orders given for firing were reduced to just three, 
‘make ready’, ‘present’ (that is they levelled their muskets at the enemy) and ‘fire’.87 
After firing, reloading was carried out without any further orders. However, in order 
for a unit of musketeers to maintain a reasonable rate of fire as a unit it was 
necessary to organise them in a series of ranks that took turns to fire and then reload 
while the other ranks were firing, the number of ranks depending on the length of 
time taken to reload. According to Turner the requisite depth was initially ten ranks, 
Barriffe required eight and for most of the Civil Wars the usual number was six.88 
 
Figure 2.1: An infantry company drawn up for drill according to Barriffe.89 
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In firing the movements of the musketeers were carefully choreographed and fell into 
two main types, firing by files and firing by ranks. Barriffe described these and their 
numerous variations using a single infantry company for illustrative purposes. He 
showed two small blocks of musketeers in ranks of four with eight men in each file, 
separated by a central block of eight files of pikemen, each of eight men.90 Barriffe’s 
infantry company was equally divided into musketeers and pikemen, although during 
the Civil Wars the usual ratio was two musketeers to one pikeman.91  
 
At the outbreak of the Civil War a large number of troops had to be raised and 
trained quickly by both sides and as a result a number of abbreviated drill manuals 
were produced that reduced drill down to a practical minimum. From these it is 
possible to identify which of the many firings detailed by Barriffe and others, such as 
Ward, were actually considered useful and practical.92 In Scotland, General Lesley 
produced a drill that was subsequently published in London in 1642.93 Like Barriffe 
he specified files eight deep. Another drill manual claimed to be A True Description 
of the Discipline of War used by the Earl of Newcastle and Prince Rupert.94 The drill 
described in this manual made use of files that were only five deep. Of all the various 
ways of firing, Lesley’s manual only contained one, firing by two ranks advanced, 
which Newcastle’s manual also had, along with firing by files. 
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Firing by two ranks advanced was probably the commonest method of firing found in 
drill books generally and its selection for these two manuals further supports a case 
for it being the preferred way of firing at the start of the civil wars. In this manoeuvre 
the front two ranks of a body of musketeers marched forwards ten or twenty paces 
under the command of a sergeant. The front rank then presented and fired, faced to 
the left or right and marched in single file to the rear of the body, each man falling in 
at the rear of his file and reloading. As soon as the first rank was out of the way the 
second rank fired and then marched to the rear to reload. Once the second rank had 
fired the third and fourth ranks began to march forward to where the first two had 
halted to fire, and then fired in their turn. This firing was also carried out without the 
musketeers advancing, in which case each rank in turn simply stepped forward to 
the front of the body before firing and filing off to the rear, this was known as firing 
maintaining ground. If the body advanced slowly while the musketeers fired then 
each pair of ranks advanced further than the previous pair.95  
 
A second method of firing was that of forlorn files, which is found in Newcastle’s 
manual. In this case individual files marched forward as far as required, wheeled to 
march across the face of the unit and then, by halting and facing the enemy, the file 
became a rank. After firing each file marched back to its original place to reload. As a 
variation on this the file could stay as a file and each man in turn fired and marched 
to the back of the file to reload. Because of the time spent marching forwards and 
backwards both of these, particularly the latter, produced relatively low volumes of 
fire.96 
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When firing either by ranks or by files there was a three foot gap between both the 
ranks and the files, which was judged to be the space required by a musketeer to be 
able to reload safely.97 A third method, firing by introduction, required the gap 
between files to be increased to six feet. The front rank fired and began to reload 
where it stood. Then the rear rank men marched up through the gaps between the 
files and placed themselves in front of the front rank to fire. They in turn were 
followed by the fifth rank and so on until the front rank was at the back and had 
reloaded. As an alternative the front rank fired and the whole body moved forward, 
the second rank placing themselves at the front, then the third and so on. As the 
amount of movement required of each musketeer was less than in the other two 
methods, this method may have produced a higher rate of fire, but the fire produced 
was spread over a wider front. Barriffe, however, was critical of it. ‘I will not dispute 
how useful it is; but sure I am, it is over-balanced with danger.’98 Although he did not 
say why he considered it dangerous it is possible that he was concerned about 
accidents as musketeers with lit match moved between others reloading and also 
that the less dense formation was more vulnerable to attack. 
 
What was noticeably absent from the pre-war and early war drill manuals was almost 
any mention of firing in three ranks. This had been developed by Gustavus Adolphus 
of Sweden and famously and effectively employed at the battle of Leipzg in 1631. It 
was, however, just one of the ways of firing that the Swedes used. The other 
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methods, by files, ranks and divisions were same as described by Barrife.99 There 
was no lack of opportunity to know about it as number of English and Scottish 
soldiers served in the Swedish army and details of the battle were widely available 
through such publications as The Swedish Intelligencer and The Swedish 
Discipline.100 These also contained information on Swedish tactical formations that 
found its way into the 1639 edition of Barriffe. Barriffe wrote that the Swedes fired by 
‘salves, powring on showers of Lead, by firing two or three Ranks together’, but that 
is all he says.101 There was no explanation or any instructions on how to carry it out. 
It was, however, something that would become a trademark of British infantry. 
 
An infantry regiment of the English Civil Wars usually consisted of ten companies, 
each of pikemen and musketeers although these two different types of soldier did not 
fight together in their companies. When a regiment was drawn up for battle it was, 
depending on its strength, formed into one or two battalia. This was a linear 
formation first developed by Maurice of Nassau at the turn of the century in Holland. 
A battalia consisted of three divisions of approximately equal size, two of musketeers 
flanking a central division of pikemen. The divisions of musketeers were in turn 
organised into sub-divisions of between four to six files, which was the same size as 
a sub-division of a company’s musketeers when drilling as a company. Between 
each sub-division a gap of six feet was kept for musketeers to march down to the 
rear of their sub-division. 
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The first major engagement of the English Civil Wars was Edgehill, fought on 23 
October 1642. The Parliamentarian army formed in what would become the 
conventional manner based on the Dutch linear form. The Royalist army formed up 
according to the far more complex Swedish form, further evidence of knowledge in 
England of Swedish tactics.102 However, there is no suggestion in any of the 
contemporary accounts that the Royalist musketeers employed the Swedish method 
of firing in three ranks, or salvee. This is not surprising as the decision to adopt 
Swedish tactics was taken on the morning of the battle, leaving no time for 
instruction and training in the Swedish salvee. 
 
A number of eyewitness accounts provide evidence of the performance and 
effectiveness of musketeers in this battle. One was written by the future James II.103 
He described how both sides opened fire as soon as they were in range with the 
royalists advancing firing while the parliamentarians held their ground. Eventually 
they were so close that hand to hand fighting broke out, however, neither side was 
able to overcome and defeat the other and a stalemate ensued with both sides firing 
away at each other until night fell. James II commented that this was 
a thing so very extraordinary, that nothing less then so many witnesses as 
were there present, could make it credible; nor can any other reason be given 
for it, but the naturall courage of English men, which prompted them to 
maintain their ground, tho the rawness and unexperience of both partys had 
not furnished them with skill to make the best use of their advantages.104 
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Neither side had the skill or experience to overcome the resistance of the other, the 
firing was sustained, but not sufficiently effective as to bring about a conclusion to 
the combat. 
 
Elsewhere at Edgehill the insufficiency of firepower left infantry vulnerable when 
cavalry acted in unison with infantry. A Parliamentarian account described the effect 
of a cavalry and infantry attack on Royalist infantry. 
But their foot...came up all in Front...that part of it which was on their Left, and 
towards our Right Wing, came on very gallantly to the Charge, and were as 
gallantly received, and Charged by Sir Philip Stapleton and Sir William 
Balford’s Regiment of Horse, assisted with the Lord Robert’s, and Sir William 
Constable’s Regiments of Foot, who did it so home thrice together, that they 
forced all the Musqueteers, of two of their left Regiments, to run in and 
shrowd themselves within their Pikes, not daring to shoot a shot.105 
The account of James II also recorded these events, claiming that the royalist 
regiments ‘were not broken by this charge, yet they were put into some disorder’.106 
However, it is further evidence that infantry alone were not able to overcome other 
infantry.  
 
Both James II’s and the Parliamentarian accounts, written by a number of senior 
officers, described the battle petering out as night fell and ammunition ran out. ‘After 
this neither party press’d the other, but contented themselves to keep their ground, 
and continued fireing, till night put an end to the dispute.’107 ‘By this time it grew so 
late and dark, and to say the truth, our ammunition at this present was all spent.’108 
The accounts of the battle make it clear that both sides had suffered problems with 
ammunition running out. Barriffe made no mention of any arrangements for the 
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resupply of ammunition, or how it was to be managed except in his description of 
Swedish formations. Here he simply wrote that the musketeers to the rear of the 
formations were there ‘either to guard the Baggage or Cannon, to be Convoyes to 
bring ammunition or victuals to the rest; or to continue a reserve to waite upon all 
occasions’.109 Elton simply echoed Barriffe when he wrote that regiments should 
have ‘always in the Reer a sufficient number of Muskettiers for the guard of the 
Baggage, Cannon, or to be Convoys for to convey Ammunition and Victual to the 
rest of their fellows’.110 It is clear that there were attempts at Edgehill at resupply, a 
Royalist soldier ‘in fetching Powder (where a Magazin was) clapt his Hand carelessly 
into a Barrel of Powder, with his Match lighted betwixt his Fingers, whereby much 
Powder was blown up, and many kill’d’.111 The inability of either side effectively to 
resupply their infantry with ammunition during a battle further hampered attempts to 
achieve a decision through the use of firepower. 
 
Whilst the precise details of the sequence of events at Edgehill continue to be 
debated there is no doubt that the outcome was inconclusive. This is due in no small 
part to the inability of the infantry of either side to achieve outright success on their 
own. The accounts of the battle suggest not only that there were prolonged firefights, 
to the extent that ammunition ran low or ran out on both sides, but also that these 
were conducted in such a manner that they failed to achieve a decision. There is 
little doubt that the Parliamentarian infantry attained a degree of superiority over the 
Royalists, but not sufficient to break them.112  
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This leads to the conclusion that the fire delivery methods used at the beginning of 
the Civil Wars and at Edgehill, firing by ranks advancing and firing by forlorn files, 
were not capable of generating sufficient firepower to force a conclusion in a firefight 
or cause sufficient disruption to ensure success in hand to hand combat. In addition 
the ability to generate sufficient firepower to achieve victory was hampered by the 
amount of ammunition available, usually twelve rounds a man. In the aftermath of 
Edgehill there is an absence of evidence of any discussion of the methodology of 
delivering infantry firepower, or of any orders or instructions to change, by either 
side. It is necessary to look at the actions that followed Edgehill for evidence of 
change and increased effectiveness. 
 
Just over two weeks after Edgehill, Charles I made an abortive advance on London 
that ended with the stand-off at Turnham Green, the closest he got to recovering the 
capital. During his advance there was a small but bloody skirmish at Brentford. The 
Royalist John Gwynne describes how the assault on the Parliamentarian forces in 
Brentford drove them ‘to the open field, with a resolute and expeditious fighting, that 
after once firing suddenly to advance up to push of pikes and the butt end of 
muskets, which proved so fatal to Holles and his butchers and dyers that day’.113 The 
key words here are ‘resolute and expeditious’, suggesting that the tactics used were 
intended to force a conclusion. Gwynne also recorded that at the second battle of 
Newbury in 1644 one Royalist regiment received orders ‘not to give fire upon the 
enemy until they came within a pikes length of him’.114 Whereas at Edgehill the 
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infantry had begun to fire once within musket range they now began to reserve their 
fire until the range was minimal, both on the offensive, as at Brentford, and on the 
defensive as at Newbury.  At the battle of Cheriton in 1644 Slingsby recorded how 
Royalist infantry fought off a cavalry attack, ‘the foote keeping theire ground in a 
close body, not firing till within two pikes length, and then three rankes att a time, 
after turning up the butt end of theire muskets, charging theire pikes, and standing 
close, preserv’d themselves and slew many of the enemy’.115 This event not only 
demonstrates fire being held to a minimal range, but that musketeers were able see 
off cavalry, in contrast to events at Edgehill.  
 
Precisely how this change in combat technique came about is uncertain. Using a 
Swedish formation for the Royal Army at Edgehill was a suggestion that had 
originated with the Patrick Ruthven, Earl of Forth, who had fought under Gustavus 
Adolphus. It is possible that the impetus for the change came from Scottish officers 
in Charles’ army who had served in the Swedish army. The descriptions of 
subsequent combat are similar to the description of Swedish infantry attacking other 
infantry at Breitenfeld in 1632. A Scottish officer there described how he reserved his 
fire until within pistol shot, fired just two vollies, each of three ranks, and then 
immediately attacked with musket butt and sword, defeating the enemy.116 
 
These developments can also be seen amongst Parliamentarian infantry. At the 
successful storming of Arundel in December 1643, by Sir William Waller’s 
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Parliamentarian army, Colonel Birch, having crossed the Royalist’s first line of 
fortifications, received a counter-attack. The account of what happened was written 
by Birch’s secretary and addressed directly to him.  
At this instant, the enemy spending their shot at too great a distance, your 
order was to horse and foote instantly to assault the enemy; your selfe with 
cheerfull speech assureing they would not stand, which proved accordinglie. 
For the enemy, feeling the force of shott poured on them with three ranks at a 
time, after short time gave ground, and your selfe entered the towne with 
them.117 
It is also interesting to note that the enemy was considered to have fired at too great 
a range. 
 
At the First Battle of Newbury, 1643, the Blew Regiment of the London Trained 
Bands was attacked by two regiments of Royalist cavalry. What happened was 
described by a Sergeant Foster in the Red Regiment. ‘Two regiments of the Kings 
Horse which stood upon their right flanke a far off, came fiercely upon them, and 
charged them two or three times, but were beat back with their Muskettiers, who 
gave them a most desperate charge, and made them flie.’118 Foster’s own regiment 
was similarly attacked. 
Then two regiments of the enemies horse, which stood upon our right Flank, 
came fiercely upon us, and so surrounded us, that we were forced to charge 
upon them in the front and reere, and both Flanks, which was performed by 
us with a great deal of courage and undauntedness of spirit, insomuch that 
wee made a great slaughter among them, and forced them to retreat’.119 
 
These accounts suggest that after Edgehill there was a fairly immediate and 
dramatic change in the way that first the royalist infantry and then the 
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parliamentarian infantry delivered their fire. Fire was reserved to a range of the 
length of a pike or two, which is five to ten metres, and then delivered by three ranks 
firing together. In the case of infantry on the offensive this was followed by an 
immediate assault. This change proved effective not only in the case of attacking 
other infantry, but also defensively against cavalry.  
 
In Yorkshire the Parliamentarian forces were commanded by Lord Fairfax and the 
infantry, in contrast to other Civil War armies, seem to have mainly consisted of 
musketeers.120 Why Lord Fairfax’s infantry was mainly made up of musketeers is not 
known, however many of the battles and skirmishes fought in the north of England 
were characterised by the presence of enclosures and hedges. It might simply be 
that these would hamper attempts by pikemen to close to hand to hand combat and 
consequently more reliance was laid on musketry. Whatever the explanation, the 
experiences of this army can demonstrate both the strengths and weaknesses of 
firepower during the Civil War. At the battle of Adwalton Moor in June, 1643, 
Fairfax’s infantry seems to have totalled some four thousand musketeers. In contrast 
the Royalist army commanded by the Earl of Newcastle had about the same number 
of infantry, but only half were musketeers, the rest being pikemen. 121 The Royalists 
had a considerable advantage in cavalry.122 Initially the Parliamentarian musketeers, 
fighting from hedge to hedge and through enclosures, gradually gained the upper 
hand. Newcastle started to give orders to retreat, but at this point the Royalists 
launched a counter attack with a large body of pikemen that turned the tide of the 
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battle. The reason for the success of this body of pikemen in amongst hedges and 
enclosures and against musketeers is not clear. The most likely explanation comes 
from Joseph Lister. 
But there was one major Jefferies keeper of the ammunition, who proving 
treacherous, and withholding it from the parliament men; who calling for it and 
being able to get none, were forced to slacken their firing, which the enemy 
perceiving, and very likely having private intelligence of, presently faced 
about, and fell upon Fairfax’s men with that fury that they soon regained their 
guns, and put them to the rout, slaying many of them.123 
 
How the musketeers delivered their fire in this battle is not clear from the accounts. 
However, what is clear is that the Parliamentarian musketeers were able to achieve 
superiority over their opponents and to neutralise any threat from the Royalist 
pikemen while they had an adequate supply of ammunition. It also suggests that a 
system for resupplying ammunition in battle was in place, but on this occasion broke 
down. A similar event happened at the battle of Tadcaster in December of 1642 
when after successfully holding off Newcastle’s forces Fairfax was forced to 
withdraw under cover of night for want of ammunition.124 Whether or not there was 
treachery at Adwalton, these incidents do emphasise the importance of the supply of 
ammunition and the difficulty of resupply on the battlefield.  
 
As with Adwalton, other accounts of the fighting in the north of England provide little 
evidence of how the musketeers from this region fought. They are commonly 
described as fighting from hedge to hedge, which may indicate that firepower alone 
was frequently relied on, with little hand to hand combat. Although there is no 
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indication of how that fire was delivered, without the option of hand to hand combat 
to finish off an opponent already shaken in a firefight, the firepower element alone 
had to have been effective enough to decide the outcome. The Parliamentarian 
musketeers at least were capable of holding their fire in defence in order to produce 
decisive firepower. At Tadcaster Sir Thomas Fairfax recorded how ‘Our Men reserv’d 
their shot, till they came near, which they did then dispose of to so good purpose, 
that the Enemy was forced to retire, and shelter themselves behind the Hedges.’125 
They were, however, also involved in the storming of a number of towns, where hand 
to hand combat is implicit in the accounts. At the storming of Leeds ‘The business 
was hotly disputed for almost two Hours; but the Enemy being beaten from their 
Works, and the Barricado’s into the Streets forced open, the Horse and Foot 
resolutely entered, and the Soldiers cast down their Arms, and rendered themselves 
Prisoners.’126 At the storming of Wakefield Sir Thomas Fairfax recalled that ‘after an 
Hour’s dispute, the Foot forced open a Barricado, where I entered with my own 
Troop’.127 From this it would appear that while the nature of the terrain in the north of 
England affected the way battles were fought there was an understanding of the 
need for musket fire to be delivered at close range in order to produce effective 
firepower and that this had to be combined with a readiness to engage in hand to 
hand combat to achieve a decision when necessary. 
 
Unfortunately there is little evidence concerning the performance of Lord Fairfax’s 
infantry at the battle of Marston Moor in 1644, after an initial success they mostly ran 
away. Five armies were engaged in that battle, which followed the raising of the 
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siege of York. There were two Royalist armies, The Earl of Newcastle’s, which had 
been defending York, and Prince Rupert’s, which had raised the siege. Opposed to 
them were the two Parliamentarian armies of Lord Fairfax and The Earl of 
Manchester, and, allied with the Parliamentarians, a Scots army, that had all been 
besieging York.128 What is evident about Marston Moor is that it was a particularly 
bloody affair. It lasted only an hour and a half, perhaps two, but well over four 
thousand were killed, mostly Royalist infantry. The language of the accounts reflects 
this ferocity and violence. One of Cromwell’s officers described ‘thinking the victory 
wholly ours and nothing to be done but to kill and take prisoners’.129 Another 
eyewitness of many battles wrote: ‘This victory was one of the greatest and most 
bloody since the warre begane.’130 These comments, the high casualties and the 
brevity of the battle when compared to Edgehill could be a reflection of the change in 
infantry fire tactics since the start of the war. 
 
At one point in the battle, part of the Scots infantry came under considerable 
pressure. The cavalry of the Royalist left wing ‘assaulted the Scottish Foot upon their 
Flancks, so that they had the Foot upon their front and the whole Cavalry of the 
enemies left wing to fight with, whom they encountered with so much courage and 
resolution, that having enterlined their Musquetiers with Pikemen they made the 
enemies Horse, notwithstanding for all the assistance they had of their foot, at two 
severall assaults to give ground’.131 The significance of this description is that this 
appears to be one of only two instances of infantry interlining pikemen and 
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musketeers to defend against cavalry, the other being at Edgehill. The general 
response to a cavalry attack seems to have been to deliver close range volley fire 
sufficient to drive off, or at least halt the cavalry’s attack. Once cavalry have stopped 
moving they are, as individuals, vulnerable to the infantry who will almost always 
have greater numbers. 
 
In Scotland evidence of similar fire tactics to those developed in England can be 
found. At the battle of Tippermuir in 1644, Montrose, the Royalist commander, was 
facing a larger enemy and was in danger of being outflanked. He instructed his 
infantry accordingly. 
He caused his Army to be drawne out to as open an order as could be 
possible, and makes his Files onely three deep. He commands the Ranks all 
to discharge at once, those in the first Ranke kneeling, in the second 
stooping, and in the hindmost, where he placed the tallest men, upright; he 
chargeth them also to have a care of mis-spending their powder, of which 
they had so small store, and that they should not so much as make a shot till 
they came to the very teeth of their enemies; & as soone as they had 
discharged their muskets once a piece, immediately to breake in upon the 
enemy with their swords & musket ends; which if they did, he was very 
confident the enemy would never endure the charge.132  
Whilst six ranks were necessary for sustained fire three ranks were the maximum 
that could be fired together in a single volley. Montrose has here made a virtue of 
necessity, the three deep line firing in a single volley at close range maximising the 
fire of his infantry while also extending his line to avoid being outflanked and 
conserving powder by avoiding a prolonged musketry engagement. The delivery of 
the fire was then to be followed by an immediate assault. The result was a victory for 
Montrose. 
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At the battle of Inverlochy, 1645, the Royalist left wing of Montrose’s army was 
commanded by Colonel Occaen. He ordered his musketeers to hold their fire to 
close range, which they did, ignoring the enemy’s fire until ‘they fyred there beardes’, 
which made ‘a cruell havoke’. They then promptly attacked with their swords and 
targes, disordering and dispersing the enemy. 133 Here again the fire was maximised 
by firing at very close range, followed by an immediate assault. Again, these tactics 
resulted in a Royalist victory. It would appear that the adoption of developing 
maximum firepower at close range followed a rapid assault was a nationwide 
development.  
 
The battle of Naseby, fought in 1645, provided clear evidence of the use of both 
brief, short range volleys in the assault and the use of lower intensity firing when the 
situation required it. The Royalist army, led by Charles I in person, took the offensive 
although outnumbered, and marched towards the Parliamentarian army, the newly 
raised New Model Army commanded by Sir Thomas Fairfax. In the centre the 
position of the Parliamentarian infantry, drawn back from the edge of a slight ridge, 
meant that the infantry regiments lost sight of each other as they closed. The 
Royalist Sir Edward Walker wrote: ‘The Foot on either side hardly saw each other 
until they were within Carabine Shot, and so only made one Volley; ours falling in 
with Sword and butt end of the Musquet did notable Execution.’134 According to the 
Parliamentarian John Rushworth ‘the Foot charged not each other till they were 
within twelve paces one of another, and could not charge above twice, but were at 
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push of Pike’.135 If the Royalists fired a single volley before closing to hand to hand it 
seems likely that they had reduced their musketeers from six ranks to three. To stay 
in six ranks would have meant the rear three ranks could not have fired, a 
considerable waste of fire power. Additionally, going into three ranks would have 
lengthened the frontage of the Royalist units, thus better matching the frontage of the 
numerically superior front line of the New Model Army. The New Model Army was 
formed on a constricted front and with little space between the front line regiments 
would not have been able to copy the Royalist formation.136 It is possible that the 
New Model fired by three ranks twice, thus producing the two ‘charges’ or vollies 
recorded by Rushworth. Clearly both armies were capable of and prepared to use 
firing in three ranks at close range to maximise their firepower immediately before 
hand to hand combat. 
 
During the battle the New Model Army’s infantry commander, Major General 
Skippon, was shot at close range, apparently ‘by one of his own Souldiers in 
wheeling off’.137 This seems to have occurred at a point after the initial contact and 
when Skippon was bringing forward reserves to counter the Royalist’s initial success, 
most likely during the period of an extended exchange of fire suggested by 
archaeological evidence.138  If that was the case it would appear that firing by ranks 
was in use at this point, presumably because the Royalists had run out of 
momentum and the New Model Army was recovering from its initial setback. Neither 
side was in a position to try to force the issue and so both resorted to low intensity, 
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but sustainable firing. Ultimately the New Model was victorious and Naseby was 
followed by a series of successes as it campaigned from Northamptonshire to 
Cornwall, finally bringing the First Civil War to an end at Oxford in 1646. 
 
The tactics used by the New Model Army and their capability with them are summed 
up in a letter written by Cromwell about the battle of Preston during the Second Civil 
War fought in 1648. ‘There came no band of your foot to fight that day but did it with 
incredible valour and resolution...they often coming to push of pike and close firing, 
and always making the enemy to recoil.’139 
 
There are few descriptions of English Civil War engagements that are sufficiently 
detailed to allow an analysis of how firepower was delivered and how that delivery 
developed. Many speak of hedge fights and driving the enemy from hedge to hedge, 
but without any explanation of the techniques involved. Many engagements were 
protracted affairs, which raises questions about the supply and conservation of 
ammunition in battle. However, some further evidence of changes in the way fire was 
delivered can be found by comparing the military manuals of William Barriffe and 
Richard Elton, Barriffe being pre-war and Elton post-war. Elton described much the 
same firing manoeuvres as Barriffe, but based his descriptions on a company with a 
2:1 ratio of musketeers to pikemen and files six men deep, rather than Barriffe’s 1:1 
in files eight deep, which indicates that there had been both an increased reliance on 
firepower and an increased rate of fire. He prefaced his descriptions with a comment 
on the variety of firings suggesting that not all of them were considered to be 
practical for the battlefield. 
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I shall therefore for the good of my Country, and for the benefit of all such as 
are herein concerned, collect forth some firings, which shall be every one 
differing from the other in one kind or other, either in the execution or 
reducing, whereby the ingenious Souldier may cull forth such as he best likes 
to make use of, what he shall think to be most fit and pertinent to his intended 
purpose, be it either for delight or service. 
He then went on to describe forty five different ways of firing that do not differ from 
Barriffe except in the number of ranks. 140  
 
Figure 2.2: An infantry company drawn up according to Elton.141 
C 
S                                             E                                             S 
m m m m m m m m D D p p p p p p p p D D m m m m m m m m 
m m m m m m m m        p p p p p p p p         m m m m m m m m 
m m m m m m m m        p p p p p p p p         m m m m m m m m 
m m m m m m m m        p p p p p p p p         m m m m m m m m 
m m m m m m m m        p p p p p p p p         m m m m m m m m 
m m m m m m m m        p p p p p p p p         m m m m m m m m 
S                                               L                                               S 
 
C = captain, L = Lieutenant, E = Ensign, S = Sergeant, D = Drummer,  
m = Musketeer, p = Pikeman 
 
 
However, while the main body of his text remained unaltered, Elton made an 
important addition to the second edition of his book in 1659. This amounts to four 
unnumbered pages added to the very end. First he gives the drill movements for the 
matchlock musket without the musket rest. In doing so he was reflecting a change 
that came about during the wars, which was the rest’s abandonment. It is difficult to 
be sure when this happened, it was probably a gradual, piecemeal process, but 
when the New Model Army was being fitted out in the winter of 1644-1645 no musket 
rests were supplied to it. This change undoubtedly speeded up the process of 
loading a musket as the musketeer had one less piece of equipment to juggle. It may 
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also indicate that muskets had become lighter, although there is no evidence to 
suggest that the design of muskets changed during the wars.  
 
Elton also wrote in this section ‘I have thought good to set down the plain way of 
exercising a company, as usually it is practised in the Army’, that is during the 
1650s.142 He wrote: 
‘We usually fire in the Front sometimes two Rancks standing, the rest passing 
by turns, then standing after they have gained the ground before their Leaders 
do fire, till all have fiered twice; other times three Rancks fire together the first 
kneels down, the second stoops; the third stands upright, then falling down, 
the three last Rancks pass through; and do the like.’   
Whether firing one, two or three ranks the idea of ranks filing off down the side of 
their unit to the rear to reload seems to have been abandoned. Instead all the firing 
appears to have been by introduction with musketeers moving in the gaps between 
files. Furthermore the musketeers reloaded where they fired while the musketeers 
who were loaded moved past them, further reducing the loading time. These then 
stood and fired immediately in front of those who had just fired, there was no 
advancing ten or twenty paces to fire, which reduced the time between vollies. Elton 
also seems to be saying that the distance between the files of musketeers was 
‘order’, half that stated by Barriffe as necessary for firing by introduction. This would 
have had the effect of concentrating the fire over a narrower frontage. 143 What is just 
as important is what is not there. Firing by two ranks advanced and by forlorn files 
have disappeared. Instead the firing by ranks was carried out in a much brisker 
manner and the aggressive firing by three ranks had become normal practice. 
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While the developments in firing methods enumerated by Elton in his 1659 edition 
appear to have increased the rate of fire of a body of musketeers he did not approve 
of all attempts to do so. He was insistent ‘that the Souldiers present and give fire 
upon their Rests, not using that slovenly posture of popping their Matches into the 
Pan, their Muskets being on their left sides, which is not only hurtful unto 
themselves, but much endangers their fellow-Souldiers, and by so doing they scarce 
or ever do any execution against an Enemy’.144 Elton did not mean that the soldiers 
had the muskets on the left side of their bodies, but rather that the muskets were 
held with the left side of the musket downwards. The advantage of this was that it 
ensured the powder in the priming pan was over the touchhole and thus made 
ignition of the main charge more certain. That Elton was railing against a widespread 
practice is supported by an account from the far west of Wales. Here the 
Parliamentarian commander, Major-General Laugherne had been reinforced by 
some troops from Ireland. The actions of these troops were described in a skirmish 
near Carmarthen in 1645. In the account they are described as ‘English, Irish foot as 
had somewhat before fled out of Ireland’ and then simply as ‘Irish’. This is to 
distinguish them from other Parliamentarian infantry and does not mean that they 
were of Irish nationality. ‘The Enemy very Souldier-like, had a forehand lined the 
hedges on the high-wayes, and approaches to the Towne, with store of Musketeers, 
which the Irish foot, with other seconds, beate from hedge to hedge, firing in a new 
dexterity, with their matches lighted in their hands, charging the enemy twice for 
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once, which they performed with much agillity.’145 Elton, however, seems to be 
making the case that rapid fire did not necessarily equate with effective fire. 
 
From the information that can be gleaned from the myriad accounts of battles and 
skirmishes and from the few drill manuals some conclusions may be drawn about the 
application of firepower during the English Civil Wars and how it changed during that 
period. After Edgehill there was a rapid move away from relatively slow and low 
intensity fire sustained over long periods of time to delivering fire in sharp close 
range bursts followed by an immediate assault. Not only was this more decisive, 
frequently in favour of the aggressor, but it also conserved ammunition while 
maximising effectiveness. At the same time the ability to maintain low intensity, 
sustained fire was retained. Although not a battle winner it still had a role to play. 
That there were measures employed to resupply musketeers during a battle is 
evidenced by comments concerning the use of reserve musketeers to bring up 
ammunition and the numerous occasions when careless musketeers blew 
themselves up when replenishing their powder.  
 
The test of these developments came during the 1650s and 1660s when English 
infantry found themselves pitted against foreign infantry who had the benefit of 
experience gained during the European-wide Thirty Years War. At the battle of the 
Dunes in 1658 they found themselves allied to the French and fighting the Spanish. 
The English were posted on the left flank of the French army and were opposite a 
large force of Spanish infantry posted on the top of a large sand hill. Lt. Col. Hughes 
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described how the English infantry ‘on hands and knees crept up the hill, and gave 
the enimies foote two good volleys, and with our pikes forced them to retreat’.146 
Morgan, commanding the infantry, described the result of the attack: ‘Immediately 
the enemy were clear shocked off their ground, and the English colours flying over 
their heads, the strongest officers and soldiers clubbing them down.’147 The battle 
was a complete victory for the Anglo-French army. From Hughes’ account it would 
appear that the infantry fired two three rank vollies, just as described by Elton.  
 
Another view of the hand to hand combat at the Dunes comes from the future James 
II who was commanding an exiled English Royalist army fighting for the Spanish. He 
led a frontal cavalry charge against Lockhart’s regiment, but was repulsed with 
considerable losses.148  Shortly after this he led another desperate cavalry charge 
against Lockhart’s. This time he attacked them in the flank and broke into the 
regiment. 
Tis very observable that when wee had broken into this Battalion, and were 
got amongst them, not so much as one single man of them ask’d quarter, or 
threw down his armes; but every one defended himself to the last: so that wee 
ran as great danger by the butt end of their muskets, as by the volley which 
they had given us. And one of them had infallibly knock’d me off from my 
horse, if I had not prevented him when he was just ready to have discharg’d 
his blow, by a stroke I gave him with my sword over the face, which layd him 
along upon the ground.149 
James’ attacks against Lockhart’s were ultimately futile, and did nothing to prevent a 
French victory, but they did demonstrate the ability of English infantry to defend 
themselves, in line against cavalry attacking them frontally. An attack from the flank, 
however, was something that would continue to be a threat to infantry in line. 
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Following the restoration of the Monarchy Charles II sent a small force, many of 
whom were New Model Army veterans, to Portugal to help in the struggle for 
independence from Spain.150 Colonel James Apsley gave an account of the actions 
of the English infantry at the Battle of Ameixial in 1663. 
The English marched on shouting as if victorious, but discharged no shot till 
they came within push of pike of the enemy, and then they poured in their 
shot so thick upon them that made them quit their ground and fly towards the 
left wing, leaving their cannon behind them, which were afterwards turned 
upon them, much to their prejudice. Notwithstanding the rich baggages and 
coaches and wealthy plunder which were on top of the hill – the English 
seeing the field not cleared – there was not one man of them stirred out of his 
rank, but kept close serried together to prevent any second onset, which 
immediately followed, for they were assaulted front, flank and rear by divers of 
the enemy’s troops of horse, but having their fire ready at all hands, they 
quickly quitted themselves of those troops.151 
This account offers nothing new in terms of combat doctrine for English infantry, the 
infantry fire is delivered at a typically close range and a counter-attack by cavalry is 
driven off in typical fashion.  The interest lies in the reaction of other Europeans to 
this action. The King of Portugal ‘acknowledged that in this year’s great defeat 1663 
he gave Don John of Austria neer Ebora, that Brigade of English who servd there, 
though not much considerable in number, did perform the toughest part of the 
service, and first shewd them the way of using the Rests of the Musquet to knock 
down the Enemy; which made the French-men cry out, Faisont comme les anglois, 
Let’s do as the English’.152 The King’s generals ‘having not been accustomed to see 
so close an approach before firing, did give up the English for lost and did believe 
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they all had intended to joined with the Castillians, but when they saw their thick 
firing and the good success the English obtained thereupon, they called us 
comrades and good Christians’.153  
 
The implication of these comments, particularly from Portugal, was that the English 
were doing something new that European enemies could not cope with and which 
very quickly gained them a considerable reputation. What that would appear to be 
was, firstly, their particularly effective and aggressive use of firepower that required 
the soldiers to ignore enemy fire and hold their own fire until they had closed to a 
range of five to ten yards when they would deliver one or two devastating vollies, 
depending on whether they were in three ranks or six. The effect on the enemy of 
the realisation that they had fired but that the English had not and were still 
advancing must have been considerable. Conversely, English infantry was 
encouraged if the enemy fired too soon or inaccurately, as with Birch’s men at 
Arundel. At the battle of Preston John Hodgson recorded how ‘the enemy let fly at us 
(a company of Langdale’s men that was newly raised). They shot at the skies, which 
did so encourage our men, that they were willing to venture upon any attempt’.154  
 
Secondly, this aggressive firepower was combined with a willingness, if not 
eagerness, to close to hand to hand combat immediately after firing and to club 
down their opponents with their muskets. This eagerness was evident at the Battle of 
the Dunes when the English infantry cheered at the sight of the enemy and the 
prospect of the fight, something that seems to have surprised Marshal Turenne, the 
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French commander.155 However, that did not mean that they were incapable of less 
intense, sustained firing when necessary. Again at the Dunes, when the English 
infantry first advanced they halted within musket range of the Spanish, who fired two 
vollies at them that caused a few casualties. Instead of allowing themselves to be 
drawn into a long range firefight they prepared for the assault, covered by 
commanded, or detached, musketeers who kept up a continual fire on the Spanish. 
Once the main body of infantry was ready to attack, the commanded musketeers 
opened to let it through.156 Again the attacking infantry ignored the enemy fire in 
order to get close to deliver their own fire.  
 
By contrast, there is nothing to suggest that the infantry of other European nations 
were doing anything other than continuing to use methods of firing similar to those 
developed at the start of the century and described by Barrife. The two nations most 
closely connected to Britain as, variously, friend and foe, were France and the 
Netherlands. The French continued firing by ranks rotating to the front until they 
devised a new form of firing by ranks in the 1670s.157 The Dutch also continued with 
the drill first devised by Maurice of Nassau until the 1670s.158 The Swedes, so 
influential on tactics in the 1630s, also seem not to have changed until the end of the 
century when they devised a technique for the offensive known as ‘ga-pa’. This 
required the infantry, in four ranks, to ignore enemy fire and close rapidly, pausing 
for the two rear ranks to fire at about 50 paces and the two front ranks firing 
immediately before contact.159 This could be said to have similarities with the British 
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method of firing three ranks at a time at very close range before closing to hand to 
hand combat, but by the time it was in use British infantry fire techniques had 
developed further. 
 
Another feature of what English infantry was doing was their ability to defend 
themselves against cavalry in line, without the musketeers having to fall back on the 
pikemen.  Although this was done by the Royalist musketeers at Edgehill and the 
Scots at Marston Moor these are rare occurrences and the preferred response to 
cavalry of short range fire and then using clubbed muskets showed a high degree of 
confidence in firepower.  
 
Despite the numerous manuals available, such as Barriffe and Elton, it was only in 
1676 that the first official drill book for the English army was published. It was titled 
An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline and was published ‘By His 
Majesties permission’.160 A later edition, diplomatically titled An Abridgement of the 
Military Discipline, was published in Edinburgh in 1680 for the use of the Scots 
army.161 The drill for the musket was still for the matchlock and was unchanged from 
Elton except for the order it was given in and some of the phrasing. The result was a 
simpler and briefer set of instructions. 
 
In describing the various ways of delivering fire the first given was firing by two ranks 
advancing. This was just the same as described by Barriffe forty-one years earlier, 
down to the marching to the rear around the outside of the unit, except it did allow for 
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the two advanced ranks to fire together. The manual went on to describe firing to the 
flanks and rear which were variations of firing advancing. These were followed by a 
description of Street Firing. In this the pikes blocked the street, or any narrow 
passage, while the musketeers loaded behind them and then, rank by rank, filed up 
one side of the pikes, formed a rank in front of them, fired and then filed to the rear 
down the other side of the pikes. This was followed by a method called The Swedes 
Way, which is discussed in detail in the next chapter162. This is similar to the three 
ranks firing described by Elton and used by the English troops in Holland and 
Portugal. For the first time there were instructions on how to form a square, in this 
edition both a hollow and a solid square. In this formation the square of pikemen was 
surrounded by the musketeers three deep. When attacked by cavalry all three ranks 
fired together, the front rank of musketeers kneeling, the second stooping and the 
third standing upright. A section of the manual headed Orders for Battel included the 
direction: ‘As soon as the Battalion comes to thirty Paces distance from the Enemy, 
let the Musqueteers Fire, the manner of which Firing shall be ordered them 
before.’163 There were also sections dealing with cavalry drill and camps.  
 
There were a further seven editions of the Abridgement, the first five with mostly 
minor alterations and additions.164 In the 1685 editions published in Dublin and 
London there were major changes, which also appeared in the next and last edition 
of 1686. Many sections were enlarged with more detailed instructions. Drill for the 
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firelock musket made its first appearance and there were also separate sections for 
battalions with firelocks and with matchlocks and others dealing with Horse 
Grenadiers, garrisons and mounting guards. The most significant changes, however, 
were in the methods of firing. When firing in square the front rank was to kneel while 
the other two fired and then stand and fire in its turn.165 Firing by two ranks and The 
Swedes Way disappeared. Instead, when firing to the front, the first five ranks of 
musketeers were to kneel while the sixth, rear rank fired over their heads. The fifth 
rank was then to stand and fire, followed by the fourth and so on. After firing each 
rank was to reload, the obvious problem being that the sixth rank would be reloaded 
and ready to fire before the first rank was reloaded. The 1685 Abridgements also 
claimed that this method of firing could be carried out by two ranks or even three 
ranks at a time, one kneeling, one stooping and one standing, or the first two 
stooping, presumably if there were other ranks kneeling in front of them.166 Clearly 
this method of firing was only possible if the battalion was stationary. When 
advancing a battalion was to halt briefly to allow the front rank to fire. After firing this 
rank was to file to the rear and the battalion was to march on until its commander 
halted it again for firing.167 However, the Orders for Battel no longer specified any 
range for opening fire. Another, quite separate section, gave an alternative way of 
firing. This required the musketeers to be reduced from six ranks to three, but not to 
fire in three ranks. Instead the first rank was to kneel while the other two ranks fired 
and then to stand and fire in its turn. After firing the musketeers were to club muskets 
and fall on.168 This method retained something of the doctrine of delivering maximum 
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fire, albeit by two ranks rather than three, immediately followed by closing to hand to 
hand combat. Generally, however, these changes appear to have reduced the 
firepower of the infantry. 
 
This change in approach to the delivery of fire would appear to be down to the 
adoption of French ideas. A British brigade served in the French army from 1672 to 
1678 and a copy of the French drill manual Le Major Parfait was inscribed ‘this book 
did belong to King James’ and dated 1686.169  Writing in 1670-1671 Sir James 
Turner referred to the French General Martinet describing a way of firing in six ranks. 
‘Of six ranks of Musqueteers he would have the first five to kneel; the sixth to stand 
and fire first, then the fifth to rise and fire next, and consecutively the rest, till the first 
rank have fired, after which he will have the foremost five ranks to kneel again, till the 
sixth discharge, if the service last so long.’ Turner expressed severe reservations 
about firing in this manner, suggesting that it put the men in the front ranks in danger 
from their own side. 170 However, the French writer Demoriet wrote in 1686: 
The best way of firing is by ranks when it is desired to fire in line, parallel to 
the foe. To do this, and to fire without embarrassment, it is best to fire at the 
halt without making any move except that needed to make the first five ranks 
kneel on the ground; and the sixth is that which makes its first fire, the fifth 
than doing the same and the rest consecutively.171 
 
The introduction of drill for the firelock musket in the 1685 edition of An Abridgement 
reflected the increasing use of firelocks by the infantry. This was a process that had 
been under way since during the English Civil Wars. At Cropedy Bridge some of 
Waller’s Parliamentarian infantry had firelocks and during the night after the battle 
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Richard Coe recorded that ‘our Fire-locks were placed under a hedge, and light 
matches hung alone on pallisadoes a Musket shot off’.172 At the Battle of the Dunes, 
Morgan had four hundred men armed with firelocks.173 In January 1683 the 
Coldstream Guards were ordered to replace their matchlocks with firelocks while in 
March it was ordered that two companies in each infantry regiment should be armed 
with firelocks.174 On the 21 February 1687 a regulation was issued giving 
specifications for infantry firearms. The Musketeers of the Guards regiments were to 
have Snaphance muskets with a barrel length of 44 inches, other musketeers were 
to have matchlock or Snaphance muskets with 42 inch barrels.175 Fuziliers, a new 
type of infantry originally formed to guard the artillery, were to have Snaphance 
muskets with 44 inch barrels while the grenadiers of infantry regiments were to have 
carbines with 38 inch barrels.176 The carbine was traditionally a cavalry weapon with 
a relatively short barrel. The description of the Grenadiers muskets as carbines was 
a reference to the bore size, a carbine having a smaller bore than a musket. 
Undoubtedly the reduction in barrel length and weight from the musket of the 1640s 
and 1650s made these muskets easier to handle and thus quicker to load. However, 
only the Fuziliers and grenadiers were to use cartridges, the rest still using 
bandoleers.   
 
The adoption of the firelock, or flintlock musket and the cartridge by some units in the 
army would make a difference to the speed of loading of individual soldiers in those 
units, but in the 1680s the majority of the infantry was still using the matchlock. What 
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was as important as the weapons in use was how the infantry was organised to 
produce its firepower. In this regard the adoption of French firing methods and the 
apparent abandonment of the aggressive tactics developed in the 1640s and 1650s 
would appear to be retrograde changes, but these changes were not to be tested in 
battle.  
 
 An account of the siege of Tangiers contains some interesting information 
concerning the supply of ammunition on the battlefield. From 1661 to 1684 England 
was in possession of Tangiers, part of the dowry of Charles II’s Portuguese bride, 
Catherine of Braganza.177 During this occupation the Garrison was in frequent 
conflict with the Moors and was besieged in 1680. John Ross described how on one 
occasion the fighting continued ‘for the space of Seven or Eight hours desperately, 
and continually firing on both sides from right to left, that it was nothing for a 
Musketeer to empty three or four Bandeleers notwithstanding of their reliefs every 
two hours.’ 178 This represents the expenditure of between thirty six and forty eight 
rounds a man, a considerable amount of ammunition. However, Ross also gave 
some clues as to how this was managed. On another occasion he recorded that: 
The Scots Granadeers once forgot their Pouder and Ball in the Enemies 
Trench: Their Lieut. Called Mackrackan, endeavoured to recover and regain 
it, but in vain, which perceiving; he threw three or four Granades with his own 
hand to set it a fire before it should fall in the Enemies hands, to the great 
danger of his life.179  
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He also made a reference to ‘Gentlemen of the Pouch’: ‘This is a most useful Officer 
in an Army, and ‘tis requisite he be stout also, otherwise they may want Powder, and 
Ball when they have most to do.’ He also referred to ‘Powder-monckies.’180  
 
From this evidence it is possible to make some tentative proposals about how the 
resupplying of ammunition was being managed on the battlefield. As also suggested 
by instances from the English Civil Wars of musketeers accidently blowing up 
powder barrels it would seem that it was normal practice for units to carry into battle 
a supply of loose powder and musket balls. It would have to be loose powder in 
order to be able to refill the individual charges on a bandoleer. How this was done 
was suggested in the Earl of Newcastle’s drill manual of 1642 when it said ‘A 
measured charge shall be given to every Musketier that holds just so much powder 
as halfe the bullet weighes at ten bullets in the pound, to fill their Bandaliers 
withal.’181 This ammunition may have been carried in small barrels or leather 
pouches, hence the Gentlemen of the Pouch at Tangiers. Monck wrote in 1646 that 
in addition to a bandoleer with powder and musket balls ‘each musqueteer ought to 
have twelve Bullets a-piece in their pockets; and each company must carry with 
them a Powder-Bag full of Powder’.182 It seems that this supply was set down on the 
ground during combat, either to facilitate distribution or so that the carriers could 
fight. One thing is certain, that the weight of powder and ball for a single bandoleer 
amounts to one and a half pounds. To supply, for example, a company of sixty 
musketeers with refills for their bandoleers just once required thirty pounds of 
                                                          
180
 Ross, Tangers Rescue, pp. 26-27 
181
 Anon., A True Description of the Discipline of War both for Horse and Foot (nd), p. 2. 
182
 George Monck, Duke of Albemarle, Observations upon Military and Political Affairs (London, 1671), 
(written in 1646 when a prisoner in The Tower of London), p. 103. 
  
 
66 
 
powder and sixty pounds of musket balls. This was a not inconsiderable weight to 
man-handle around a battle field. It is not possible, on this limited evidence, to say 
exactly how ammunition resupply was being managed or that this reflects anything 
other than the practice in Tangiers in the 1680s. However it does begin to offer a 
possible answer to the question of ammunition resupply to musketeers using 
bandoleers rather than cartridges, which were already beginning to come in to use. 
The cavalry had used them for their firearms since the 1630’s and Orrery was a 
champion of their use.183 
 
During the English Civil War a particularly aggressive way of fighting based upon the 
close range delivery of overwhelming firepower followed by an immediate advance to 
hand to hand combat was developed in England and Scotland and used by all 
protagonists. This was not something found in the drill books and although it was 
similar to the Swedish Salvee developed by Gustavus Adolphus there were 
important differences, primarily in the manner of its application. The Swedes used 
this as a part of their fire tactics and with limited application.184 In contrast English 
and Scots infantry would frequently, even habitually, fight in this manner. Given the 
widespread availability of information about Swedish tactics it is possible that this 
represents a uniquely British development of the use of the Swedish Salvee, but the 
manner of that development and its adoption right across the British Isles is 
unknown. This development occurred in isolation and was not matched by any 
similar development in Europe where the application of this way of fighting achieved 
dramatic results. In 1685 the adoption of a French firing system resulted in the loss 
                                                          
183
 John Cruso, Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (Cambridge, 1631),  p. 41; Roger, Earl of Orrery, A 
Treatise of the Art of War (London, 1677), p. 31-32. 
184
 See below, p. 71. 
  
 
67 
 
of the ability to concentrate the firepower of a whole battalion into a single volley, 
thereby making it impossible to continue to rely upon the aggressive application of 
firepower as a key element of battlefield doctrine. This retrograde position was, 
however, short lived. In 1688 the Glorious Revolution placed the English and 
Scottish armies firmly under the influence of Holland when the French ways were 
swept aside and replaced by the latest Dutch practice and in particular the recently 
developed platoon firing. 
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3: The origins of platoon firing and its introduction into the English and Scots Armies 
 
 
From the late seventeenth century and into the middle of the eighteenth century the 
method employed by British infantry to deliver its firepower was platoon firing, which 
was a major factor in British success on the battlefield. It is generally accepted that it 
was introduced from the Dutch army by William III after the Glorious Revolution of 
1688 when he and Queen Mary succeeded the deposed James II.185 It has, 
however, been far from clear what the origins were of platoon firing, just when and 
how the English and Scottish armies adopted it, for they were still two separate 
establishments, and precisely what form it first took.  
 
Chandler wrote ‘It is almost impossible to trace the real origins of the platoon firing 
system with any certainty.’186 In seeking to establish the origins of platoon firing he 
quotes the French writer Le Blond. 
Platoon fire, introduced in France as part of the 6 May 1755 Ordinance, was a 
well established practice by the Dutch; there is some evidence that they can 
be credited with the original idea and that it was they who introduced the 
practice to the other European nations who adopted the practice.187 
 
However, as well as crediting the Dutch as the originators of platoon firing Chandler 
also records the suggestion made by some that platoon firing actually originated with 
the Swedes under their King, Gustavus Adolphus in the 1630s.188 
 
Chandler further suggests that the introduction of platoon firing to British troops took 
place in Flanders in 1689 when Marlborough took a contingent of the army there to 
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join William’s Dutch army.189 What he does not do is give any indication of how 
platoon firing came to be in use throughout the English and Scottish armies and not 
just that part in Flanders. Furthermore, no historian has yet identified just how 
platoon firing was first carried out by the English and Scots armies. Chandler does 
give a description of platoon firing, but this is based on Kane’s instructions in his 
Discipline for a Regiment of Foot.190  This formed part of Kane’s book Campaigns of 
King William and Queen Anne; From 1689 to 1712, which was not published until 
1745, after Kane’s death. Chandler is, however, writing about infantry tactics during 
the period 1688 to 1748, a somewhat broad definition of the Age of Marlborough, 
and Kane’s version of platoon firing is clearly of a later date than 1689. Most 
obviously it contains no reference to pikemen, then still an integral part of infantry 
regiments. Furthermore the full title for this section of Kane’s book is A New System 
of Military Discipline for a Battalion of Foot on Action and the introduction states that 
Kane wrote it because he considered other military manuals available to be 
inadequate. This would suggest that he was writing what he considered to be 
contemporary best practice for the period after 1712 and before 1736, when he died, 
and not describing the practice of some twenty five years or more earlier.  
 
This chapter will identify the unique characteristics and nature of platoon firing, which 
is necessary in order to identify its early forms and origins.  It will examine the origins 
of platoon firing, including the claims for Gustavus Adolphus, give an account of the 
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introduction of platoon firing into the English and Scottish armies, and identify and 
describe its original form as practiced in 1689.  
 
It is possible to identify three elements that when combined give platoon firing its 
unique character and distinguish it from any other fire delivery system.  First, the 
infantry were organised into platoons, a tactical sub-unit of a larger battalion or 
regiment that did not necessarily correspond to any other sub-unit, such as the 
company. Secondly, the soldiers were drawn up in three ranks, later reduced to two 
ranks, and all the ranks fired together. Thirdly, the platoons were drawn up in a line 
and fired in turn along the line according to a preordained pattern, which ensured 
that a part of the line was always loaded and ready to fire. 
 
Two of these elements, the platoon as a sub-unit of infantry formations and putting 
musketeers into three ranks rather than the more usual six, were well known before 
the start of the English Civil War in 1642. Both practices originated in the Swedish 
army under Gustavus Adolphus and were described in some detail by the 
professional Scottish soldier Robert Monro, who served in the Swedish army from 
1630 to 1634. 191 He described the organisation of the infantry into brigades with the 
musketeers in platoons or, as he writes, ‘Plottons’, of forty-eight men in eight rots or 
files, each of six men, that is with each plotton having six ranks, see figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: An illustration of a Swedish Brigade from Barriffe and based on Monro’s 
description.192 
 
 
 
Monro then described the process for firing three ranks together in what he called a 
‘salve’ and later became known as a salvee or volley. 
When you would command the body of your musketiers to give fire in a salve, 
as is ordinarie in Battell, before an enemy joyne, or against Horsemen; then 
you command the bringers up or Reare to double the Front to the right hand, 
and to make readie, having the match cocked and their pannes well guarded, 
having closed the three Rancks, though not the Files, the Officers standing in 
equall Front with the foremost Rancke, betwixt two Divisions, he commands to 
give fire, one Salve, two or three, and having charged againe, and shouldered 
their Armes, they retire to the left hand againe, every man falling behind his 
owne Leader.193 
In this manoeuvre the rear three men in each file marched forward and placed 
themselves alongside the front three, either to their left or, as described by Monro, to 
their right. This three deep formation was shallow enough for all three ranks to fire 
together, with the front rank kneeling, the second stooping and the third standing 
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upright.194 After firing as many salves as required the men from the rear could march 
back to their original positions, bringing the plotton back to six ranks. 
 
The Swedish Intelligencer, published in London, described the effect of this form of 
firing at the battle of Leipzig in 1631;  
The Scots ordering themselves in sevrall small battagliaes, about 6 or 700 in 
a body, presently now double their rankes, making their files then but 3 deepe 
(the discipline of the King of Sweden being, never to march above 6 deepe ) 
this done, the foremost rancke falling on their knees; the second stooping 
forward; and the third rancke standing up; and all giving fire together, they 
powred so much lead at one instant in amongst the enemies horse, that their 
ranckes were much broken with it.195 
Its use at Breitenfeld has already been described.196 
 
This practice was deliberately spread to other armies allied to Sweden. On 9 May 
1632 at Munich Gustavus Adolphus; 
Held a generall Muster before the City: himself ( to shew some content to the 
Bavarians ) drilling and exercising his souldiers: teaching them especially how 
to give a Charge or Salvee; some upon their knees, other behind them 
stooping forward; and the hindmost ranke standing upright, and all to give fire 
at once, the hinder man over his foremans shoulder.197 
 
Monro’s service with the Swedish Army ended in 1634 when his regiment was 
destroyed at the battle of Nordlingen while he was in Scotland recruiting.198 Two 
years earlier, in 1632, Sir James Turner had joined the Swedish Army and served 
briefly under Gustavus Adolphus who was killed that year at the battle of Lutzen.199  
 
                                                          
194
 Sir James Turner, Pallas Armata (London, 1683), p. 238. 
195
 William Watts, The Swedish Intelligencer, The First Part (London, 1632) p. 124. 
196
 See above, p. 40. 
197
 William Watts, The Swedish Intelligencer, The Second Part (London, 1632) p. 169. 
198
 Brockington, Monro, p. xvi. 
199
 Sir James Turner, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times (Edinburgh, 1829), pp. 4-5. 
  
 
73 
 
In Pallas Armata (written in 1670-71) Turner gave a slightly different account of the 
Swedish use of musketeers. He also gave a description of the Swedish Brigade and, 
referring to the gaps between the three blocks of pike men as being like sally ports, 
described how the musketeers would sally out from behind the central pike block. 
There were two passage like sally ports between the reer of the advanced 
Body of Pikes, and the two Batallions that staid behind, out of one whereof on 
the right hand issued constantly one or two more hundreds of Musqueteers, 
who before all the three Bodies of Pikes gave incessantly fire upon the 
Enemy, and when the word or sign for a Retreat was given, they retir’d by the 
other passage on the left hand, back to the great Body of Musqueteers, where 
so many of them as came back unwounded, were presently put into rank and 
file, the fire continuing without intermission by Musqueteers, who still sallied 
through the passage on the right hand; and it is to be observed that the 
firemen fought thus in small Bodies, each of them not above five files of 
Musqueteers, and these for the most part but three deep.200  
There is, however, no suggestion of any pattern to this fire. Turner’s description also 
varies from Monro and others in that he has all the musketeers formed behind the 
blocks of pikemen and none flanking the pikes as in Figure 3.1. 
 
While two of the requirements for platoon firing can be attributed to the Swedish 
Army under Gustavus Adolphus, the use of platoons and firing in three ranks, the 
third element, a line of platoons firing in a set pattern, is absent. Furthermore, after 
the death of Gustavus Adolphus the Swedish Brigade disappeared from use.201 
Despite its success under Gustavus Adolphus it was complex and demanded a high 
degree of training and discipline. During the first half of the seventeenth century, the 
rest of Europe had gradually adopted the simpler linear deployment of infantry 
developed by Maurice of Nassau at the end of the sixteenth century and which, by 
the middle of the century, had become the norm.  
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The depth of infantry units had gradually decreased from the beginning of the 
century, when the tactics developed by Maurice of Nassau employed ten ranks, to 
the middle of the century when six ranks was the rule. The number of ranks was 
dictated by the length of time it took to reload a musket. As Turner discusses, initially 
ten ranks were required to keep up a sustained fire from a unit because it took as 
long for one rank to reload as it did for the other nine to come successively to the 
front and fire in their turn.202 As muskets were lightened and improved and loading 
was speeded up it became possible to reduce the depth to five or six ranks, but not 
to have less than that, let alone as few as three ranks. Turner states specifically that 
firing one rank at a time in three ranks does not give the first rank time to reload 
before the third has fired.203 As for firing in three ranks all together, the military 
writers of the first half of the seventeenth century are consistent in their reservations 
about this, which is that it leaves a unit open to attack before it can reload. 
Consequently they considered that it was only to be used in extremis, such as 
against a cavalry attack when firepower must be maximised to stop it or immediately 
before charging home against an enemy. Monro wrote that its use was ‘ordinarie in 
Battell, before an enemy joyne, or against Horsemen’.204 For all other occasions he 
says that firing by ranks is ‘the forme that I esteeme to be the best.’205 Thus, while 
the devastating effect of a three rank volley was well known, the circumstances 
under which it could be employed were considered to be severely limited. For 
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example, the description given above from the Swedish Intelligencer is of the effect 
of firing in three ranks against a cavalry attack at Leipzig. 
 
Monro and Elton, although writing some twenty years apart, both described units of 
musketeers, six ranks deep, firing two ranks at a time, that is in three volleys.206 This 
would seem to be at odds with Turner’s statement that three ranks could not reload 
fast enough to keep up a sustained fire. However, sustained fire was not always the 
objective. When Monro describes each pair of ranks advancing ten paces in front of 
the unit before firing, he is describing attacking an enemy, ‘ever advancing to an 
enemie, never turning backe without deathe or victorie’.207 Under those 
circumstances it would seem that a brief period of a high rate of fire was preferable 
to slower sustained fire. Elton also described firing the six ranks in two lots of three, 
which also would not allow enough time to reload in order to keep up a constant fire, 
but he also described firing one rank at a time, which would.208  
 
Orrery, in his Treatise of the Art of War published in 1677, also discussed the 
number of ranks and the rate of fire.209 Based on his own experience, he 
recommended fighting in four ranks, whilst acknowledging that the idea would not be 
readily accepted. 
The chief objection that I know of, is, as to the Musketeers, who being but four 
deep, and advancing firing, the first Rank cannot have loaded their Muskets 
again, by that time the fourth Rank has done firing; so that there will be an 
intermission of shooting. To that I answer, Let the Musketeers Charge their 
Muskets with such Cartridges as I have mentioned, and the first Rank will be 
as soone ready if you are but four deep, as the first Rank will be if you are six 
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deep, loading with Bandeleers, especially if I use the Fire-lock, and the 
Enemy the Match-lock. 
What Orrery was saying was that musketeers with cartridges and firelocks could 
reload in two thirds of the time that it took musketeers with matchlocks and 
bandoliers. Thus, a unit in four ranks could deliver fire from a rank just as often as 
one in six ranks. Given two units of the same size, the unit in four ranks would also 
have half as many men again in each rank as the unit in six ranks, thus firing half as 
many shots again from each rank. What four ranks could not do, however, was all 
fire at once, which was only possible with three ranks. 
 
The cartridge had the advantage over the bandoleer that the powder for loading the 
musket and the ball were both contained in a roll of paper, the cartridge. The 
musketeer simply bit open the cartridge at the end opposite the ball and poured the 
powder down the barrel, followed by the paper and ball. Initially the musket was still 
primed from a separate flask. The advantages were spelt out by Orrery who was ‘a 
great approver of Boxes of Cartridges; for then, but by biting off the bottom of the 
Cartridge, you charge your Musket for service with one Ramming’.210 As for the 
firelock he gave a whole list of reasons for its superiority over the matchlock.211 
 
The use of the cartridge and the firelock or flintlock musket had the effect of 
speeding up the reloading process. If Orrery is correct and four ranks could keep up 
the same rate of fire as six with matchlock musket and bandoleer that is a reduction 
in the loading time of one third. This, in theory, made it possible to reduce the 
number of ranks needed to keep up a continual fire. However, the introduction of 
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both into the British Army was slow and while the matchlock and bandoleer remained 
in service six ranks remained the norm. It was not until 1685 that James II ordered 
the army to be completely equipped with flintlocks. A process accelerated by William 
III and only completed in the early years of the eighteenth century.212  
 
There are two key points to understanding the ways in which infantry firepower was 
delivered during the period predating the introduction of platoon firing. The first is 
that for defensive firing it was important to maintain a steady and continuous fire. 
The great fear was of being attacked when a unit was unloaded, particularly by 
cavalry. To avoid this danger a sufficient depth of ranks was required to allow time 
for reloading. By the 1640s this was generally taken to be six ranks. The second 
point is that when attacking it was advantageous to maximise the rate of fire to 
deliver as much firepower as possible in as short a time as possible before closing to 
hand to hand combat when there was no point in being loaded, particularly with a 
matchlock. This required breadth rather than depth so that all the musketeers could 
fire at once. As Turner put it;  
Next, firing by three ranks at a time, should not be practised, but when either 
the business seems to be desperate, or that the Bodies are so near, that the 
Pikemen are almost come to push of Pike, and then no other use can be 
made of the Musquet but of the Butt-end of it. I say then that this manner of 
six ranks to fire at two several times is not at all to be used; for if it come to 
extremity, it will be more proper to make them all fire at once, for thereby you 
pour as much lead in your enemies bosom at one time as you do the other 
way at two several times, and thereby you do them more mischief, you quail, 
daunt, and astonish them three times more, for one long and continuated 
crack of Thunder is more terrible and dreadful to mortals than ten interrupted 
and several ones, though all and every one of the ten be as loud as the long 
one.213 
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Thus the reason for the various ways of delivering fire was the necessity to be able 
to meet the differing tactical demands of attack and defence, something that no 
single fire delivery system could do prior to the development of platoon firing. The 
use of the short range volley given in three ranks in both attack and defence that was 
developed in Britain during the Civil Wars is overlooked by Turner. Similarly it has no 
place in the writing’s of Orrery and Albemarle. These are all soldiers with experience 
in the Civil Wars, as well as on the continent, who were writing after those wars, but 
all three make very little mention of anything from them. It is as if diplomatic 
considerations had rendered invalid any practical lessons. Regardless of the efficacy 
of the close range, three rank volley, however, the fact remained that it did not solve 
the question of how to combine heavy, effective fire with sustainable fire.  
 
A new way of firing made its appearance in 1676 with the publication, ‘by His 
Majesties Permission’, of An Abridgement of the English Discipline.214 In addition to 
the usual and well established firing by ranks, either singly or in pairs, this official 
publication also included a description of what it called the ‘Swedes Way’.215 This 
involved reducing the ranks of musketeers from six to three by doubling their front. 
Each block of musketeers, one on each side of a central block of pikes, was then 
subdivided.  
Figure 3.2 shows how the subdivisions were arranged, slightly in advance of the pike 
division and alternating one forward and one back. The advanced subdivisions fired 
first, either all three ranks, kneeling, stooping and standing or the first rank kneeling 
and reserving its fire while the second and third ranks fired. These subdivisions 
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would then reload where they stood while the rear subdivisions advanced to fire in 
their turn. As the subdivisions were split into two lines that fired alternately, it was still 
considered necessary to have the option of reserving the fire of one rank in order to 
avoid the danger of having all the musketeers reloading at the same time. 
 
Figure 3.2: The Swedes Way, from the 1684 edition of An Abridgement of the 
English Discipline.216 
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The illustration appears to be purely indicative of how the formation should appear; it 
contains 144 men in the ratio of two musketeers to one pikeman. The Abridgement 
did not state how many subdivisions there should be for a battalion formed up for 
battle. However, it did say that a battalion normally comprised six companies, which 
was half a regiment.217 One possibility was that the musketeers of the six companies 
were divided into eight subdivisions as in the illustration. This would result in each 
subdivision of musketeers being between twenty and thirty men.218 This was a 
similar size to the subdivision of four, five or six files in six ranks as described by 
Elton, which gave a strength of from twenty-four to thirty-six men.219  
At this time the company was a purely administrative unit consisting of both pike and 
musket that was broken up to form battlefield formations. It would appear, instead, 
that there was a preference for tactical subdivisions of musketeers to be about 
twenty-four to thirty men. The reason for this would appear to be connected to 
command and control. Monro observes; 
To exercise a squadron of Musketiers, how strong soever they be, the number 
of Rancks being no deeper than six, the files being even may be so many as 
your voice can extend to, ever observing that your Command be given in the 
Front, otherwise may breede disorder...and above all things you are to 
command them to keepe silence, not babbling one to another....220 
In other words, a platoon is limited in size by the reach of the commander’s voice. 
When firing in ranks Monro wrote that the officer commanding the musketeers must 
stand ‘even in Front with them, the Cannon or mouth of their Muskets of both Rancks 
being past his bodie’.221 Similarly when firing in salve he described ‘the Officers 
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standing in equall Front with the foremost Ranck, betwixt two Divisions’.222 The 
difficulties of command in battle were also touched on by Elton who wrote of 
‘Commanders, whose voices are drown’d by the loud thundering of the Cannon or 
Mukettiers; as also by the neighing of Horses, or the lamentable cries of the maim’d 
and wounded Souldiers’.223  
This form of firing, the ‘Swedes Way’, disappeared with the publication of the 1685 
edition of An Abridgement, but it did represent an attempt at producing linear fire 
using small subdivisions of three ranks that all fired together rather than depending 
on ranks coming to the front of a unit in turn to fire. The subdivisions fired in a simple 
alternating sequence along the line and it thus qualifies as an early form of platoon 
firing. The problem that had not been solved was how to fire in a linear formation 
without too long an interval between discharges of fire. 
 
The name for this way of firing, the ‘Swedes Way’, gives rise to the possibility that 
platoon firing was first developed in Sweden. There is no doubt that that the Swedes 
under Gustavus Adolphus were the first to use platoons of musketeers and to fight 
and fire in just three ranks. If they had taken the next step towards platoon firing 
proper, as opposed to simply firing in platoons, then one might expect to find 
evidence of that before 1676 when the ‘Swedes Way’ first appears in an English drill 
book. The last Swedish drill book produced before then appears to be Een Militarisch 
Exercitiae Book, published in Stockholm in 1669.224 However, it contains nothing that 
bears any similarity to the ‘Swedes Way’. The most likely explanation for the name is 
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that it is simply a reference to the use of platoons and three ranks. When, the 
‘Swedes Way’ disappeared from An Abridgement it was replaced by a French 
system of firing by ranks with a six deep formation. 
 
The earliest evidence for platoon firing by the Dutch is in a military manual of 1684 
by Louis Paan.225 In the introduction to the second volume of his work Paan wrote 
that it contained descriptions of the organisation of battalions ‘as they have been 
brought to practice in the last war’. By this he is referring to the war of 1672-1678 
between France and the Dutch Republic. It describes something not dissimilar to the 
Swedes Way, but with each wing of musketeers divided into three platoons. As such 
it would appear to have suffered from the same drawback, which was that it did not 
allow for continuous firing. Paan also gave a reason for the development of platoon 
firing. Referring to battalions that fired by ranks he wrote; 
Such Battalions as mentioned before have been esteemed for a certain period 
by most military, however it has been found that the Musketeers, after having 
fired in ranks, in retreating back made too wide a circle in order to get restored 
to readiness. This caused great disorder which is why this method has been 
rejected by several military men; that is to say, as far as giving fire in ranks is 
concerned it is considered to be better to do such with platoons instead of 
ranks. This is the reason why such changes have been made in the forming of 
Battalions as described before.226 
The Dutch rejected the rotation of ranks by marching them down the sides of 
platoons to reload at the rear as it caused too much disorder. Clearly keeping the 
men in their ranks and firing and reloading in platoons was more efficient and less 
complicated or prone to confusion. They also chose not to emulate the French, who 
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had developed their method for firing by ranks sometime before Turner described it 
in 1670-71.227 
 
Following the accession of William and Mary in 1688 the English and Scots armies 
found themselves allied to the Dutch and involved in a war with France. One of the 
first consequences of this was the dispatch to Flanders of an English force under the 
command of the, then, Earl of Marlborough. In May 1689 Marlborough wrote to 
William’s Secretary at War, William Blaythwayt: 
I desire that you will know the King’s pleasure whether he will have the 
Regiments of Foot to learn the Duch exercise, or else to continue the English, 
for if he will I must have itt translated into English.228 
There is no record of a reply or of any translation of Dutch drill being issued to 
English regiments, but this letter has been taken to demonstrate the introduction of 
Dutch drill to the English and Scots army.229 Much clearer evidence, however, is 
available that makes it clear that platoon firing was introduced to both the English 
and Scots armies in 1689. At the same time as Marlborough was in Flanders another 
combined Dutch and English army under the command of the Duke of Shomberg 
was fighting the forces of the deposed James II in Ireland. In September 1689 James 
II offered battle to Shomberg, who refused, keeping his army in its fortified camp at 
Dundalk. Subsequently James and his army withdrew to Ardee and went into winter 
quarters. No sooner had the Jacobite army retreated from Dundalk than Shomberg 
ordered that ‘the Brigades that did not mount the Guards, should be exercised at 
firing at a Mark when it was Fair weather (as t’was very seldom) for the Duke knew 
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most of his men had never been in service, and therefore he would have them taught 
as much as could be’.230 Just how poorly trained the infantry was is apparent. 
The Weather for two or three days proved pretty fair, and the Soldiers were 
exercised with firing at Marks; but it was observable, that a great many of the 
new men who had Match-Locks, had so little skill in placing of their Matches 
true, that scarce one of them in four could fire their Pieces off; and those that 
did, thought they had done a feat if the Gun fired, never minding what they 
shot at.231 
Then, on 29 September 1689, ‘Lieutenant-General Douglas exercised the Regiments 
of the first Line, teaching them how to fire by platoons’.232 Whilst this provides clear 
evidence of the introduction of platoon firing, there are, unfortunately, no details 
given of how it was conducted. 
 
At the same time as Marlborough was campaigning in Flanders and Douglass in 
Ireland, William had sent Major General Hugh Mackay, a Scot in Dutch service, to 
take command of the forces in Scotland. In his diary he described how, before the 
battle of Killiekrankie in 1689, he had ‘commanded the officers, commanding 
battalions, to begin their firing at the distance of 100 paces by platoons, to 
discourage the approaching Highlanders meeting with continual fire’, thus 
demonstrating that platoon firing had also been introduced to the Scottish Army.233 
On this occasion platoon firing was no match for the onslaught of the highland 
charge and Mackay lost the battle. In 1692 he was killed at the battle of Steenkirk. 
Then in 1693 a drill book was published in Edinburgh with a title page that stated it 
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included ‘the Rules of War in the day of Battel, when Encountering with the 
Enemy’.234 
 
This was, in part, a reprint of a drill book of 1690, the first issued under William and 
Mary, but which was limited to the infantry drill and did not include the Rules of 
War.235 According to the introduction to the 1693 Edinburgh edition Sir Thomas 
Livingstone, who had succeeded Mackay to the command in Scotland, had revised 
and corrected the earlier edition as well as adding the exercise of dragoons and also 
adding ‘Lieutenant General Mackay’s Rules of War for the Infantry, to be observed 
when they are to Encounter with the Enemie in the day of Battel’.236 Given the official 
nature of this publication, and its recommendation to the Scots and English Armies, 
there would seem to be no reason not to accept Mackay’s rules as representing the 
then current practice in the Dutch Army that was adopted by the English and Scots 
Armies and that it was an approved description of battlefield doctrine for all three, 
allied, armies, from 1689 onwards. In these Rules the Dutch had solved the problem 
of keeping up sustainable fire using platoons. It also seems that they were published 
even before 1693 as the title page for the Rules describes them as reprinted, further 
strengthening the case for them being the practice introduced under William in 1689. 
 
Included in Mackay’s Rules were detailed instruction on how platoon firing was to be 
organised and conducted. The Rules were organised in twenty three articles and 
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from the start it is clear that they represented a significant departure from previous 
doctrine. Whilst Mackay acknowledged six ranks as the norm for forming a battalion 
and marching he had it in three ranks on the battlefield. There was no place for the 
older, deeper six rank formations.  
 
Figure 3.3: A Battalion drawn up according to Mackay’s Rules.237  
 
G P M M M M M M P M M M M M M P G 
 
G = Grenadier 
P = Pikemen 
M = Musketeer 
 
 
 
Mackay described the formation of a regiment, or battalion, of thirteen companies, 
including a grenadier company, see figure 3.3. All the pikemen were formed in a 
central division, except for eighteen who formed on each outer flank of the two 
divisions of musketeers. The musketeers of the twelve ordinary companies were 
formed into twelve platoons, six on each side of the pikemen. The grenadiers were 
divided into two platoons positioned on the extreme flanks. In the case of battalions 
that were under strength it would appear that it was considered more important to 
keep up the size of platoons rather than the number of platoons. 
If the regiment be compleat, every company may make a plotton, which 
makes six Plottons upon each Wing; but if considerably weakened, a Wing 
may be divided into four Plottons, which ought to be the least number, to give 
time to charge again, and be ready by that time the Fire is round, that the 
Battalion, if there be occasion, may entertain a continual Fire.238 
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In this context the phrase ‘to charge again’ refers to reloading and this tells us that a 
platoon should be able to reload and be ready to fire again by the time the other 
three platoons have fired. It is also clear that sustained fire was to be achieved by 
each platoon firing in turn along the line of each division of musketeers rather than 
by the rotation of ranks to the front or by ranks kneeling so those behind could fire 
over them.  Instead of using, as Orrery suggested, a minimum of four ranks, this 
method used a minimum of four platoons.239 Further, a platoon did not necessarily 
conform to a company and all the ranks in a platoon fired together. Thus all the three 
elements required for platoon firing were brought together. 
 
The musketeer still required room for reloading the matchlock musket and, even if 
not hampered by a rest, the process was still a complex one and on the battlefield 
the use of just three orders was retained. On the command ‘Make Ready’ the front 
rank of musketeers knelt and the second and third ranks closed forwards and all 
prepared to fire, on ‘Present’ they took aim and on ‘Fire’ they fired. After firing and 
with no further orders the front rank stood, the second and third ranks stepped back 
to a distance of two paces between ranks and they all reloaded.240 
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Figure 3.4: A possible firing sequence with six platoons on each flank. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 P 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
 2 3 4 5 6 P 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 P 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 P 6 5 4 3 2 1 
 
 
 
As Mackay made clear, four platoons could keep up a continual fire, one after the 
other with the first platoon ready to fire again after the fourth fired. From this it is 
possible to speculate on a firing sequence with six platoons, see figure 3.4. This 
could have been first platoons one and five, then two and six, next three and finally 
four before starting all over again. The benefit of this sequence would be that fire 
came from both flanks of a wing of musketeers at the same time, covering the 
central platoons of the division, and then from the central platoons, which in turn 
covered the flank platoons. Thus not only was a part of the formation always loaded 
and ready to fire, but each platoon that was loading was protected by the fire of 
those platoons. However, it could be that all six simply fired in turn along the line with 
the first to fire having reloaded by the time the sixth fired. 
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In terms of weight of fire delivered this system is clearly superior to the other two 
methods already mentioned. A unit firing by platoons in two wings of six platoons 
each can deliver all its fire, in four vollies, while a unit in six ranks firing by ranks will 
have only fired four ranks. Moreover it can maintain a sustained fire whilst a unit 
firing by ranks from the rear, as the French did, has a problem once the front rank 
has fired, which is that the rear rank cannot fire again until the ranks in front of it 
have reloaded, which has to be done standing up. A unit firing by ranks rotating to 
the front to fire and then retiring to reload would be at a disadvantage because of the 
time lost through the movement of the men, whilst the men firing by platoon reloaded 
on the spot. A unit using platoon firing could, all other things being equal, generate 
50% more fire than a unit in six ranks firing in ranks. Furthermore, being in three 
ranks a unit using platoon firing would be longer than a unit of the same size in six 
ranks and would be able to fire into its flanks. This represented a considerable 
improvement on the French method introduced under James II. 
 
In describing how to fire in three ranks Mackay also gave the earliest known 
description of what was to become known as locking up. This is the manner in which 
the three ranks closed and inter-locked so that they could all fire together safely. 
Houlding suggests that this was not introduced until the 1720s.241 In this he 
contradicts Chandler who claims it was introduced under Marlborough, but without 
giving any evidence.242 Curiously, after Mackay, subsequent military writings make 
no further mention of it until the 1720s when it reappears in a drill book written by 
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Humphrey Bland.243 Prior to the introduction of locking up each man in a file had 
stood directly behind the man in front and, in the case of the second and third ranks, 
fired over the head of the man in front. Whilst the man in the front rank knelt the man 
in the second rank had to stoop so that his head was below the level of the musket 
of the man behind him. In Mackay’s Rules the second rank man placed his left foot 
between the feet of the kneeling man and the third rank man placed his left foot 
between the feet of the second rank man. This had the effect of moving each man 
slightly to the right of the man in front so that the third rank man could level his 
musket past the shoulder of the second rank man, who no longer had to stoop.244 
 
When a battalion was to fire the whole line was to halt and the platoons were to fire 
from their position in the line. Mackay advised against advancing the platoons that 
were to fire ahead of the line. His argument was that doing so could result in 
confusion that an enemy might take advantage of.245 The importance of maintaining 
the line was again emphasised in Mackay’s instructions on what to do when an 
opposing enemy battalion was beaten. 
If by a resolute continuance and close fire, the Battalion happen to break the 
opposite enemy, the Officers must take special care their men do not break 
after them, but content themselves to make the Granadeers fire amongst 
them to augment their Terrour and Confusion, that they may receive in good 
order, such of the enemy as shall come up to sustain those which you ought 
to have routed, This Article the more carefully to be observed that in the 
advancing of the Line you are subject to be flanked by the enemies Horse 
posted betwixt the Lines for that purpose.246 
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Mackay is drawing attention to the need to maintain formation and the threat to 
infantry in a linear formation from cavalry, not attacking frontally, but attacking a 
flank.  
 
Another new departure for any English or Scots drill book was the advice on 
managing fire control. Mackay stressed the need for the men not to present or fire 
without order from their platoon commander. The reason for this being  
because if the battalion be attacked by horse, and the Commander, to avoid 
confusion, chosing rather to keep his fir whole, till they be very close, and then 
to fire by Plottons, upon a mint of the enemies squadrons, as break in upon 
his Battalion [he] think fit to cause it present without design of firing at that 
distance, sometimes makes the first rank of the squadron not only stoop 
short, but fall in confusion upon those that follow, but to bring the Souldiers to 
a custom of this last they must in Exercise be often accustomed, & 
commanded to present & recover their Arms without firing, telling them at the 
same time the reason for it, particularly at the same time of Action, and 
against Horse. The Commander judging it safest to manage his first fire, least 
their quick motion might prevent the second.247 
Mackay’s rules left something to be desired in terms of sentence structure and 
clarity, but what he was saying was that when attacked by cavalry a battalion 
commander may wish to make the enemy cavalry think he was about to fire by 
ordering his men to present, but not fire. In these circumstances the cavalry might 
baulk at advancing further and cause confusion in their own ranks. This would allow 
the commander to reserve his first and usually most effective fire for when the 
cavalry came closer. There was always a danger that fire at too great a range would 
not be sufficiently effective to stop cavalry, who could then close with the infantry 
before they could reload. Mackay reinforced the importance of keeping a firm control 
on management of the fire with the following advice. 
                                                          
247
 Mackay, Rules of War, Article X. 
  
 
92 
 
If the commanding Officer of a plotton, be not altogether perswaded of his 
Souldiers Patience and exact Obedience, as to the order of firing, to prevent a 
confused fire he shall march softly, according to the motions of the line, with 
shouldered Musquets permitting none to make ready, but such Plottons as he 
intends immediately shall fire.248  
This advice also reinforced the suggestion that there was a very specific sequence in 
which the platoons were to fire. Clearly there were still concerns about the threat 
posed to infantry by cavalry, but there is also a confidence that, handled properly, 
infantry in line could defeat cavalry by firepower alone. 
 
During the Nine Years War that followed the Accession of William and Mary there 
were a number of instances when English or Scots infantry are recorded as making 
use of platoon firing, several by Edward D’Auvergne who was chaplain first to the 
Earl of Bath’s Regiment. He wrote that in August 1693, in an action near Halle, ‘Sir 
Bevil Granville, who commanded the Earl of Bath’s Regiment, marched up to the 
relief if this Lunenburg Regiment, bearing the enemies fire before he suffered any 
Platton of his Battalion to discharge once’.249  He also recorded the effectiveness of 
platoon firing. Writing about the same action he said the French ‘infantry was so 
harras’d by our Fire, that they seem’d unwilling at last to come to the Charge’.250 
Clearly the doctrine of getting in close before firing was not just theoretical and was 
also found to be effective. 
 
Platoon firing as defined at the start of this chapter and described by Mackay would 
seem to have been developed in Holland between 1678 and 1688 before being 
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introduced to Britain in 1689. Thus, by the early 1690’s the infantry of both England 
and Scotland had adopted the principles of the platoon fire delivery system and were 
making effective use of it. This meant that British infantry, with its penchant for the 
aggressive application of firepower at close range, would no longer be hampered by 
the need to choose between depth in formations to ensure continuous, but low 
intensity fire, or a three deep line to maximise fire but with the risk of being caught 
unloaded. Platoon firing in a three deep line would mean that a British infantry 
battalion could manage and control the rate and intensity of its fire without changing 
formation. 
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4: William III and the Nine Years War 
 
The Accession of William III and Mary to the thrones of England and Scotland 
embroiled the country in the Nine Years War, 1688-1697, also known as the War of 
the League of Augsburg. This is a conflict which is largely overlooked by military 
historians in favour of the War of Spanish Succession that followed soon after it and 
which was dominated by the genius of the Duke of Marlborough. Chandler glosses 
over it in The Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough and the war’s main historian, 
John Childs, does not address the ‘how’ of the British Army despite his claim that an 
army’s ‘methods are as historically vital and relevant as their institutions and 
personnel’.251  What is more while many historians are aware that platoon firing was 
used by British infantry during this war, they draw their understanding of it from a 
description of an action in 1709, by which time, as will be demonstrated, it had 
undergone significant alteration from the form introduced in 1689.252 
 
At the time of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 there was little difference between the 
drill and tactical doctrine of the French army and the armies of England and 
Scotland, as shown by the 1685 edition of An Abridgement of the English Military 
Discipline.253 Yet the reign of William III and the war that followed was to be a period 
of considerable development for the English and Scots armies where the foundations 
were laid for the fighting capabilities that Marlborough would later employ so 
effectively. Furthermore, for most of the Nine Years War this was done without the 
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assistance of Marlborough who, despite playing a major role in the revolution in 
support of William, was out of favour with William from 1691 and did not hold a 
military command again until the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession in 
1702.  
 
This chapter will examine how platoon firing was developed, from the form 
introduced in 1689, how it was used on the battlefield and how its use was adapted 
and changed in response to the significant changes in the weapons used by British 
infantry during this period. These developments, however, are not readily 
identifiable. Following the publication in 1690 of The Exercise of the Foot with the 
Evolutions, and its 1693 Scottish edition with Mackay’s Rules, there was no official, 
printed drill produced until 1728.254 There was also a scarcity of eyewitness accounts 
to allow a comparison of theory with practice and few of these writers concerned 
themselves more than occasionally with the detail of drill and tactics. Some provided 
nothing, such as Captain Blackader, whose work was little more than an account of 
his own piety.255 Despite this it is possible to produce a broad description of the 
developments of the last decade of the 18th century and to analyse their implications 
and impact. 
 
The period of the Nine Years War was one of considerable change for the British 
army as, in common with other European armies, it exchanged the matchlock 
musket and the pike for the flintlock musket and the bayonet. During the same period 
bandoleers were phased out and replaced by cartridges, although priming from the 
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cartridge was not yet introduced. The disadvantages of the matchlock musket when 
compared to the firelock have already been discussed, but the firelock’s advantages 
can be summarised as being more certain ignition and quicker to load. When 
combined with the use of cartridges the firelock could achieve a rate of fire half as 
fast again as with the matchlock.256 Despite these advantages the French were 
particularly slow to change and Nosworthy has suggested that this was because they 
were preoccupied with the attack, in which they considered firepower to be less 
important than in defence.257 The gradual disappearance of the pike as a weapon of 
British infantry also meant that, eventually, half has many men again would be 
armed with muskets. Put simply, this increase in the number of muskets and the rate 
of fire meant that when compared to a unit of the same size from the English Civil 
War, an infantry unit at the end of the seventeenth century had the potential to 
generate in excess of double the firepower. 
 
The narrative of these changes in equipment is far from clear, consisting of 
piecemeal changes carried out during the last decade of the 17th Century and the 
first few years of the 18th Century and as finance allowed. Chandler, however, does 
give an account that is sufficient to grasp the outline and further, more technical 
details are to be found in Blackmore’s British Military Firearms.258 What neither writer 
does and it is really outside the scope of Blackmore’s book, is to analyse what these 
changes meant for the firepower generated by British infantry. The departure of the 
pikeman also meant that a reorganisation of the battalion was necessary and, 
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consequently, changes in the organisation of platoon firing. The pike, however, was 
slow to disappear as there were difficulties with its replacement, the bayonet, as 
quickly became apparent. 
 
Platoon firing was a relatively new development for the Dutch as well as the English 
and Scots and the Battle of Killiekrankie in July 1689 was the first opportunity for its 
use, against a Jacobite army of Highlanders. The infantry of a small Government 
army under the command of Lt.-Gen. Hugh Mackay was a combination of three 
English regiments and three regiments from the Scots Brigade in Dutch Service. In 
accordance with his own Rules of War, Mackay’s infantry were drawn up three deep 
and the battalion commanders were ordered to ‘begin their firing at the distance of 
100 paces by platoons to discourage the approaching Highlanders meeting with 
continual fire’.259 This was an unusually long range at which to open fire and the 
reason for this was a combination of the nature of the early bayonet and Mackay’s 
understanding of the way Highlanders fought, advancing at speed to get to hand to 
hand combat.  As Mackay himself observed, ‘if a battalion keep up [reserve] his fire 
till they [the highlanders] be near to make sure of them, they are upon it before our 
men can come to their second defence, which is the bayonet in the musle of the 
musket’.260 By opening fire at a longer range than usual, and then keeping up a 
‘continual fire’ by platoon firing, Mackay hoped to give his infantry time to inflict 
casualties by fire and to fix their bayonets before the enemy closed to hand to hand 
combat. Mackay’s own account described the fire of some of his infantry. 
Hastings, the General, and Levin’s regiments, which made the best fire and all 
the execution; particularly the General’s battalion made a great fire being well 
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exercised thereto by his brother, who, being his lieutenant colonel, 
commanded the battalion.261 
However, the fire of the infantry, even in platoons, was insufficient to stop the charge 
of the Highlanders and Mackay’s infantry was broken and over run.  
 
The bayonet was to have a considerable impact on firepower as it replaced the pike, 
allowing pikemen to become musketeers, but initially its use was fraught with 
difficulties. It had made its appearance early in the second half of the seventeenth 
century and in its early form was of the type known as a plug bayonet, which was 
simply a dagger with a grip of a small enough diameter to be pushed into the muzzle 
of a musket. There were a number of drawbacks to this type of bayonet and the main 
one was that once in place the musket could not be fired, as experienced by 
Lieutenant General Mackay at Killiekrankie in 1689.  In defence of Mackay and his 
unfortunate infantry it must be said the Highland charge continued to be a problem 
for British infantry up to the battle of Culloden in 1746. Mackay claimed that he 
subsequently developed a bayonet that attached to the barrel with a pair of rings that 
slid over the muzzle.262 He mentioned in his Rules of War a bayonet that ‘fixt without 
the muzzles of their Pieces’, which would suggest that he wrote the Rules between 
Killiekrankie and his death in 1692.263 
 
Brigadier-General James Douglass, in his manuscript military manual Scholae Martis 
or the Arte of War…as Practised in Flanders, in the Wars, from Anno 1688 to An: 
1714, also wrote of the problems of using the plug bayonet: ‘we could never make 
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use of them till all our shot was spent and then we fixed the wooden hafts within ye 
caliber of our muskets which was of so little consequence that ye least strok upon ye 
barall would make them presently fly out whereof I have been often witness’.264 
Subsequently the plug bayonet was replaced by the socket bayonet, something for 
which Douglass claimed credit. As a Captain at the battle of Landen in 1693 he 
claimed to have captured a French socket bayonet and had it copied for the use of 
his own Grenadier company.265 Instead of a wooden handle the socket bayonet had 
a tubular sleeve that fitted over the outside of the musket barrel. A zigzag slot in the 
socket engaged on a lug on the barrel, securing it in place and giving rise to the 
‘bayonet fitting’. This allowed the musket to be loaded and fired with the bayonet 
fitted and meant that it was also more firmly attached. 
 
At the same time as the bayonet was developing and being introduced it was also 
being discovered that infantry did not necessarily require pikemen to defend 
themselves against cavalry attacks. The vulnerability of infantry to cavalry was a 
major consideration for as long as cavalry rode horses. The response in the 
seventeenth century was twofold. Firstly there was the pike, usually some five 
metres long, that could present a steel tipped hedge to attacking cavalry, holding 
them off beyond the reach of the horseman’s sword or lance. Secondly there were 
complex formations in which the pikemen formed an all round defence with the 
musketeers sheltering under the pikes or between or behind the pikemen. However, 
as already shown, musketeers in the English Civil Wars were quite capable of 
defending themselves against cavalry without resorting to such formations. Despite 
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this the various editions of the Abridgement of Military Discipline all contained 
directions for forming hollow squares of pikemen surrounded by musketeers and 
gave detailed instructions on how to organise the firing of a square. What was 
missing from the instructions, however, was any actual mention of cavalry and how 
to deal with an attack by them. 
 
Mackay’s Rules, in contrast, contained a considerable amount of advice on how to 
deal with cavalry, and without resort to defensive formations based on pikemen. The 
key element of Mackay’s advice was that the infantry should reserve their fire until 
the attacking cavalry ‘be very close and then to fire by Plottons’.266 In contrast to 
earlier drill books Mackay’s Rules make no mention of forming any sort of battalion 
square to defend against cavalry, nor were there any accounts of this happening 
during the Nine Years War. Mackay’s Rules represented the common tactical 
doctrine of the three armies under William’s control, English, Scottish and Dutch, and 
just how effective platoon fire could be against cavalry was demonstrated at the 
Battle of the Boyne in 1690 when Jacobite cavalry attacked William’s Dutch Guards 
who were leading the attack across the Boyne and had no pikes. The Guards were 
isolated on the enemy side of the river and had no protection from any natural 
obstacle such as a hedge or ditch. William was, according to an eyewitness, 
extremely concerned: 
But when he saw them stand their ground and fire by platoons, so that the 
horse were forced to run away in great disorder, he breathed out…, and said 
he had seen his Guards do that which he had never seen foot do in his life.267 
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William’s comment that he had never seen such an action before is further evidence 
of the novelty of platoon firing. 
 
The Battle of the Boyne, a victory for William over the Jacobite army of James II, was 
one of the first occasions on which platoon firing was successfully tested in battle. 
Only days before another trial of platoon firing had occurred in Flanders at the battle 
of Fleurus where Dutch infantry under Field Marshal von Waldeck defeated a French 
force. Here the Dutch infantry demonstrated the ability of platoon firing to deal 
effectively with both infantry and cavalry. 
For after they [the Dutch infantry] were abandoned by the horse, they also 
sustained the charge of French cavalry and infantry, and being attacked in 
front, flank, and rear, all at once, yet remained firm, unbroken and 
impenetrable: they let the enemy’s horse approach within pistol shot of them, 
and then discharged with such an unconcerned and steady aim, that the 
whole squadron seemed to sink to the ground, scarce thirty of the whole 
squadron number escaping: and this course they so accustomed themselves 
to observe, that at length they laughed at the enemy. The French, on the 
other side were so confounded with the execution done upon them, that they 
fled as soon as the Dutch began to present their muskets.268 
Two important points are apparent in this account. First, the Dutch infantry let the 
French cavalry come very close before firing and second, it became sufficient for the 
infantry to threaten to fire for the French cavalry to retreat, such was the 
effectiveness of their close range fire. 
 
Another account tells the same story and adds that the French infantry were just as 
intimidated by the Dutch firepower as the cavalry. 
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So that the enemy, by their [Dutch] close and punctual Fire were so often 
Galled and Shattered they knew not what to do; the French Infantry could not 
so much as dare look them in the face.269 
In all three of the preceding examples the infantry concerned behaved in complete 
accordance with Mackay’s Rules. 
 
Chandler comments that ‘at the battle of Fleurus, it was widely noted that several 
German battalions using firearms alone had proved capable of repulsing French 
cavalry more effectively than others armed with the conventional number of pikes’.270 
William III’s army contained troops of many nationalities in addition to English, Scots 
and Dutch. There were troops from many German states, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Brandenburg Prussia. The Prussian infantry were 
taught platoon firing in the Autumn of 1688.271 It would seem reasonable to suggest 
that the troops from other nations were at least aware of platoon firing even if they 
did not adopt it or stick with it. For example, according to Nosworthy the Swedish 
army under Charles XII employed a tactic from 1701 called ‘ga-pa’, literally go-on. In 
this they advanced in four ranks and at fifty paces the rear two ranks fired a volley. 
The advance then resumed with the front two ranks firing at point blank range before 
charging home.272 
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Although the examples of the Boyne and Fleurus gave ample evidence of the 
effectiveness of platoon firing on these occasions the main protagonists were Dutch 
infantry. English and Scots regiments also made their presence felt in the war and 
clearly took to platoon firing, which they combined with their previous propensity for 
getting close to the enemy before firing. In 1689, the same year as Killiekrankie, at 
the battle of Walcourt one English battalion in particular distinguished itself. The 
French launched an attack that surprised the allied army under the command of 
Field Marshal von Waldeck while a large portion of it was foraging in the surrounding 
countryside. They were protected by the single English battalion of Colonel Hodges. 
The French attack was led by cavalry and began at about nine o’clock in the 
morning. The London Gazette carried the following graphic account. 
Col. Hodges lined some convenient Hedges, and kept Firing upon them [the 
French cavalry] till between 10 and 11, in which time most of the Foragers 
were gone home. The French brought Dragoons and Foot to force Hodges 
from his Post, who thereupon retired to a Mill, which he maintained till he 
received Orders to retreat, which he did with extraordinary Bravery, still firing 
upon the Enemy, till he came about twelve a clock near to a little Town called 
Walcourt, a Mile from our Camp, and the Pass to it; where we had a Regiment 
of Lunenburgers, who fired very thick upon the French: so with the loss of 
Lieutenant Colonel Graham, Captain Davison mortally wounded, and about 
30 Men killed, Col. Hodges returned to the Camp.273 
This action and the actions of British troops in the ensuing battle earned nothing but 
praise, von Waldeck expressed surprise, ‘Mons. The Colonel Hotzes [Hodges] and 
the English, who are with him, have accomplished miracles, and I would never have 
believed so many of the English would show such a joie de combattre.’274 Although it 
is not explicitly stated that Hodges’ battalion was using platoon fire it is unlikely they 
were using anything else, given its official status.  
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At the battle of Steenkirk in 1692 it was William’s infantry who were on the offensive 
and the French who had the benefit of hedges. The battle was something of a 
disaster as William was unable to properly support the English infantry who led the 
attack on the French; the result was that despite their success the battle was a 
bloody defeat. The English infantry, however, further enhanced its reputation and 
demonstrated that they were still perfectly capable of closing with the enemy to make 
their musket fire tell. D’Auvergne described how 
Sir Robert Douglass, with his first Battalion, charg’d several of the Enemies, 
and beat them from three several Hedges, and had made himself Master of 
the fourth, where going through a Gap to get on the other side, he was 
unfortunately kill’d upon the spot; all the other Regiments performing equal 
wonder, and behaving with the same Bravery, and beating the Enemies from 
their Hedges so far, that in this Hedge-fighting their fire was generally Muzzle 
to Muzzle, we on the one side, and the Enemy on the other.275  
Close range fire was again being employed, this time offensively. The British infantry 
were closing with the French, who were protected by hedges, successfully engaging 
them at extremely close range and forcing them to retreat. The example of the Earl 
of Bath’s Regiment has already been given, but includes the detail that the French 
fire was deliberately ignored in order to get close.276 
 
The infantry also demonstrated a considerable amount of discipline and fire control 
in the subsequent withdrawal.  
The night drawing on, the King order’d the Army to retreat, which was done 
with admirable Order; for tho’ the French did follow us for some time, yet they 
did not fire a shot, such was the order of our Retreat that they did not dare 
venture upon it; the English Grenadiers brought up the Rear, and whenever 
the French mov’d towards us, they fac’d to the Right about, and presented 
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themselves to the Enemy; then the Enemy would halt, and so our Rear-Guard 
then march’d on; this halting and facing, and then marching, continu’d for 
some time.277 
Again, this passage shows a close adherence to Mackay’s Rules, presenting 
muskets as if intending to fire, and that although the British were retreating the 
French were sufficiently wary of their fire capabilities that they kept their distance. 
 
The increased firepower generated by platoon firing combined with the introduction 
of the socket bayonet meant that there was no longer a need for pikemen and over 
the course of the Nine Years War they were gradually reduced in numbers. Childs 
has suggested that the ratio of muskets to pikes increased from 2:1 in 1689 to 3:1 by 
1697.278 Certainly by 1702 it would seem that the intention was that infantry 
regiments should have given up their pikes. Six regiments of infantry going to Ireland 
in June 1702 all received the same instruction. 
Her Majesty’s pleasure is that all pikes already issued to the Regiment of Foot 
under your command be returned to the Stores of Ordnance, in lieu of a 
sufficient number of muskets which you are to receive out of the said 
stores.279 
 
The way that infantry fought and carried out platoon firing at the start of this period 
was clear from Mackay’s Rules. The disappearance of pikes, however, gives rise to 
the question of how regimental organisation and the management of platoon firing 
were consequently affected. Brigadier-General Douglass’ manuscript military 
manual, Scholae Martis, contained very detailed directions on drill and platoon firing 
by battalions without pikes. 280 The difficulty is that the manual was, obviously, written 
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at some time after 1714 and there was no date given for when the drill described 
was in use during the twenty six year period covered by the title.  
 
Douglass’ drill is certainly later in date than Mackay’s. When Mackay’s Rules of War 
appeared it was published as part of The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions.281 
In this the drill for musketeers, individually and as part of a battalion, was using the 
matchlock musket. The drill for the firelock musket was given as a separate section. 
There was also pike drill. In Douglass’ manuscript battalions were completely armed 
with firelock muskets and socket bayonets. There was no mention of matchlocks and 
he used the phrase ‘since the pikes were out of use’, which indicates a date for the 
drill after the end of the Nine Years War.282 He also had each company making a 
platoon, which echoed Mackay.283 As will be shown, by 1708 it had become the 
practice in the British Army to divide battalions into fifteen platoons, regardless of the 
company organisation, which places Douglass’ drill before that date. That is if it was 
a British drill and not a Dutch one. Prior to 1701 Douglass had been serving in 
Holland with the Scots Guards, but was then appointed Lieutenant Colonel of 
Aeneas Mackay’s regiment of the Scottish Brigade in Dutch service.284 As will be 
shown, the Dutch method of platoon firing remained much as Douglass described it 
up to the end of the War of Spanish Succession in 1714. He also included in his 
manuscript various ‘evolutions’ or drill manoeuvres that were abandoned in 1708 by 
the British army. If he was writing a Dutch manual it could have been reflecting their 
practice for anytime from 1700 up to 1714, but it would not be unreasonable to 
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expect a Dutch manual to have been written in Dutch. Perhaps most tellingly, 
however, he described how to salute the King. This must be a reference to William 
III, who died in March 1702 and was succeeded by Queen Anne.  This evidence 
points to the turn of the century as the date for when the drill described by Douglass 
was in use.  
 
As William III was head of both the Dutch army and the English and Scots army it is 
reasonable to assume that the same drill, as described by Douglass, was in use in 
both armies at that time. This assumption is supported by sections of the manual 
where Douglass described differences between the Dutch and British organisation of 
grenadiers and how to allow for that in the drill, so it could be used by either army.285 
 
Douglass’ instruction on firing included details on the order of firing of the platoons.  
Let the firing begin from ye two extream plotouns upon ye rigt and left of ye 
Battallion and so continue sucesivly firing till you end in ye centre...But if a 
continuall fire must be keept as in Battell reqd after ye plotouns have fired 
they must immediately loadd againe & shoulder till ordered by ye Capt to 
make ready etc and this is done in addvancing and retearing as well as 
standing.286 
The firing order of the platoons was specified and simple, it was from the flanks to 
the centre, gone was Mackay’s suggestion of a more complex order of firing.287 In 
the other respects of reloading immediately and his comment about advancing, 
retiring and standing he echoed Mackay. Mackay’s suggestions that the best shots 
be held in reserve and that the Grenadier platoons could be hidden behind the flanks 
of a battalion had also gone, further simplifying the drill.288 
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Douglass also instructed that the men in each rank were to stand with the files at 
close order, that was ‘shoulder to shoulder, but so as they can be master of ther 
Arms’.289 This was closer than specified in the Exercise of the Foot that also 
contained Mackay’s Rules of War, there the distance between files when firing was 
given as half a pace.290 This closing up was undoubtedly a result of exchanging the 
matchlock for the flintlock and had the effect of concentrating a battalion’s fire over a 
narrower front. Both The Exercise of Foot and Douglass said the distance between 
ranks ‘either standing or marching is 4 paces’.291 Although the number of movements 
required to load and fire a firelock musket was fewer than for a matchlock the use of 
just the commands ‘make ready’, ‘present’ and ‘fire’ continued in use in action. On 
the order ‘make ready’ the ranks closed, the front knelt, the middle stooped and the 
rear stood, all cocking their muskets. On ‘present’ they levelled their muskets and 
then came ‘fire’. After firing the ranks were to open ‘backwards to 2 paces distance 
that they may have roum to charge or load ther arms againe without expecting any 
word of command for ye same’.292 
 
Douglass also included a revised version of Mackay’s Rules that gave an indication 
of how combat practices had changed over the course of the Nine Years War. In 
many places Douglass’ Rules used the same wording as Mackay, although 
elsewhere he improved on their intelligibility and simplified some of them.  In general 
the content of both sets of rules was the same, but there were a few differences. For 
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instance, Douglass made no mention of locking up, instead he reverted to the older 
method of the second rank stooping to fire over the heads of the kneeling front rank 
with the third rank standing to fire over the heads of the second rank.293  
 
Douglass also discussed dealing with cavalry in a much simpler, clearer way, while 
retaining the need for close range fire and being able to present without firing. 
If the battallyon be charged with a body of Cavallry, the commanding officer 
shall keep up his fire until the horse be very close and then to fire either by 
rank or plotouns as he thinks proper.294 
The Enemy in this case will now and then come briskly up as if they designed 
to fall in with you, although they doe not designe itt, but only to try what 
countenance you mak, and in such occurancys the Commanding officers 
must cause the whole Battallion present without any designe of firing wher 
with beforehand he is to advertise ye officers, and that will redaly make ye first 
Rank of ye Squadrons not only stoup but fall in confusion upon those that 
follow.  
And to bring his souldiers to some expertness in this they must be often 
commanded to present ther Arms and againe recover without firing telling 
them ye reason for it.295  
That this theory was put into practice was seen during the retreat of William’s allied 
army following its defeat at Landen in 1693. 
Lieutenant-General Talmash had the care to bring off the English Foot of the 
main Body by Dormal, which he did with as much Prudence as he had before 
fought with Bravery... As the Enemy offer’d to trouble his Retreat, he made 
the Battalions face, and Present to them, and then they halted, unwilling to 
feel any more the fire of our Foot.296 
Clearly the ability to not fire at close range was as important as actually firing. 
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During the course of the Nine Years War large numbers of new troops were raised, 
either for new units or to replace casualties, who all needed to be trained quickly.297 
Not all units would have had the training and experience of regiments such as the 
Dutch Blue Guards. As well as demonstrating how the disappearance of pike men 
was dealt with, it is also possible that Douglass’ manual represented a simplified 
version of drill and tactics pared down to the necessary basics in order to avoid 
confusing newly raised troops. However, it was with this drill and method of platoon 
firing that the British army under Marlborough started the War of the Spanish 
Succession. 
 
A significant difference between the tactical methods of the Nine Years War and 
those of the English Civil War and the campaigns following the Restoration of 1660 
is the apparent abandoning of the infantry assault following close range fire. Mackay 
states, and Douglass copies almost word for word; ‘If by a resolute continuance and 
close fire, the Battalion happen to break the opposite enemy, the Officers must take 
special care their men do not break after them, but content themselves to make the 
Granadeers fire amongst them to augment their Terrour and Confusion.’298 This 
emphasis on beating the enemy by firepower has been seen as indicating an 
abandonment of the infantry assault. As Chandler writes; 
In the 1690s it became rare for infantry to fight hand-to-hand with their 
opponents, although there were of course notable exceptions such as 
Steenkirk (1692) where the English and Dutch battalions were divided from 
the French only by hedgerows. Generally speaking, however, commanders 
deemed their foot to be a source of more or less static fire-power once they 
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had moved ponderously up into musket range, relying on the wheeling 
horsemen to decide the ultimate issue.299 
 
Some explanation for the abandonment of the previously highly successful tactic of 
following a close range volley with a charge to hand to hand combat can be found in 
Mackay and Douglass. They both drew attention to the importance of not breaking 
the line to pursue a broken enemy unit in case, as Douglass wrote, ‘you come to be 
flanked in yt irregular action by troups ye Enemie may have posted betwixt yr lines 
for that purpose’.300 Mackay used much the same words.301 To close with the enemy 
to hand to hand combat would inevitably leave a battalion in some confusion, making 
it extremely vulnerable to counter-attack. Thus the infantry chose to rely upon 
firepower to break an enemy. That they were able to do so was a result of the 
changes that had taken place since the English Civil War. During the Civil War 
infantry regiments were not able to generate long range, sustained fire that was also 
effective and decisive. On the other hand an infantry regiment that advanced to point 
blank range and maximised its fire had little choice but to close to hand to hand 
immediately after firing. With all its fire delivered in one go and with reloading taking 
so long, to do otherwise would leave it vulnerable. By contrast a battalion at the end 
of the century could not only deliver more fire more rapidly at any range, but because 
of platoon firing it was sustainable fire, there was always some part of it that was 
firing and thus protecting those parts that were reloading. Furthermore, as suggested 
by Mackay, the fire of the front rank could be reserved and the battalion would still be 
able to generate a considerable amount of continuous platoon fire and be protected 
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by the front rank with bayonets fixed.302 As Douglass wrote, and at the same time 
summed up the different roles of the infantry and the cavalry: 
For now, in our modern way of fighting viz: by platouns alternativly firing, it is 
not aloud ye Infantry to fall in pell mell amongst any troups in confusion, least 
therby they bring themselves in to ane equall disadvantage an so change the 
smyles of fortune in to frouns and threats of loss, therfor whatever confusion 
ye Enemy may be in the Infantry ar not to brake ther Ranks to persheu but ar 
still to march softly on in full body closing ther files and making up ther Ranks 
as the men drops, and so re never out of condition of Battalling or Sustaining 
wher its requied leaving the accomplishment of the victory to ye Cavalry 
giving no quarters till ye victory is determined.303 
 
Mackay, however, did write about the use of the bayonet: 
That such Regiments as are provided of good Bayonets, fixt without the 
muzzles of their Pieces, may in approaching to the due distance of firing, 
cause the first rank of the whole Battalion to fix their Bayonets and continuing 
their march till they be close upon the Enemy, make the first rank kneel with 
the points of their Bayonets upon the Ground, and the other two Ranks closed 
up, fire over their heads upon the Enemy, who supposing readily all the fire 
spent, if he happen to stand it, will come up the bolder to your Battalion, who 
receiving him with the [fire of the] first Rank, second with the push of pike and 
Bayonet, will readily break him whether horse or Foot.304 
Mackay included the need to ‘be close upon the enemy’ before firing, but rather than 
maximising the infantry’s fire power, held the front rank fire in reserve in case of a 
counter attack, in which case the front rank was to fire and then charge, or present, 
their bayonets at the same time as the pikemen charged their pikes. It was a 
description of the bayonet used defensively, just as the pike was, and suggests that 
the bayonet was seen as an alternative to the defensive qualities of the pike and that 
its offensive qualities had not yet been recognised.  
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Douglass omitted any such advice on the use of the bayonet from his version of the 
Rules, although he did record his role in copying the socket bayonet from the French 
and comment on its superior qualities as a weapon compared to the plug bayonet.305 
Writing of the battles of Fleurus, Steenkirk and Landen he described how the French 
socket bayonet was a ‘great advantage’ as it meant the French ‘both push’d and 
fired at once’ and was ‘a much better defence than our pikes wer’.306 Again the 
bayonet was clearly seen as a defensive weapon. 
 
Chandler wrote, in a comment later echoed by Nosworthy, ‘many contemporaries 
spoke with awe of the fury of the initial French fire in action, although its continuity 
and effectiveness tended to fall off rapidly after the initial discharge’.307 As already 
discussed, the French fired by ranks, and during the Nine Years War, when they 
habitually formed five ranks, they could deliver all their fire in two volleys of three and 
two ranks. Whilst this did result in a very heavy fire it also resulted in reloading 
problems once all the ranks had fired.308 From contemporary accounts it would also 
appear that French infantry opened fire at a greater distance than British infantry, 
allowing the British to get closer to the French, who were presumably busy reloading, 
before delivering their own, heavy and sustainable platoon firing. 
 
A number of examples of this are available. Although it occurred against Jacobite 
Irish infantry Story recorded one instance; ‘As our men advanced up the hill, the Irish 
fired a whole Volley upon them, and then set up the Huzzah, but scarce killed a Man, 
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(for they shot over them) our Men however went on till they were got within Pistol-
shot of them, and then fired, by which they galled the Irish, that they immediately 
run.’309 It is notable that the Irish are recorded as firing a ‘whole volley’ and no more. 
Presumably they were trying to reload as the English infantry advanced and then 
fired within pistol range. The example of the Earl of Bath’s regiment under Sir Bevil 
Granville has already been given as it ‘marched up to the relief of this Lunenburg 
Regiment, bearing the enemies fire before he suffered any Platton of his Battalion to 
discharge once’.310 
 
There is no doubt that the English and Scots continued to deliver their fire at close 
range. This was clear from the account of the fighting at Steenkirk already quoted 
and the actions of the English regiments in the victory over the Jacobites at Aughrim 
in 1691. ‘The Irish at their near approach to the Ditches, fired upon them, but our 
Men contemning all Disadvantages, advanced immediately to the lowest Hedges, 
and beat the Irish from thence.’311  
 
Platoon firing was extremely effective in a firefight where both sides sought to 
overwhelm the other by fire alone and one side, as the French did, chose to fire by 
ranks in a deep formation. It did not, however, always win the day. At Killiekrankie 
the Highlanders’ tactic of firing a single volley and then rushing in, sword in hand, 
allowed them to overwhelm Mackay’s infantry in hand to hand combat even though 
they suffered heavy casualties from the fire of his infantry.312 Similarly at the battle of 
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Fleurus not all the fighting had gone in favour of the Dutch infantry. No less an 
authority than Maurice de Saxe in his Reveries described how platoon firing could be 
defeated in a manner not very different from that of the Highlanders at Killiekrankie. 
It was an established maxim of M. de Greder, a man of reputation, and who 
has for a long time, commanded my regiment of foot in France, to make his 
men carry their firelocks shouldered in an engagement; and in order to be still 
more master of their fire, he did not even suffer them to make ready their 
matches: thus he marched against the enemy, and the moment they gave 
their fire, he threw himself, sword in hand, at the head of the colours, and 
crying out Follow me! rushed at once upon them. By this method he defeated 
the Frise guards at the battle of Fleurus, and was also successful on all other 
occasions.313 
 
In 1693 French infantry under Marshal Catinat in Italy stormed Austrian positions 
with the bayonet. The effect of these events is summarised by Chandler. 
Such success, however, encouraged French generals of several generations 
in the belief that the true metier of the French foot was cold steel – and this 
assumption led them to disregard the refinements of infantry fire tactics, with 
what proved to be near-fatal results in the following war.314 
Amongst the French generals who subsequently sustained this belief in cold steel 
was the Marechal de Saxe, whilst the influential writer Folard also adhered to it.315  
French offensive tactics attached little importance to firefights conducted at a 
distance, every effort being made to approach the enemy and overthrow them 
with the threat of the bayonet or drawn sword.316 
The French remained content to rely on the bayonet and, despite its drawbacks, their 
version of firing by ranks. In contrast the British adopted an approach that 
emphasised firepower. 
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Although often overshadowed by the war of Spanish Succession, the Nine Years 
War represents a pivotal period in the development of the firepower capability of 
British infantry. During this period the pike disappeared and was replaced by the 
bayonet, which increased the number of soldiers with muskets by half as many 
again. The matchlock was replaced by the flintlock, which was more reliable and 
quicker to load and fire. The speed of loading was further increased by the 
introduction of the cartridge in place of the bandoleer. The resultant increase in 
firepower was, at the same time, delivered by means of platoon firing, which allowed 
the full potential of the increase in available firepower to be realised by giving a 
battalion commander a range of options on how to deliver his battalion’s fire. 
 
A battalion could now fire one of its twelve platoons every few seconds and still have 
the first platoon to fire reloaded and ready to fire again by the time all twelve had 
fired. Depending upon circumstances this rate of fire could be slowed down if 
sustainable fire was required over a long period of time. The option also existed for a 
battalion commander to fire only a given number of his platoons or to fire all his 
platoons together in a battalion volley. A further option was to fire only the second 
and rear ranks, in any of the ways mentioned, keeping the entire front rank as a 
reserve. Furthermore, British infantry retained its ability to sustain the enemy’s fire 
and get close before delivering its own fire, although the bayonet was, in the drill 
books at least, seen as a defensive rather than offensive weapon. 
 
Despite these advantages platoon firing was not an inevitable battle winner. It was 
vulnerable to a rapid assault, as at Killiekrankie and Fleurus, and to being 
overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, as at Landen in 1693. Outnumbered 
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approximately three to two the Confederate Army of William finally collapsed when it 
could no longer keep the French at bay with musketry. 
The elector upon the Right, order’d two Battalions to Charge the Enemy in 
Front, whilst three others should Charge them upon their Left Flank... The two 
Battalions, one Dutch and t’other of Scots Gurds, which the Elector had 
commanded to Charge the Enemy in the Front, had spent all their 
Ammunitions by their continual Fire for so many hours: The Elector order’d to 
have Ammunition brought them, but it could not time enough to do 
business.317 
This failure was attributed to a lack of ammunition rather than any failing in the men 
or tactics. However, its ability with this new fire system was usually enough to allow 
British infantry to overcome its usual enemy of the time, the French. It was also 
sufficient to deal with frontal cavalry attacks. 
 
Platoon firing as described by Lieutenant General Mackay had been developed at a 
time when a third of a battalion was made up of pikemen and the musketeers were 
armed with matchlocks and loaded from bandoleers. Although the disappearance of 
the pike and the introduction of the flintlock musket and the cartridge led to minor 
adaptations in the way that platoon fire was delivered it remained basically 
unchanged and was the fire delivery system that the British infantry took into 
Flanders at the outbreak of the War of Spanish Succession in May 1702. A battalion 
in line formed its dozen line or hat companies into a dozen platoons in two wings of 
six. The platoons fired in turn from the flanks to the centre, starting with the right 
hand platoon of the right wing, followed by the left hand platoon of the left wing and 
alternating platoons on the right and left until the two platoons in the centre fired. The 
Grenadier company was divided into two and formed a platoon on each flank. They 
appear to have operated almost independently of the main body. By the end of that 
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war, however, platoon firing had undergone a major change that took advantage of 
the improvements in weapons and the resultant increase in potential firepower. 
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5: The Age of Marlborough, 1702 to 1714  
 
It is the view of David Chandler, writing about the Duke of Marlborough, that 
‘England has never produced a greater soldier’.318 Field Marshal Montgomery of 
Alamein’s assessment is that, 
Of all the military personalities who pass across the stage during his 
times...Marlborough was the greatest.... I have always considered that it was he who 
was responsible for the rise of the British army to become one of the foremost 
armies in Europe.319 
Marlborough’s praises have been sung by military historians such as Richard 
Holmes, John Keegan, Andrew Wheatcroft and J W Fortescue.320 But in studying the 
man and his campaigns historians have tended to ignore the detail of how 
Marlborough’s battles were fought and concentrate instead on the narrative of 
events, analysing his strategies and manoeuvres. Yet, regardless of Marlborough’s 
brilliance, the battles were ultimately decided by the outcome of the combat between 
battalions and squadrons in which technique was critical. As John Houlding put it; 
‘We are too easily dazzled by the brilliance of Marlborough’s grand-tactical 
dispositions, the more so when these are contrasted with those of William; 
Marlborough’s victories were the fruit of the military genius of the commander, and 
not of any radical departure in the drill and tactics (save for platoon-fire) of the 
individual corps under his command.’321  
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Marlborough’s greatness is not in dispute and, as Houlding demonstrates, there was 
little change after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 in the way the British army 
operated tactically, except, vitally, for the introduction of platoon fire.322 However, 
using this new combat technique, British infantry, and their allies the Dutch, 
repeatedly punched above their weight on the battlefield in the face of frequently 
numerically superior French forces. In order to explain the success of British infantry 
it is necessary to look past the brilliance of Marlborough and understand what was 
happening in the ranks and files of his battalions. 
 
The importance of platoon firing is clear in the views expressed by Houlding. ‘By the 
time of Blenheim a new fire-tactics – the famous platoon-fire system – had 
established itself as the forte of the British foot.’323 Houlding also states ‘that a sound 
appreciation of the supremacy of firepower over all other forms of combat had been 
a lesson well learned by the end of Marlborough’s campaigns, and had been taken 
to heart in the army’.324 Furthermore, although platoon firing was learnt from the 
Dutch, the British army first made it its own and then, after William’s death in 1702, 
further developed it whilst the Dutch platoon fire changed hardly at all. It was thus at 
the very heart of the success of the British army under Marlborough. However, 
despite this fundamental importance, the way platoon firing was organised and 
carried out and how it continued to develop under Marlborough has not been 
accurately described nor its application analysed.  
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In his Art of Warfare in the Age of Marlborough, covering the period of 1688 to 1748, 
Chandler’s aim is ‘a fairly full examination of how the regimental officer and soldier 
fought and manoeuvred’ and he achieves a great deal of success.325  However, as 
he deals with all arms and the major European nations it is perhaps not surprising 
that he dos not get down to the detail of how Marlborough’s own army fought. 
Furthermore, whilst grasping Marlborough’s strategic and tactical abilities, he fails to 
fully appreciate the nature of platoon firing. He understands that platoon firing 
‘developed over a considerable number of years’, and that it changed during this 
period.326 However, he does not identify its original form or how it developed, quoting 
Kane’s version as representing ‘English usage’ during the War of Spanish 
Succession.327 In this misunderstanding he is in company with others, such as 
Nosworthy.328 Like Chandler he bases his description of platoon firing on a 
combination of an account of one particular firefight, at Malplaquet in 1709, and 
Kane’s instructions. These views of the nature of platoon firing during the War of the 
Spanish Succession are generally accepted by historians, but are wrong.  
 
As has been shown above, neither of the sources drawn on by Chandler and 
Nosworthy described the way platoon firing was conducted at the start of the war.329 
This was also quite different from what was described at the battle of Malplaquet in 
1709. This chapter will identify how and when the organisation of platoon firing 
changed, something not recorded in any publication at the time and which has 
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eluded historians. It will show that there was a very significant change in the conduct 
of platoon firing by 1709 and that there were also differences between the conduct of 
platoon firing in that 1709 firefight and what Kane later advocated. 
 
In 1708 The Duke of Marlborough’s New Exercise of Firelocks and Bayonets was 
published, but this was not an official publication and only dealt with drill and not how 
firing was to be conducted.330 Fortunately a number of manuscripts and letters 
survive that record the steps in the development of platoon firing through this period. 
There was also a scarcity of eyewitness accounts to allow a comparison of theory 
with practice and few of these writers concerned themselves more than occasionally 
with the detail of drill and tactics. However, there are sufficient first hand descriptions 
to allow an analysis of platoon firing in practice. 
 
Despite his fall from favour with William III in 1692, Marlborough was politically and 
militarily rehabilitated by the eve of the War of Spanish Succession, 1701-1714. The 
two men worked together to prepare for the conflict, but, following a riding accident, 
William died in March 1702 to be succeeded by Queen Anne. The most obvious 
effect of this was to elevate Marlborough to the position of Commander in Chief of 
the English and Scots armies. Less obviously it broke the link that had existed 
between the English, Scots and Dutch armies when William was head of state and 
commander in chief of all three. 
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The first major engagement of the war for the British army was the storming of the 
Schellenburg on 2 July 1704. As part of Marlborough’s campaign that culminated in 
the battle of Blenheim, it was necessary to acquire a suitable base for supplies. 
Accordingly a plan was laid to capture Donauworth on the Danube. The town and 
defences of Donauworth were dominated by the Schellenburg Heights and capturing 
those was the key to the town. The fight for the Schellenburg subsequently became 
synonymous with vicious hand to hand fighting where there was little opportunity for 
the disciplined and controlled application of platoon fire. Perhaps the most vivid 
description came from one of the French defenders, whose account left no doubt 
that the British infantry had not lost any of their stomach for hand to hand fighting. 
It would be impossible to describe in words strong enough the details of the 
carnage that took place during this first attack, which lasted a good hour or 
more. We were all fighting hand to hand, hurling them back as they clutched 
at the parapet; men were slaying, or tearing at the muzzles of guns and the 
bayonets which pierced their entrails; crushing under their feet their own 
wounded comrades, and even gouging out their opponents’ eyes with their 
nails, when the grip was so close that neither could make use of their 
weapons. I verily believe that it would have been quite impossible to find a 
more terrible representation of Hell itself than was shown in the savagery of 
both sides on this occasion.331 
Eventually the defences of the Schellenberg were penetrated and the heights were 
captured. The garrison of Donauworth itself abandoned the town without a fight. 
 
At the subsequent battle of Blenheim the British infantry were able to demonstrate 
their courage, discipline and platoon firing to their full effect.332 The right flank of the 
French army rested on the banks of the Danube and the village of Blenheim. The 
village was held by sixteen battalions with another eleven in reserve supported by 
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twelve squadrons of dragoons, many dismounted. The first attack on the village was 
made by the five British battalions of Rowe’s Brigade who were at the head of Lord 
Cutt’s column. A vivid account of this attack was written by a chaplain, Josiah 
Sandby. It began with Brigadier Rowe leading his Brigade against Blenheim. 
And he had proceeded closely and slowly within 30 paces of the Pales about 
Blenheim before the enemy gave their first fire, and when this was given there 
fell a great many brave officers & soldiers on our side, but yet that did not 
discourage that Excellent officer Brigadier Rowe from marching directly to the 
very Pales, in which he stuck his sword, before he suffered a man to fire a 
piece & then our men gave the first volley in the teeth of the enemy. His 
orders were to enter sword in hand, but the superiority of the enemy & this 
advantage of the post made yt impossible. And therefore this first line was 
forced to retire, but without the Brigadier who was left by the side of the Pales 
by a shot he had received in his thigh. This was a great disadvantage to the 
service at the first beginning & his own Lt Col and Maj who but knew his worth 
endeavouring to fetch him off were both killed upon the spot. 333 
The loss of the three most senior officers of a single British battalion in this attack is 
an indication of the ferocity of the fire that the French were able to generate. Despite 
this the account shows a determined adherence to the principle of getting in close to 
maximise the effectiveness of musketry. The French fired at thirty paces, the British 
even closer, possibly at as little as five metres. This was followed immediately by an 
attempt to storm the defences of the village, which failed.  
 
Unfortunately for Rowe’s Brigade they were attacked by French cavalry as they 
retreated. 
The Hessian Brigade, pursuant to orders, made ready to renew the attack: 
But while this was doing some Squadrons of the Gens d’Armes fell in upon 
the Right of Rowe’s Brigade, put two Regiments in disorder, & took the 
Collonels Collours of Rowe’s Regiment, upon which the Hessians in the 
second line, facing to the right, charged those Squadrons so warmly that they 
repulsed them & retook the Colours.334 
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This incident demonstrates exactly the danger of infantry having a flank exposed to a 
cavalry attack, but that cavalry could be equally vulnerable to formed infantry facing 
them frontally. 
 
The fight for Blenheim village continued throughout the battle with the British infantry 
and their allies unable to capture it. Neither, however, could the French mount a 
counter-attack to drive off the British and Allied infantry. 
The attack then increased in vigour and the enemy were driven into the 
village, where they were too numerous to act, being wedged up into a dense 
mass so that our well directed fire produced a murderous effect. We retired 
about 80 or 90 yards and plied them so warmly with our platoons that they 
were cut off as fast as they attempted to leave the village to put themselves in 
order to attack us.335 
The account of Robert Parker confirms the effectiveness of the platoon firing. 
The enemy also made several attempts to come out upon us: But as they 
were necessarily thrown into confusion in getting over their trenches, so 
before they could form into any order for attacking us, we mowed them down 
with our platoons in such numbers, that they were always obliged to retire with 
great loss; and it was not possible for them to rush upon us in a disorderly 
manner, without running upon the very points of our Bayonets.336 
By standing at 80 or 90 yards from the French defences the British infantry put 
themselves outside truly effective range, so that when the French tried to counter-
attack and came out of Blenheim they had to leave the protection of their defences 
and move closer to the British in order to form up. This placed them within effective 
range of the British platoons. The alternative was to just attack in a rush, which was 
also not a practical option. 
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Having given up trying to capture the village of Blenheim, Cutts kept the French, who 
had 27 battalions to Cutts’ sixteen, bottled up in the village, relying on steady platoon 
firing to do so. 
All this while the village of Blenheim had been incessantly attacked by the 
Lord Cutts, who having found it impracticable to enter that place sword in 
hand, as the enemy were posted, had altered his method & attacked with his 
Fire only. The first of his lines which was posted near the enemies 
intrenchments continually discharged in Platoons & the other lines relieved 
this & each other successively.337 
Sandby’s account demonstrated how the lines were rotated while the following 
account of John Deane suggested this enabled them to keep supplied with 
ammunition. He also told how some of the attacking troops did get into Blenheim, but 
were unable to establish any sort of a position in there. 
Att length the enemy making all the force they could upon us forced us to 
retreate and to quitt the village having lost a great many of our men, but we 
rallied againe, having received some fresh ammunition, resolving to give the 
enemy another salute. So that as soon as they perceived our designe they 
beat a parley.338 
Bottled up in the village the French were unable to make use of their superior 
numbers while suffering dreadfully from the British platoon fire, eventually they 
surrendered. 
 
The effectiveness of infantry against cavalry was also demonstrated in the centre of 
the battlefield where the Comte de Merode-Westerloo led an attack of French 
cavalry that was initially successful as it drove Marlborough’s cavalry back.  
I charged with all the men I could rally, and I had the good luck to defeat my 
adversaries and push them back to the brink of the stream – but I had no wish 
to recross it, for I could see they still had five lines of cavalry. However, I failed 
to notice that they had brought their infantry well forward and they killed and 
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wounded many of our horses at thirty paces. This was promptly followed by 
an unauthorised but definite movement to the rear by my men.339 
The actions of the British infantry at Blenheim against both infantry and cavalry 
demonstrated a continuing commitment to maximising the effectiveness of infantry 
firepower by getting close to the enemy, even if that meant having to endure the 
enemy’s fire to do so.  
 
The battle of Ramilles in 1706 was won by Marlborough’s brilliant use of terrain to 
move his troops to gain local superiority over the French and is best known for the 
massive cavalry action that decided the outcome of the battle.340 By comparison with 
Blenheim the surviving accounts of the battle supplied little information about how 
the British infantry fought.  However, it was during the winter that followed that the 
next major change took place in the manner in which the infantry delivered their 
firepower. That winter Lieutenant General Ingoldsby was appointed Commander in 
Chief in Flanders while the troops were in their winter quarters and Marlborough and 
most of the general officers were in England.341 Ingoldsby was the Governor of 
Ghent where thirteen British battalions were to spend the winter.342 It is clear from 
correspondence that Ingoldsby was busy with the training of the infantry in 
something new. Unfortunately not all the relevant correspondence appears to have 
survived, such as the letters from Ingoldsby to which Adam Cardonnel, 
Marlborough’s secretary, replied on 16 December 1706. 
I received yesterday by the Ostend Packet the honours of your letter of the 
10th instant and this morning by way of the Brill that of the 19th and have laid 
them before my Lord Duke who approves entirely of what you are doing 
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relating to the Exercise of the Foot. You see by the enclosed the method I 
have taken to acquaint the General of the Foot with it that he may have 
nothing to object to you on that score.343 
 
It is clear from the need for Marlborough’s approval and Cardonnel’s remark about 
keeping the infantry’s commander informed that something of some significance was 
afoot. The first clue to what was happening appears in a letter from Ingoldsby to 
Marlborough from Ghent on 31 December 1706. 
My Lord I have be-gon to exercise all the adjutants, sargants, and corporals, 
who are all-reddy pretty perfect, and mightelly pleased that your Grace has 
thought fitt to put them upon one exersise 
Itt is Imposable to tell your Grace the disorder thay weare in, not two regamts 
exersising a lik, nor anney one companney off Granadrs eable to exersis with 
the Battalyone so that if your Ldship had a mind to see the Line exersise, all 
the Granadrs off the armey must have stood still, and not to Regamts eable to 
perforum a like, which I hope is prevented, and will appeare to your 
sattysffacksion, iff I can have the recruits over in time.344 
 
At the time of Ingoldsby’s letter the last official drill issued to the English and Scots 
armies had been The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions that appeared in 1690 
and was last issued in 1693 with Mackay’s Rules. A further edition did appear in 
Dublin in 1701, but was simply a reprint of the 1690 Exercise and Evolutions without 
Mackay’s Rules.345 This drill was written when battalions were armed with matchlock 
muskets and pikes. With their disappearance and replacement with flintlocks and 
bayonets it is perhaps not surprising that by the War of Spanish Succession the drill 
of the infantry varied from regiment to regiment and even within regiments between 
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the line companies and the grenadiers. It was to correct this state of affairs that 
Marlborough ‘thought fitt to put them upon one exersise’.346 
 
Ingoldsby’s letter also demonstrates how new drill was disseminated amongst the 
regiments. First the regimental adjutants and NCOs were gathered together and 
taught the new drill. Once proficient they returned to their regiments and taught it to 
the other officers and soldiers.347 It is clear, however, that Ingoldsby was doing more 
than just ensuring a uniformity of drill. He was also introducing something completely 
new as his next letter to Marlborough, written from Ghent on the 2 March 1707, 
makes clear.  
I suppose Majr Peniteere will give your Grace an acct how forward both 
officiers, and souldiers are in the exercise you were pleas’d to cumande, to 
perforum which as well as the ffirings upon the Queens Berthday, I have 
contriv’d without toutching one grayne off her majys pouder, but what the 
souldiers brought with them into Garrison.348 
This reference to ‘ffirings’ provides evidence of the first use of firings in the British 
army. 
 
Prior to this date each platoon in a battalion had fired singly, in turn, along the length 
of the battalion. A firing was the grouping together of a number of platoons that could 
either fire one by one within the firing or altogether. The essential point was that 
these platoons were not grouped physically together, but distributed along the whole 
front of a battalion. Furthermore there were only three of these firings. This 
development overcame the main danger of the older system, which was stated 
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clearly by Humphrey Bland some years later.349 The problem with each platoon firing 
in turn along the line of a battalion was that whole sections of the line could be left 
unloaded and therefore vulnerable to a sudden attack, as had been seen at 
Killiekrankie and Fleurus. If the first platoon to fire in a wing was ready as the sixth 
platoon fired it meant that the four between them were still reloading and as little as 
one sixth of a battalion was ready to fire at any time. The adoption of firings meant 
that the platoons reloading, ready to fire or firing were distributed more evenly along 
a battalion. Bland was writing in the mid-1720s about the way the Dutch fired and it 
is clear that they had continued to fire in the same way throughout the War of 
Spanish Succession. Among the papers of Willem Baron Van Wassenaer, Colonel of 
the First Dutch Guards Battalion are instructions dating from 1713 on how firing was 
to be carried out.350 They are, in substance, the same as Douglass’ instructions. 
 
It is also possible that there were other reasons for the change. The older system 
depended on each platoon reloading and being ready to fire again in the time it took 
the other five in a wing of a battalion to fire. With only three firings reloading had to 
be carried out in the time that the other two firings took to fire. This suggests that 
with the increase in the speed of loading resulting from the introduction of the 
flintlock and the cartridge the reloading time may have been reduced to such an 
extent that platoons had found themselves loaded and ready to fire, but having to 
wait their turn while the other five platoons finished firing, not an easy thing to do in 
the heat of battle. Support for this possibility comes from Mackay’s remark that just 
four platoons could keep up a continuous fire with matchlock muskets and 
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bandoleers.351 Concentrating the fire of a battalion into three firings also meant that a 
heavier fire could be delivered in a shorter time, overwhelming the enemy more 
quickly and avoiding a protracted firefight. Moreover, this form of firing could match, 
if not outweigh, the intensity of the initial fire of a French battalion and then be 
maintained while the French intensity fell off. 
 
That Ingoldsby was successful in his enterprise is clear from an account of a review 
held on 30th May 1707. 
The Duke of Marlborough review’d all the British Corps, who exercised and 
fired four Rounds gradually before him, and that by the signal of the waving of 
a Pair of Colours for each Word of Command, performed by Colonel William 
Blakeney, on Top of our Pontons, posted a little in the Front thereof; attended 
by each Drum-Major with a Drum, in the Front of their respective Regiments, 
who, at each wave of the Colours, gave a tap on his Drum, answerable to and 
for each Word of Command; the which each Regiment observed to perform 
accordingly: And soon afterward he review’d each other Corps of the Army, 
who also in the like manner exercised and fired gradually before him.352 
Another account of the same review described how ‘all the English foote exercised 
by signall of coulers & beat of drium, and every brigade fired in platoons before his 
Grace; in which exercise the English gott great applause of the foreigners’.353  
 
The first real test of this new method of firing the platoons did not come until June 
1708 at Wynendael. A large French force attempted to intercept an important allied 
convoy taking ammunition and supplies to the allies besieging Lille. It was confronted 
by a much smaller allied force under the command of General Webb. Sir Winston 
Churchill described the following battle as ‘a striking instance of the superior fire-
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discipline which was so marked a feature of Marlborough’s infantry training’.354 One 
contemporary account describes; 
The regiments and grenadiers making such a continual fire as forced their two 
wings on to their centre and obliged the whole to retire in the greatest 
confusion, notwithstanding all the efforts their officers could make by 
encouragement or violence to keep them up, so that they only fired at a 
distance on our lines which was returned, advancing by platoons as at their 
exercise with all the order imaginable.355 
Another account also draws attention to the precision with which the infantry 
delivered their fire, ‘our foot made such a fire as never troops made more regular at 
exercise’.356 The new firings clearly allowed the battalions to keep up a continuous, 
effective and sustained fire. 
 
The following month, July, brought one of Marlborough’s great victories, 
Oudenarde.357  This was something of an encounter battle, with both sides feeding 
troops into the fight as they arrived. The theme of close and disciplined fire continued 
in the eyewitness accounts.  
Our two battalions of Guards, together with the two brigades of English ffoote 
ware come up, advanced upon the enemy who boldly bore down towards us, 
and having rec’d there fire without much damage, we gave them a merry 
salute, firing into there verry faces, the wch. they could not abide, but turned 
tayle and never faced more.358 
The theme of receiving the enemy’s fire and getting close before returning fire and its 
effectiveness was clearly demonstrated here. The application of the controlled and 
disciplined nature of platoon fire was also described. 
Half our Army, immediately advanced on with undaunted Courage, and 
vigorously attack’d the Enemies Right Wing next to them, and most open, and 
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elsewhere, with small Shot, as regular and gradual as the Time and Ground 
would permit.359 
Another description of the fighting at Oudenarde refers to a Colour Platoon, implying 
one central platoon, something not found in the platoon firing of Mackay or Douglass 
where the platoons were evenly divided between two wings.360 The explanation for 
this and details of the way the new firings were organised were to be found in 
Ireland. 
 
Following the winter spent training the infantry in Ghent Lieutenant General Richard 
Ingoldsby had been appointed as Commander in Chief in Ireland. There he found the 
troops ‘very defective in their discipline, especially the foot’ and consequently, as 
Robert Parker records, Ingoldsby wrote to Marlborough requesting that Parker be 
sent to Ireland ‘in order to introduce among them the discipline practiced in 
Flanders’.361 Parker had been the adjutant of the Royal Irish Regiment and 
consequently responsible for the training of his regiment. It was particularly 
appropriate for Parker to be summoned as Ingoldsby was the colonel of the Royal 
Irish. Moreover, some years later the regiment’s then Major and acting Lieutenant 
Colonel, Richard Kane, wrote ‘The Regiment of Foot that I serv’d in, is well known by 
the Title of the Royal Regiment of Ireland, from which Regiment I may without Vanity 
say, our British Infantry had the Ground-work of their present Discipline.’362 This 
combination of circumstantial evidence, Ingoldsby’s training initiative in Ghent, his 
choice of Parker and Kane’s remark, suggests that it might have been in the Royal 
Irish that the use of firings was first developed. Moreover, as Parker seems from the 
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following letter to have been instrumental in devising drill it is possible that he was 
the officer responsible for the idea.  
 
On 13 September 1708 Parker wrote from Dublin to Lieutenant Colonel Sterne, 
acting as Colonel of the Royal Irish in Ingoldsby’s absence. 
Dear Collo  
I have been labouring hard wth ye two Regimts in Town in showing them & ye 
ajudts our fireings, the Genll is come from his progress & will see these 
Regimts perform in a day or two after which I shall be going for Corke and 
when ever the wether permits I must be wth ye Regimts there & at Kinsale. 
According to yor directions I brought the Genll to consent to our Marching in 
four Grand divisions and I have undertaken to form ye Square on ye March 
which is done in half ye time you are drawing up ye Batl... [at this point Parker 
gives a lengthy and detailed description of forming square on the march]. I 
thought fitt to let you know what I have don in this affair that I might have an 
opinion of you & ye Major on it.363 
As already shown, the infantry in Flanders were taught the new exercise and firings 
by training the adjutants and NCOs first. Parker’s letter shows that much the same 
process was followed in Dublin and it is tempting to suggest that it might have been 
him that carried out the training in Ghent. As Ingoldsby needed to bring Parker to 
Ireland to introduce the troops there to Flanders’ practice it suggests that Flanders’ 
practice was developed in isolation in theatre in Flanders, that it was not written or 
published, and that it was developed and transmitted by word of mouth. This is not 
surprising as the British regiments in Flanders were not rotated in and out of theatre 
as they are today, thus there was no opportunity for the new firings to be transmitted 
from regiment to regiment through the army. Furthermore, the close proximity of the 
British regiments in Flanders to each other meant that everything could be achieved 
by word of mouth and there was no need for written instructions. There was certainly 
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no published manual of the period that described the new organisation of platoons 
into firings. It was even possible that Parker did not have his own written version, or, 
even if he did, that the drill was transmitted by instruction and demonstration rather 
than by being copied. Houlding has suggested that the drill was copied in 
manuscript, however, this seems not to have been the case.364 Parker described 
how ‘in order to introduce among them the discipline practiced in Flanders... I 
continued two years disciplining the Foot of that Kingdom, in which time all the 
Regiments of Foot passed through my hands’.365 It is clear that he instructed them 
directly. 
 
Fortunately it is possible to examine in detail what the new drill was and how the new 
firings were organised as two manuscript versions of the drill survived. One had a 
first page that was headed ‘The Exercise of Firelock and Bayonet with the sevll 
Fireings of the Foot as they are to follow Each other according to the method 
appointed by his Excie Lieut Genll Ingoldsby.’366 The other has no such heading and is 
superficially different, but in substance it is exactly the same, which further supports 
the idea that this drill was not copied from a master manuscript, but rather that each 
officer took his own notes on the new drill.367 The first bears the name of Bryan 
Mahoney who was an ensign and subsequently a lieutenant in Mountjoy’s Regiment 
until placed on half pay on the Irish establishment when that regiment was 
disbanded in 1714. The second bears the name of a Captain John Foster of Dulwich 
who it has not been possible to identify. 
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Mahony’s manuscript began with the exercise or drill for handling a musket and 
bayonet, or the manual exercise as it was known, listing each drill movement and 
how many individual movements each was comprised of. These movements were 
the same, with minor variations in wording, as those given in Foster’s manuscript 
and in a publication with the title The New Exercise of Firelocks & Bayonets; 
Appointed by his Grace the Duke of Marlborough to be used by all the British Forces. 
This was not an official publication, but was stated to be ‘By an Officer in Her 
Majesties Foot Guards’ and was published in London in 1708.368 It was also limited 
to the manual exercise and did not deal with the firings. 
 
The key sections in both Mahony’s and Foster’s manuscripts were their descriptions 
of the organisation of a battalion into platoons and firings and how firing was to be 
carried out. Mahony provided a diagram that clearly shows a central or Colour 
Platoon, see figure 5.1. 
 
Fig.5.1: A Battalion of infantry according to Mahoney’s Manuscript369 
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Each box represents one of the fifteen platoons that a battalion was now to be 
divided into. The grenadier company was still divided into two platoons that took their 
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places on the flanks of the battalion, indicated in the diagram above by (G). The hat 
companies were divided into thirteen platoons. The fifteen platoons were then 
divided into three firings, the first and second of six platoons each and the third of 
just three. The upper number in each box indicates the firing that a platoon was in. 
The lower number in each box indicated the order of firing of the platoons within 
each firing.  Thus when the first firing fired (highlighted in red) the platoon marked 1 
over 1 fired first, followed by the platoon marked 1 over 2 from the other flank of the 
battalion. Next came 1 over 3, then 1 over 4, 1 over 5 and finally 1 over 6. The 
second (yellow) and third (green) firings followed in the same manner. There was a 
slight difference in the way the grenadier platoons fired as they were to wheel 45° 
towards the centre so that their fire was directed more towards the centre of the 
enemy line. If firing on the march or advancing the whole battalion was to halt when 
the platoons fired. If the battalion was retreating then the whole battalion halted and 
faced about while the platoons of a firing delivered their fire. The effect of this new 
method was that the firing of the platoons was more evenly distributed across the 
front of a battalion, as the first two firings consisted of almost every other platoon. In 
addition there were always at least three platoons loaded at any time, the smallest, 
third firing, and because those were on the flanks and in the centre it maximised the 
protection they could give to the other platoons.  
 
The most significant aspect of the new firings, however, was that rather than only 
firing in turn all the platoons in a firing could fire together in a single volley. Six 
platoons together represented in excess of 40% of the firepower of a battalion. This 
could be followed very quickly by a second firing of the same size and even the 
smaller third firing, 20%, was on a par with a rank of a French infantry battalion. 
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Furthermore, due to the sustainability of platoon firing, this small third firing could be 
followed by the first firing again with another 40% of the available firepower and so 
on. This sustainability was in part a product of the changes that had taken place over 
the preceding fifteen years or so as flintlock replaced match lock and cartridge 
replaced bandoleer leading to much quicker reloading. 
 
As a variation on the above the commander of a battalion could choose to keep in 
the reserve the front ranks of the first and second firings. The reserved front ranks 
were then fired after the second firing. This would give four firings of approximately 
27%, 27%, 26% and 20%. The orders for loading and firing continued to be ‘make 
ready’, ‘present’ and ‘fire’ but the distance between ranks for loading was reduced to 
a single pace from two. This reduction in space was probably the result of the 
abandonment of the matchlock and bandoleer making the loading process less risky. 
The benefit of it was that it further reduced, albeit slightly, the time taken to load as 
the third rank now only needed to take two paces back instead of four. 
 
A reduction in the reloading time of the few seconds it took to take two steps 
backwards may not seem very significant. However, when combined with the 
benefits of the changes in weapons and equipment it is what allowed a battalion to 
keep up a continuous fire based on three firings rather than the four platoons 
required by Mackay. This increase in the rate of fire increased a battalion’s firepower 
by a third. 
 
The effectiveness of the new firings was demonstrated at Oudenarde, while at the 
battle of Malplaquet in 1709, the fourth of Marlborough’s great victories against the 
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French, the British infantry demonstrated that they had not lost any ability when hand 
to hand combat rather than shattering vollies was required.370 The fighting in the 
wood of Taisnières was described by Sergeant John Wilson. 
[We] attacked the Enemy in the wood afores’d with a great deal of courage 
and resolution but were received by the Enemy with as great bravery. Wee 
beat them from that post and they beat us back again with as great courage 
and resolution as wee had them. Whereupon ensued an obstinate engagem’t 
for the space of two hors in which there was a great effusion of blood on both 
sides; the Armys fireing at each other bayonet to bayonet. And after came to 
stab each other with their bayonets and several came so close that they 
knocked one another’s brains out w’th the butt end of their firelocks.371 
 
It was, however, at Malplaquet that a most remarkable event occurred that gives 
perhaps the clearest evidence of the superiority of British platoon firing over French 
fire by ranks. Robert Parker of the Royal Irish Regiment was not a participant in the 
battle of Malplaquet, being at the time in Ireland, but he has left a most vivid account, 
presumably garnered from fellow officers. The Regiment was the last British 
regiment to arrive on the battlefield and found itself in a relatively isolated position of 
the extreme flank of the army, opposite the wood of Sart. As the army advanced and 
the Royal Irish marched through the wood they found themselves in a clearing and 
confronted by a single French battalion. No other troops were involved in what 
followed. 
Upon this Colonel Kane, who was then at the head of the Regiment, having 
drawn us up, and formed our Plattoons, advanced gently toward them, with 
the six Plattoons of our first fire made ready. When we had advanced within a 
hundred paces of them, they gave us a fire of one of their ranks: Whereupon 
we halted, and returned them the fire of our six Platoons at once; and 
immediately made ready the six Plattoons of our second fire, and advanced 
upon them again. They then gave us the fire of another rank, and we returned 
them a second fire, which made them shrink; however they gave us the fire of 
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a third rank after a scattering manner, and then retired into the wood in great 
disorder: On which we sent our third fire after them, and saw them no more.372 
This was a text book action on the part of the Royal Irish. They closed with the 
French and did not fire until the French had. The French were clearly adhering to 
their usual practice of firing by ranks and the Royal Irish replied with whole firings. 
When Parker’s regiment advanced they discovered that the enemy battalion had 
been the French Royal Regiment of Ireland. The British battalion had suffered four 
killed and six wounded while the French battalion lost ‘near forty’ killed and 
wounded. Parker gave an explanation for this victory and the disparity in casualties. 
The advantage on our side will be easily accounted for, first from the weight of 
our ball; for the French Arms carry bullets of 24 to the pound: Whereas our 
British Firelocks carry ball of 16 only to the pound, which will make a 
considerable difference in the execution. Again, the manner of our firing was 
different from theirs; the French at that time fired all by ranks, which can never 
do equal execution with our Plattoon-firing, especially when six Plattoons are 
fired together. This is undoubtedly the best method that has yet been 
discovered for fighting a Battalion; especially when two Battalions only 
engage each other.373 
This extensive and detailed account contained a wealth of information, but has also 
been subject to some misunderstanding. Parker stated that the first and second 
firings of the Royal Irish consisted of six platoons. It has been assumed by Chandler, 
Nosworthy and others that the third firing also consisted of six platoons and that this 
event represented a clear example of platoon firing as described by Kane.374 It is 
clear from the manuscripts of Mahony and Foster that the third firing would have 
been only three platoons. Three firings of six platoons each was a much later 
development, before which, as will be shown, there was a reduction to only fourteen 
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platoons. Finally, in an echo of Mackay, the third firing was fired as the enemy broke 
and ran.375 
 
Parker describes the battalion advancing on the enemy and not firing until fired upon, 
each rank fired by the French Irish being replied to with all the platoons of a firing 
giving fire together. He is clear in his view of the superiority of platoon firing over 
firing by ranks, which is perhaps not surprising as each French rank that fired, 
representing 20% of the battalion, was replied to by a firing of 40% of the Royal Irish. 
He also makes a very interesting comment about the relative effectiveness of British 
and French muskets. Edward D’Auvergene made a similar comment in his account 
of the campaign of 1692. ‘Of the wounded a vast many dy’d afterwards, because our 
arms are stronger, and carry better balls than theirs.’376 Undoubtedly a heavier 
musket ball travelling at the same velocity as a lighter one will inflict the greater 
damage. However, there are a number of other factors at play that determine the 
ballistic characteristics of a musket shot, such as the size of the charge of powder, 
the strength of the powder and the quality of the musket barrels, which would need 
to be considered in evaluating Parker’s claim and which fall outside this work. But 
whatever the reason, there would appear to have been a belief that individual British 
musket shots caused more damage than French ones. If this belief was shared by 
the French it could have had a serious, deleterious effect on their morale. A hint that 
this might have been the case is found in Chandler who cites a French despatch 
after the battle of Steenkirk that reported French soldiers throwing away their 
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matchlocks and taking up captured flintlocks.377 That, however, could be because of 
the superiority of the flintlock to the matchlock firing mechanism rather than a 
superior ballistic performance. 
 
The new system of firings was not without its problems. These arose when a 
battalion had to form a hollow square as a defence against cavalry. This required the 
grenadiers to be divided into four platoons and the rest of the battalion to be divided 
into four grand divisions of equal size that were divided in turn into four platoons 
each. This was relatively straightforward for the grenadiers, but the hat companies 
had to be reorganised from thirteen platoons into sixteen. This problem was touched 
upon in Parker’s letter of 13 September 1708; however it is not clear if he is writing 
about four grand divisions being made the norm or just used on the march.378 Each 
grand division formed a side of the square and became a firing of four platoons. The 
grenadier platoons either stayed outside the square and covered the corners or 
marched in and out of the square to fire, the right hand platoon of each face, called 
the angle platoon, acting as a sort of gate for them. A square could be formed either 
from the battalion in line or on the march with the four grand divisions marching in 
column, one behind the other. This last manoeuvre as described in Mahony’s 
manuscript is the same as that apparently devised by Parker. Once the square was 
formed the battalion commander had a number of options when it came to firing. 
First the angle platoons marched forwards while the grenadiers outside the square 
fired. They then marched into the square behind the angle platoon while it fired 
before returning to its place. After that the other three platoons in each firing fired, 
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the right hand one first, then the left and lastly the centre one. As a variation on this 
the fire of the front ranks could be reserved. Alternatively, the three platoons of each 
firing could fire together by ranks, starting with the rear rank, followed in turn by the 
angle and grenadier platoons firing their three ranks together. 
 
Given the complexity of two different arrangements of a battalion into platoons it is 
perhaps no surprise that British infantry battalions appear to have preferred to face 
French cavalry head on. At Malplaquet Matthew Bishop described what happened 
when his battalion was threatened by French cavalry. 
Then we had orders to wheel to the right. Had we not the French Horse would 
certainly have fallen upon our Rear. This happened at the Ground where we 
first made our Attack. But when we faced them, they backed their Horses as 
fast as they could.379 
 
Foster’s manuscript book also contained a revision of drill issued by Lord Orkney on 
23 October 1711 because ‘For the better Regulating of her Majties Foot his Grace the 
Duke of Marlborough has thought fit I should give out the following orders.’ Orkney’s 
orders included the manual exercise, which contained minor changes, mostly in the 
wording of commands, the Evolutions, described as being ‘according to the 
Explainatn in K Wms Book of Exercise’, various regulations for garrison duty and the 
like and a new method of organising the firings.380 A diagram showed twelve hat 
platoons and two of grenadiers, see figure 5.2. 
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Fig 5.2: A battalion of infantry after 1711, according to Foster381 
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The first firing (red) was composed of the platoons numbered 1 to 6, using the upper 
number, the lower number indicating the first firing. The second firing (yellow) was 
platoons 7 to 10 and the third firing (green) was the grenadier platoons, 11 and 12, 
and platoons 13 and 14 in the centre. The orders stated ‘You fire your Platoons Right 
and Left as usual’ referring to the order of firing within each firing.382 The orders do 
not go into any detail about the different ways of managing the fire of the firings and 
the platoons, so it would seem that these remained unchanged. 
 
This method represents an improvement on the previous method for a number of 
reasons. First, this organisation meant a return to each company also forming a 
platoon, except for the grenadiers, which can only have simplified matters and made 
command and control easier. Secondly and most obviously, it is a lot easier to form a 
square as the twelve line platoons are simply divided into four grand divisions 
without the need to reorganise the platoons. Once the square was formed the 
grenadiers still marched in and out to fire, the three platoons on each face of the 
square formed a firing and fired in the order of the right hand platoon first, then the 
left hand one and finally the centre one. The third improvement was that fewer 
platoons meant bigger platoons. The first firing of six platoons represented almost 
half the battalion while the other two firings were roughly a quarter each. This meant 
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that the all important first firing was slightly bigger than before while the second firing 
was about a third smaller. The third firing was also larger than before, but two of its 
four platoons were the grenadier company divided in two, so it was still smaller than 
the second firing. In percentage terms the strengths of the firings were approximately 
46%, 31% and 23%. 
 
The orders for the garrison of Ghent issued by Major General Cobham in 1712 
contain no changes to the organisation and execution of firing, he did, however, 
include in the orders some illuminating observations about firefights. 
All Commanding Officers must take great care when they march a Battn to 
attack an Enemy, to be moving so slow that their men may be in good ordr & 
not out of breath when they come to Engage, they must always manage their 
fire well, & never begin to fire till they are very near it being very certain it is 
better to receive an Enemy’s fire than fire at two (sic) great distance.383 
Cobham emphasised the importance of a steady advance and of getting close to the 
enemy before firing, even if it meant receiving the enemy’s fire. On the subject of 
dealing with cavalry attacks he advised that whether in square or line it was best to 
reserve the fire of the front rank while the second and rear ranks fired by platoon. 
The fire of the front rank was to be delivered at close range, ‘a well managed fire at 
30 or 40 paces distance will make their front rank not only stop short, but fall into 
confusion upon those which follows’.384 
 
Cobham also gave details of a rather fanciful way of forming a battalion six deep into 
a total of twenty-eight platoons. His comment on this was telling. ‘These sorts of 
figures are very handsome in exercise & very useful for ye instruction of soldiers, & it 
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may happen may be of great use sometimes.’ He followed this with his observations 
on what he considered practical on the battlefield. 
I have seen much pains & trouble in firing Platoons advancing, & retreating 
but such will never happen, but at Exercise for it was never Done on real 
service but a Battn formed this way is ready to march either backwards or 
forwards together, if you beat ye enemy you can’t overtake them in good 
order without ye fear of being flank’t, & if they will beat you all the Precaution 
imagineable will not hinder some Confusion so as to put you by order so that 
fireing as it’s call’d maintaining ground, & very quick is ye real service done by 
Platoons, & let ye maner & form of making Plattoons be never so convenient 
& handsome, quick firing & maintaining ground is ye real service of it, & 
indeed on all occasions to teach men to fire quick & sure is the best Exercise, 
not but all figures composed Handsomely shows a genious fill for great 
matters, it is very commendable in every officr & will meet with the applause of 
all men, & will enable those men to make enquiry into further matters that will 
at least make them great.385 
 
Taken together with his comment about not firing at ‘two great distance’ this 
represented a clear statement of British doctrine for infantry combat as it had 
developed during the previous two decades. It amounted to getting in close, thirty 
paces or less, before one fired, fire quickly and accurately, hold one’s ground and 
keep firing. Stated thus it was a simple doctrine, albeit one that was complex in 
execution. That it worked is clear from the success of British infantry on the 
battlefield. Sustained fire won the day at Wynendael in the face of a numerically 
superior enemy and kept another numerically superior French force bottled up in 
Blenheim. The short, sharp bursts of fire delivered at Oudenarde quickly decided the 
firefights in favour of the British infantry. Confidence in its firepower also allowed 
British infantry to face and see off French cavalry without resorting to forming 
square, as at Blenheim and Malplaquet. 
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There is no doubt that Marlborough was one of the finest generals of his day and 
one of the best ever produced by Britain. All his skill and talent in planning and 
manoeuvre would, however, have counted for nothing if his infantry had not been 
able to win the firefights and drive off enemy cavalry. That they could do so, 
frequently in the face of a numerically superior enemy, was due to the adoption of 
and adherence to platoon firing. Employed at often brutally close range it simply 
overwhelmed the opposition with its weight of fire. Combined with continuing ferocity 
in hand to hand combat British infantry under Marlborough became arguably the 
finest in Europe. 
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6: Humphrey Bland and The Duke of Cumberland, 1714 to 1749 
 
Following the battle of Malplaquet in 1709 and the end of the War of Spanish 
Succession in 1714 the British Army was not involved in another major battle until 
Dettingen in 1743. During the intervening three decades there were minor 
engagements and campaigns, most notably against the Jacobites in 1715 and 1719. 
Mostly, however, the army was engaged in peacetime soldiering and its levels of 
readiness and competency, its fitness for service, suffered accordingly.386  It was 
also a period during which little of any substance appeared to change in the way that 
the British infantry would fight, battalions would still form their companies into 
platoons organised in three firings. What changes there were, however, whilst subtle, 
would have both positive and negative effects on the effectiveness of the infantry in 
battle.  
 
It was also a time when professional British soldiers started to put pen to paper for 
the first time since Orrery and Turner were published in the 1670s.387 It was also 
when, in 1728, the first official drill regulations since the 1690s were published.388 
Taken together with the regulations, the works of Bland and Kane gave a picture of 
how British infantry, indeed the whole army, intended to fight battles.389  
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Accounts of battles became more numerous, allowing analysis of the way the British 
infantry conducted themselves during of The War of Austrian Succession, 1740 to 
1748, and that home affair of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 to 1746. The manuscript 
of La Fausille, written after the war, was the first example of a retrospective analysis 
of combat by a British officer and offered the opportunity for deeper understanding of 
what happened at Dettingen and Laffeldt and the doctrinal approach of the 
infantry.390 
 
This chapter will first analyse the developments and writings prior to the start of the 
War of Austrian Succession in order to establish how British infantry intended to 
fight. An analysis of events during the war will then establish the extent to which 
practice followed theory and the alterations that were made during the war. 
 
When writing about the tactics and doctrine of the British Army in the mid-eighteenth 
century modern historians invariably turn to Humphrey Bland’s A Treatise of Military 
Discipline. Houlding describes it as being of ‘commanding influence in the army’.391 
In the preface to his Treatise of Military Discipline Humphrey Bland laid out his aims 
and his reasons for writing. He pointed out that there had been nothing written on the 
art of war by a British author for fifty years. He went on to say that as there were then 
so few old officers with experience of war he felt it necessary to write what he knew 
of military matters for those ‘who are yet to learn’.392 Bland’s Military Discipline was 
thus a statement of how things were at the time of writing. It contained nothing that 
would be considered innovative by his fellow officers, if anything it looked 
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backwards. It was also very comprehensive, which probably explains its widespread 
appeal at the time and its endurance.393 For the historian it allows developments 
since the War of Spanish Succession to be identified. 
 
Prior to the publication of Bland the drill for handling, loading and firing the musket 
was simply referred to as the Exercise of the Firelock and Bayonet. In Bland this 
was, for the first time, referred to as the Manual Exercise, in order to differentiate it 
from the Platoon Exercise that then appeared. Prior to the introduction of the Platoon 
Exercise, possibly some time around 1720, that part of the Exercise of the Firelock 
and Bayonet that was concerned with loading could be carried out either move by 
move, with a separate command for each move, or by each soldier in his own time 
when the orders for loading and firing were reduced to ‘make ready, present, fire’. 
The Platoon Exercise was intended specifically for the soldier loading in his own 
time. Most of the movements for these two exercises were the same, but there was 
one significant difference. In both exercises the soldier, having faced to the right of 
his unit, primed the pan of his musket with the musket pointed to the front of his unit 
and held level in the left hand at about waist height. With the Manual Exercise the 
soldier then faced to the front and brought the musket upright in a position known as 
‘Recover’. He then faced to the left and brought the musket down, holding it in his left 
hand with the butt down and the muzzle up near his right shoulder ready to insert the 
cartridge in the barrel. This was the movement known as ‘Cast About to Charge’. 
After loading his musket the soldier would face to the front and come to the ‘Recover’ 
position again. In the Platoon Exercise, after priming, the soldier stayed facing to the 
right and simply rotated his musket in his left hand to bring the muzzle up to near his 
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right shoulder where he could load the musket. It was effectively the same position 
as that for loading after casting about, but without the 180° turn to the left with the 
‘Recover’ in the middle of it. This simple expedient cut the loading time by several 
seconds and also required less effort on the part of the soldier.394 Curiously the 
official regulations issued in 1728, the year after the publication of Bland, made no 
mention of the Platoon Exercise. However, in the next official regulations, of 1756, 
the Platoon Exercise was the only way given of loading a musket. 
 
In his instructions for the Platoon Exercise Bland also reintroduced locking, last seen 
in Mackay’s Rules.395 Bland observed that this avoided the awkward position of the 
middle rank man having to stoop. 
 
Bland goes to considerable detail on the organisation of platoons into firings. It is 
here that some difficulties begin to arise in identifying precisely how it was intended 
to organise a battalion for platoon firing in the 1720s. Lord Orkney’s orders of 1711 
had laid down an organisation of fourteen platoons.396 At that time a battalion had 
one grenadier company and twelve hat companies, meaning that each hat platoon 
was made up of a single company while the Grenadier company formed two 
platoons. Bland’s Military Discipline included a diagram of a battalion drawn up that 
clearly showed that structure.397 In 1717, however, the establishment of battalions in 
England had been reduced by one company. Despite this an order book for 
Handasyde’s Regiment showed a battalion in 1723 still divided into two grenadier 
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platoons and twelve hat platoons, see Figure 6.1.398 This organisation was also 
shown in the 1728 Regulations and meant that eleven hat companies had to form 
twelve platoons.399 In Ireland the establishment was reduced to just nine hat 
companies in a battalion and the order book for Handasyde’s, then serving in 
Ireland, also showed an eleven platoon organisation, presumably in an endeavour to 
adhere to the more practical method of platoons and companies being the same, 
Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.1: A Battalion in 12 Platoons Besides Grenadiers Divided into four Grand 
divisions three Platoons in each Grand Division400 
 
1 3      1   2   3   4  2 4 
3 1 2 1 2 1 3 3 1 2 1 2 1 3 
Front 
The lower number indicates the firing, the upper number indicates the four Grand 
Divisions and, for the grenadiers, how they divide to form square. 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The Method of Fireing a Battalion in 11 Platoons Including Granadiers in 
three Fireings401 
Front 
The lower number indicates the firing, the upper number the order of the platoons 
when firing individually. 
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Early in his book Bland stated that the hat companies of a battalion should be 
divided into three grand divisions, each divided into three, four or five platoons. With 
the grenadiers, as usual, divided into two platoons, this left the eleven hat platoons 
to be divided into nine, twelve or fifteen platoons.402  Subsequently, however, Bland 
provided diagrams for battalions formed with two grenadier platoons and ten, thirteen 
or sixteen hat platoons.403 He then went on to write of his diagrams that they made 
everything clear and ‘I believe there will want no further Explication for the 
Comprehending of it’.404 Several pages later he adds that these plans are for 
battalions of four hundred, five hundred and six hundred men respectively, resulting 
in platoons of between thirty-three and forty-six men.405 All of the organisations that 
Bland gives, bar one, are at odds with the contemporary organisations in the order 
book of Handasyde’s and the 1728 Regulations, both of which have twelve hat 
platoons. 
 
This organisational variety is thoroughly confusing and difficult to make any sense of. 
However Bland did write ‘The rule laid down in these Plans, for disposing the 
Platoons of the different Firings in the manner here mention’d, may be varied, if the 
Commanding Officer thinks proper.’406 What Bland was giving the reader were 
examples, and within his writing were the principles that guided how battalions were 
to be divided into platoons, according to circumstance. With regard to the size of 
platoons he wrote that they should not be fewer than thirty men, because less than 
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that did not produce sufficient fire, or more than forty-eight because that was the 
most a single officer could manage.407 This is entirely in keeping with his statement 
about the numbers of platoons varying according to the size of battalions. In this 
remark on command considerations he was harking back the first half of the 
seventeenth century.408 The 1728 Regulations also suggested that other 
arrangements were possible when they stated ‘supposing the Battalion to be told off 
in fourteen Platoons, including two of Granadiers’.409  
  
If Bland was confusing in his description of the various permutations of the 
organisation of platoon firing, he was clearer when he discussed practical tactics and 
doctrine. Here he came down firmly in favour of the use of four Grand Divisions and 
the dividing of a battalion’s hat companies into twelve or sixteen platoons. As he 
wrote, if a battalion was divided into any other number of platoons it was necessary 
to reorganise the platoons before Grand Divisions and Squares could be formed.410 
 
Bland helpfully laid out the reasons why platoon firing was the best way to fire, with 
the platoons of each firing distributed along the front of a battalion, giving four 
reasons. First it spread the fire of each firing across the enemy battalion. Secondly, if 
a battalion was attacked while some platoons were loading then the fire of no part of 
the battalion would be particularly weakened. His third reason is something of a 
reiteration of the second, which was that if the platoons of a firing were altogether it 
would leave that section vulnerable while loading. Lastly he suggested that this way 
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of firing ‘makes the Exercise the more beautiful’ and, rather more importantly, got the 
men used to having firing going on both sides of them without joining in 
themselves.411  
 
In his descriptions of how to carry out platoon firing Bland wrote of the platoons both 
firing in turn within their particular firing and all the platoons of a firing firing together. 
As detailed in Mahoney’s drill book he also had the grenadier platoons wheeling 
slightly inwards before firing.412 After firing the men were to reload without orders and 
when finished to bring their muskets to the shoulder, that is, held vertically against 
the left shoulder, the butt at about waist height. When advancing Bland had the 
whole battalion halt while each firing fired, likewise when retreating he had the whole 
battalion halt and face about while each firing fired. He also described an alternative 
way of firing advancing and retreating, which involved the battalion continuing to 
move while each firing fired and the men marching with their muskets at the recover 
position and at half cock. In this position the musket is held vertically in front of the 
body with the right hand at the trigger guard at about chest height. This was the 
position immediately before bringing the butt to the shoulder and levelling the musket 
to fire. Bland disliked this as it made it particularly difficult to stop the men firing out 
of turn. He wrote; 
In Advancing towards the Enemy, it is with great Difficulty that the 
Officers can prevent the Men (but more particularly when they are 
Fired at) from taking their Arms without Orders, off from their 
Shoulders, and Firing at too great a Distance. How much more difficult 
must it be to prevent their Firing, when they have their Arms in their 
Hands ready Cock’d and their Fingers on the Trickers.413 
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When it came to dealing with cavalry Bland advised the same way of firing, whether 
a battalion was in line or square, which was keeping the front rank in reserve and 
firing the second and rear ranks by platoons.414 He went on to say, however, that 
because of the intervals in cavalry formations there was usually sufficient time for all 
a battalion to reload between individual cavalry attacks, in which case it was 
unnecessary to keep a reserve.415 As with earlier writers he stressed the importance 
of not firing until close range, twenty five or thirty paces, and also of being able to 
present, but not actually fire416. He also described how firing by ranks was executed, 
and dismissed it as old fashioned and a relic of the days when pikes were used, but 
made no mention of this still being the preferred method of the French Army.417 
Bland was confident of the infantry’s ability to deal with cavalry and stated; ‘If Foot 
could be brought to know their own Strength, the Danger which they apprehend from 
Horse would soon vanish; since the Fire of one Platoon, given in due Time, is 
sufficient to break any Squadron.’ He continued in words that anticipated the Battle 
of Minden, ‘one battalion of well-disciplined Foot may despise the Attacks of a whole 
Line of Horse’.418 
 
When he wrote of how to engage enemy infantry Bland continued the long held 
doctrine of reserving a battalion’s fire until close range and after the enemy had fired. 
Unlike earlier writers, however, he spelt out this doctrine, rather than leaving it to be 
extrapolated from the evidence. He advised that the sight of seeing troops with their 
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fire reserved still advancing on troops that had fired would often cause those who 
had fired to run away.419 If the enemy also reserved their fire Bland advocated 
preventing them from firing by giving a battalion’s fire and immediately charging 
them, under the cover of the smoke, with the bayonet. His belief was that the shock 
of the fire and the immediate attack would result in victory with ‘a very inconsiderable 
Loss’.420 Bland also included in his work a description of how Dutch infantry 
conducted platoon firing. The Dutch fired their platoons from the flanks to the centre, 
alternating between the right and left flanks, thus giving it its name of alternate fire. 
Bland describes how the Dutch used alternate fire while advancing to wards the 
enemy, but reloaded so that when close to the enemy they could give them the fire 
of the whole battalion, ‘as the English do’.421 What was absent from Bland’s work 
was any mention of sustained fire fights. Within Bland’s work there was an 
expectation that a single round of close range fire from a battalion followed by an 
immediate attack with the bayonet would be sufficient to bring victory. 
 
Brigadier General Richard Kane’s book was not published until after his death. The 
writer of the Preface says of Kane: 
With great Contempt he read some Books, which pretended to Teach 
the whole Military Art; and often assured his Friends, that those mean 
Performances provoked him, to attempt something on the same 
Subject, which, if not perfect, might be free from those gross Errors and 
glaring Absurdities, which abound in them.422 
This may be a reference to Bland’s Military Discipline, indeed it is difficult to think 
that it could refer to anything else for the simple reason, as Bland himself said, there 
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were no other books. Kane himself is also scathing of the 1728 regulations. After 
quoting its title in full he called it a ‘poor performance’.423 
 
Kane is particularly adamant concerning the division of a battalion into four Grand 
Divisions. This is, he wrote, ‘the Groundwork of all our Performances, of which our 
Martinet gives but a faint Idea’.424 Although Bland wrote initially of dividing a battalion 
into three Grand Divisions he also wrote of four when it came to how to form a 
square. The 1728 regulations contain no mention at all of forming Grand Divisions, 
which makes it seem likely that Kane’s ‘Martinet’ is a reference to the official 
regulations. These were drawn up by a committee of very senior and distinguished 
officers and approved by the King, George II, who took a great interest in his army. It 
is therefore perhaps not surprising that Kane’s ideas were not published until after 
his death.  
 
Kane was also flexible in the number of platoons to be formed by a battalion. His 
preferred number was sixteen hat platoons in addition to the grenadiers, but he also 
wrote that twelve was possible for a weak battalion, particularly one on a reduced 
peace time establishment. He divided the platoons into three firings but as he 
considered it ‘absolutely necessary’ to have a reserve he held the front rank as a 
reserve or fourth firing, leaving the second and rear ranks to carry out the firings. 425 
The front rank of the two central platoons, however, were not reserved, but were to 
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fire with the rest of their platoons. This was so that the battalion commander, out in 
front of the battalion, had somewhere safe to stand when the reserve fired.426 
 
Figure 6.3: A Battalion in 18 platoons according to Kane427 
3G  1 2 1 2 3 1 2 3 3 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 3G  
 
Front 
G = Grenadiers  
1 = 1st firing  
2 = 2nd firing  
3 = 3rd firing  
 
Kane insisted that all the platoons of a firing should fire together and not one at a 
time according to their order in a firing, which he describes as normal practice at 
reviews, ‘they are not to keep popping by single Platoons’.428 He required the full 
weight of six platoons’ fire to be delivered together.429 Kane described how the 
simultaneous firing of six platoons scattered along a battalion frontage could be 
achieved by the battalion commander making use of drum beats to transmit 
commands. The platoon officers and sergeants were simply to ensure their men 
acted as ordered by the battalion commander. In particular he mentioned ensuring 
that the soldiers ‘level well their Arms, so that their Fire may have Effect on the 
Enemy’.430 Kane does seem to suggest that extended fire fights might be necessary, 
describing the battalion going through its firings he wrote ‘And thus the Colonel 
continues his Firings standing, without Intermission between them’. If the enemy 
were not broken by that fire he wrote that the battalion should be advanced closer by 
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the commander who then ‘continues his Firings as fast as he can, until he obliges 
them to give Way’.431 
 
Like Bland, Kane writes that infantry in line fighting cavalry should fire by platoons, 
but In contrast to Bland, Kane wrote that when in square each side of the square 
was to fire by ranks.432 Unfortunately he did not explain his reasons for his 
preference. Kane also completely omits any mention of the bayonet in attack or 
defence. Another officer writing in 1744 deliberately omits anything on firings, writing 
that they ‘have long ago been very clearly and fully laid down by Mr. Bland’, but 
mentions firing by ranks as one way of firing.433 Despite the comprehensive nature of 
Bland it would seem that there was still a considerable amount of variety of opinion 
over the details of how a battalion of infantry should fight. This was not helped by the 
brevity of the 1728 Regulations, which would have left officers with no alternative but 
to consult Bland on the finer points of drill. What is clear is that the underlying 
principal of close range firing by platoons organised into firings and the subsequent 
assault with the bayonet against infantry, if necessary, was still the basis of the way 
British infantry intended to fight.  
 
A further change to the process of loading and firing made its first appearance in the 
1740 edition of the 1728 Regulations. Until then, officially at least, muskets had been 
primed from a small flask before a cartridge was opened and loaded into the barrel. 
The 1740 edition allowed for the musket to be primed direct from a cartridge, thus 
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saving valuable seconds in the loading process.434 During the mid-eighteenth 
century wooden ramrods were gradually replaced by steel ramrods and despite 
some early problems with them bending or being too brittle and breaking they also 
seem to have speeded up the rate of fire.435 Combined with the Platoon Exercise 
Houlding suggests that these changes increased the rate of fire of the infantry from 
two to three rounds a minute.436  
 
While Kane probably wrote his book around 1730 it was not published until 1745 
and, although he shed a little light on the way British infantry were intended to fight, it 
was with Bland and the 1728 Regulations to guide them that they embarked upon 
the War of Austrian Succession. 
 
La Fausille’s manuscript, written around 1750-1752, contained a considerable 
amount of information that cast light upon the battlefield practices of British infantry 
during the War of Austrian Succession in a manner that a theoretical drill book could 
not. Not least he identifies the French contribution to British success. He first 
emphasised the importance of preventing ‘the men from throwing away their Fire to 
no purpose, or at too great a distance, as our men, being then Novices, did at the 
Battle of Dettingen’, explaining that the first discharge of fire in a battle is the one that 
does the greatest execution as it was properly loaded. As well as happening at 
Dettingen he added that long range fire almost happened again at Fontenoy. He 
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then stated that ‘the French generally begin to Fire at a great distance’.437 Amherst, 
later to be Commander-in-Chief in North America recorded that at Fontenoy the 
French opened fire at ‘about 80 yards distance’.438 Citing Laffeldt as an example La 
Fausille described how the British infantry continued to advance, ignoring the French 
fire, the French then hurried to reload, doing so without using the ramrod, but simply 
dropping the open cartridge into the musket and then banging the butt on the ground 
to get the cartridge and ball to drop to the breech. The effect of loading in this 
manner, now commonly referred to as tap-loading, is that the balls do not travel far 
or with any great force, in fact, if the ball lodges in the barrel some way short of the 
breech, it can result in the barrel bursting. La Fausille added ‘this Preserved many of 
our men at the Battle of Laffelt’.439  He then described how they advanced against 
the French, ignoring their fire, until they came up to the hedge and ditch in front of 
the French. The British then fired and ‘leaping in among them immediately after it, 
thus struck them with such a terror, that they gave way’. He made the observation 
that British battalions were able to attack in this manner three times and lost fewer 
men than allied battalions who tried to rely entirely upon firepower to defeat the 
French. 440 
 
La Fausille observed that once an engagement had begun the pressure of combat 
‘rarely affords the men time to Prime, Load and Ram down their Cartridge properly’. 
That tap-loading was a common practice in British infantry regiments was clear from 
his advice on what to do after an enemy had been broken. First the battalion was to 
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be put in order and then it was to ‘fresh Prime, Load or Ram down the charge of 
such as are Loaded’.441 Ramming tap-loaded charges and freshly priming muskets 
would have ensured that the battalion’s next fire was as effective as any first fire, it 
was effectively starting again. 
 
Bland also wrote about tap loading in his manual, reinforcing that it was a common 
practice. He advised that loading quickly was facilitated by ensuring that the 
cartridges were made so that after being placed in the barrel a thump on the ground 
with the butt end of the musket would make them drop to the breech. Like La 
Fausille he did not greatly approve of it and listed his objections. First, if the barrel 
was dirty, the cartridge could stick part way down, risking the barrel bursting. 
Secondly the paper of the cartridge could get between the powder and the touch-
hole. Thirdly, the power of the shot could be greatly reduced so that ‘the Ball will 
either drop within two or three Yards, or not have Force enough to do much 
Execution’. He added that if the men ‘are not press’d too close by the Enemy, the 
Ramming down of the Cartridge should not be omitted in Service’.442 
 
Despite Bland’s objections there are clear indications in order books that tap-loading 
was not only acceptable, but was planned for in the preparation of ammunition. An 
order of February 1743 to the British army in Europe instructed that if any unit had 
balls too big for their muskets they were to hammer them ‘on every side, to reduce 
them to such a size as they may go easily down in a Cartridge, allowing for the 
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fouling of a piece by often firing’.443 It would appear, while the dangers of tap-loading 
and the benefits of properly loaded muskets were well understood, that at short 
range, the benefit of an increase in the speed of loading, and thus the rate of fire, 
outweighed any loss in effectiveness. Loading without using the rammer could have 
shortened the loading time by as much as half. This meant that the well loaded first 
shots of the firings could be fired with shorter intervals between each firing as the 
first firing to fire would have reloaded in half the usual time. This would have 
increased the intensity of the firing and thus its effect on an enemy. 
 
 The first battle of the war, Dettingen, 1743, was also the last occasion upon which 
British troops were commanded in the field by their monarch, in this case George II. 
The British with their Hanoverian and Austrian allies were outmanoeuvred by the 
French and found themselves trapped between the river Main and forest covered 
hills with the French in front, behind and across the river. Fortunately, errors by the 
French gave the British and their allies a chance to fight their way out when the 
French force blocking their march launched an unnecessary attack. 444 
 
It is general stated that the platoon firing of the infantry pretty much fell apart with 
every man firing in his own time, despite which the British and their allies were able 
to achieve a notable victory over the French. The main source for this assertion is a 
letter from Lieutenant Colonel Russell of the Guards in letters to his wife. 
That the Austrians also behaved well is also true; that except one of 
their battalions which fired only once by platoons, they all fired as 
irregular as we did; that the English infantry behaved like heroes, and 
as they were the major part of the action, to the honour of the day was 
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due; that they were under no command by way of Hide Park firing, but 
that the whole three ranks made a running fire of their own accord, and 
at the same time with great judgement and skill, stooping all as low as 
they could, making almost every ball take place is true; that the enemy 
when expecting our fire, dropped down, which our own men perceiving, 
waited till they got up before they would fire, as a confirmation of their 
coolness as well as bravery, is very certain; that the French fired in the 
same manner, I mean like a running fire, without waiting for words of 
command, and that Lord Stair did often say he had seen many a battle 
and never saw the infantry engage in any other manner is as true.445 
Russell is clearly stating that the British infantry did not fire by platoons as practised 
in Hyde Park. The London based Guards’ Regiments drilled in Hyde Park and the 
term Hyde Park became synonymous with doing things strictly according to 
regulations. In another letter Russsell wrote ‘our men and their regimental officers 
gained the day; not in the manner of Hyde Park discipline, but our foot almost 
kneeled down by whole ranks, and so fired upon ’em a constant running fire’.446 He 
goes on to say that each man fired as an individual, and that Lord Stair stated that 
was what always happened in a battle. The extent to which this sweeping statement, 
which could be read as applying solely to the French, can be relied upon is open to 
question. Lord Stair had been the army’s Commander-in-Chief until his position was 
usurped when George II took personal command and there is little doubt that Stair 
was sulking.447 Similarly Russell was in no mood to pay compliments to the line 
battalions as the Guards had been with the rear-guard of the army and saw no 
action. In fact Russell wrote to his wife that his view of the battle was from a hill two 
miles away.448 More reliable are the accounts of those in the infantry who were 
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directly involved, including a young James Wolfe with Duroure’s Regiment. He is 
clear on the point that his battalion and several others opened fire at far too great a 
range.449 . Col. Duroure, acting as Adjutant General, wrote that the British infantry 
fired ‘not by Platoons but with perpetual Volleys from Right to Left, loading almost as 
fast as they fired without ceasing, so that the French were forced to retreat’.450  La 
Fausille described how once some battalions began to fire firing broke out right along 
the line of British infantry even though in places the French were even out of cannon 
shot.451 He also recounted how, when a battalion commander asked a general 
whether he should order his battalion to fire by platoons or ranks the general advised 
him to keep his men in good order, try to hold their fire to a very close range and he 
would be delighted to see either fire by platoon or ranks as he ‘never did yet but on a 
Field day or at a Review’.452 However, at least one British infantry battalion seems to 
have managed to fire correctly, by platoons, in firings. An officer in the Royal Welch 
Fusiliers described how they advanced to within sixty paces of the French before 
firing. 
Our people imitated their predecessors in the late war gloriously, marching in 
close order, as firm as a wall, and did not fire till we came within sixty paces, 
and still kept advancing; so that when we had soon closed with the Enemy, 
they had not retreated: for when the smoak blew off a little, instead of being 
among their living we found the dead in heaps by us; and the second fire 
turned them to the right about, and upon a long trot.453 
This describes the battalion continuing to advance after giving the first firing and on 
emerging from the smoke of their fire finding the French had taken heavy casualties. 
The battalion’s second firing then caused the enemy to run. This feat was then 
repeated against three other French regiments, including a Guard’s regiment that 
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retreated before the Fusiliers could fire. This officer was clear in his views about the 
reasons for the success of his regiment, emphasising the importance of getting close 
to the enemy before firing. 
What preserved us was keeping close order, and advancing near the enemy 
ere we fir’d. Several that popp’d at one hundred paces lost more of their men, 
and did less execution, for the French will stand fire at that distance, tho’ ‘tis 
plain they cannot look men in the face.454 
In his official report Col. Duroure not only gave his account of what happened, but 
also made mention of how the infantry had been ordered to fight. It was ‘judged that 
the whole fire had been given without Orders, against the Directions to preserve 
ours, and first to receive the Enemy’s, then giving ours and charging with 
Bayonets’.455 A clear statement that if Dettingen had been won by firepower alone 
that had not been the intention. 
 
At Dettingen the French cavalry enjoyed an initial success against the British 
infantry. The French Household cavalry broke through the first line of British infantry, 
but did not cause it to retreat. Rather the words of Bland about the superiority of 
infantry over cavalry were vindicated when the Grenadier company of Huske’s 32nd, 
in the second line, held off the cavalry while the battalion finished forming.456 Then, 
trapped between the first and second line of infantry, the cavalry were shot to pieces. 
 
For events at Fontenoy in 1745 there is a French account of cavalry attacking British 
infantry. ‘Our Cavalry, which advanced before them immediately, could not sustain 
the terrible Fire made by that Line of Infantry... Several of our Squadrons rallied, but 
                                                          
454
 Gentleman’s Magazine, 1743, vol. XIII, p. 386. 
455
 Webb, Suffolk Regiment, p. 70. 
456
 Anon, British Glory Reviv’d (London, 1743), p. 10. 
  
 
168 
 
were again repuls’d by the prodigious Fire of the Enemy’s Infantry.’457 Although 
Fontenoy was a defeat for the Allied army under the Duke of Cumberland the British 
infantry more than held their own against both French cavalry and infantry.458 
 
Following Dettingen the infantry had trained hard in their battalion firings, as shown 
by an order of 1 December 1744; 
The Regt which fired ball against the wall of ye Capuchin’s near the Nonnen 
Bosh, are to do so no more, but to find some other place, if they have 
occasion to fire anymore.459 
Whilst not a great deal of detail of the infantry battle at Fontenoy has come down to 
us, the notable exception to this is the firefight between the British and French 
Guards early on in the battle, when the benefits of such training were clear. Three 
battalions of British Guards were on the right of the first line of the British infantry 
attacking the French position. In an incident immortalised by Voltaire they came face 
to face with the French Guards, the Swiss Guards and the Regiment Courten. 
According to Voltaire, Lord Hay, a captain in the First Guards, stepped forwards and 
invited the French to fire first.  A French officer responded saying that they never 
fired first.460 The truth, as related by Lord Hay, was more prosaic. He saluted the 
French, toasted them from his hip flask and told the French he hoped they would not 
swim the nearby Scheldt as they had the Maine at Dettingen, a reference to their 
rout at that battle.461 It is unclear who did fire first. Voltaire suggests that the French 
infantry were so stunned by the British fire that they didn’t fire at all.462  An account in 
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a British newspaper stated that the French fired first.463 Whether they fired first or 
second the effect of the British fire was devastating. Voltaire says that the fire was by 
platoons and it seems most likely that the Guards fired twice by firings at a range of 
less than thirty yards. The total strength of the three guard’s battalions at Fontenoy 
was approximately 1,970 rank and file, meaning that the French received 
approximately 3,900 rounds of musket fire.464 Voltaire records this fire as causing a 
total of 912 killed and wounded, giving the Guards a hit rate of about 23%.465 By 
contrast the three battalions of Guards suffered a total of 736 killed and wounded for 
the whole battle. 
 
British participation in the War of Austrian Succession was interrupted by the 
Jacobite Rebellion of 1745 when Prince Charles Edward Stuart, with French support, 
landed in Scotland and raised a Scottish army to attempt to recover the Crown for 
his father. The eyewitness descriptions of combat that survive from that domestic 
affair allow a far more detailed analysis of how the British infantry fought than has so 
far been possible. From the beginning it was recognised that the threat posed by 
Highland forces was quite different from that of conventional European forces. Their 
tactics had been described by Lt. Gen. Hugh Mackay who had been beaten by them 
at Killiekrankie.  
Their way of fighting is to divide themselves by clans, the chief or principal 
man being at their heads, with some distance to distinguish betwixt them. 
They come on slowly till they be within distance of firing, which, because they 
keep no rank or file, doth ordinarily little harm. When their fire is over, they 
throw away their firelocks, and everyone drawing a long broad sword, with his 
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targe (such as have them) on his left hand, they fall a running toward the 
enemy.466 
 
Lieutenant General Henry Hawley wrote a similar account of the Highlander’s tactics, 
adding that they normally formed four deep, with their best men in the front rank, but 
that by the time they reached their enemy they were twelve or fourteen deep.467 The 
Duke of Cumberland added further detail when he gave his orders on how the 
Highlanders were to be fought. His orders explained that the object of the 
Highlanders firing ‘at a distance’ was to draw their enemy’s fire, adding that after 
firing they lay down to avoid that return fire. This enabled them to charge home with 
swords against unloaded muskets.468 
 
Mackay’s attempts to overcome the Highland tactics ended in defeat.469 Hawley’s 
response was to advise firing by ranks, the fire directed at the centre of the attacking 
body of Highlanders, starting with the rear rank, but not firing until the range was ‘ten 
or twelve paces’. He deemed it necessary to wait until the range was so short 
because the speed of the advance would prevent reloading. Cumberland’s orders 
were more comprehensive as he allowed for the enemy advancing slowly as well as 
for the Highland charge. First he specified that a battalion must be in eighteen 
platoons. If the advance was slow he ordered that firing should be by half firings, that 
is three platoons at a time, in the case of a rapid advance the fire of the whole 
battalion was to be reserved until the range was ten or twelve yards. He makes no 
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mention of firing by ranks, so it would seem the whole battalion was to fire 
together.470 
 
The first infantry to meet the Jacobite army were those of the scratch force of 
Lieutenant General Sir John Cope at Prestonpans on 21 September, 1745. A 
considerable amount is known concerning events at Prestonpans because there was 
a subsequent enquiry into the defeat of Copes little army, although the main interest 
of the enquiry was the conduct of the senior officers, not the tactics employed. What 
is clear is that there was no attempt to fight the Jacobite army in anything other than 
a completely conventional way. The infantry was described as completely formed 
and having been divided into platoons and firings.471 When the Jacobites attacked 
first the dragoons broke and then the infantry gave what was described as ragged 
fire and also broke and ran.472 
 
At the battle of Falkirk, 17 January, 1746, the British army was led by Lt. Gen. 
Hawley and, following the defeat of his cavalry, most of his infantry turned and ran in 
the face of the Highland charge and a raging storm with rain and sleet.473 However, 
some detail is available of how the infantry battalions that stood fought the Jacobites. 
In particular the description by a sergeant in Barrel’s Regiment describes how the 
front rank knelt while the centre and rear rank fired continually.474 This is confirmed 
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by a private in Barrel’s who referred to the battalion keeping a reserve, that is the 
front rank.475 A description of the Royal Scots that appeared in a Dublin newspaper 
described them firing on attacking Highlanders, the rear rank first, then the centre 
rank and the front rank when the enemy were within a few paces. This was sufficient 
to repel the attack.476 There is a suggestion that while the front rank was held as a 
reserve, the centre and rear ranks fired by platoon rather than whole ranks, but on 
the whole those battalions that stood appear to have adhered to Hawley’s advice.477 
 
Prior to the Battle of Culloden the Duke of Cumberland assembled his army at 
Aberdeen. There the infantry were carefully trained for the forth coming confrontation 
with the Jacobite army and the Highland charge in particular. On 2 April 1746 
Cumberland ordered: 
The Royal North British Fuzileers to be out in the Park tomorrow at 11 o’clock 
there to practice the motions of alternate firings by platoons from ye right and 
left to ye centre reserving the fire of ye front rank & Grenadiers. 
These were followed by the Royal Scots, Price’s, Barrell’s and ‘Every Regiment to 
take their turns afterwards.’ 478 This method of firing was a departure from the normal 
practice of firing by platoons organised into firings. In some ways this was similar to 
what Bland advised for dealing with cavalry, with the front rank reserved, but 
alternate firing was something that he advised against. He described the way the 
Dutch conducted alternate firing when advancing and although he thought it could be 
very effective against a stationary enemy he considered it to be vulnerable to a 
sudden counterattack while the platoons were reloading. He emphasised that it was 
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necessary for a battalion firing in this manner to advance slowly, ‘to give the Men 
Time to load their Arms before they approach too near the Enemy’.479 This would 
seem to make it unsuitable as a method of dealing with the fast advancing 
Highlanders. However, the suggestion that a battalion could be left vulnerable while 
men reloaded also indicates that the whole fire of a battalion could be delivered very 
quickly in this manner, something that would be desirable against Highlanders 
closing quickly. Should that fire not stop an attack then the fire of the reserved 
Grenadiers and front rank could be delivered at a range of only a few yards. This 
intention of delivering the maximum available fire in a short time at close range is 
borne out by a passage in a contemporary history of the rebellion that described the 
infantry at Culloden as firing ‘according to Orders, viz. the 2d and 3d Rank, as they 
were within 30 Yards, and the 1st, just as they were at the Muzzles of their Guns’.480 
 
Figure 6.4: Platoon Firing at Culloden 
G 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 G 
                  
                  
Front 
Green = Front rank and Grenadiers held in reserve 
White = 2nd and 3rd ranks of platoons firing in the sequence indicated from the flanks 
to the centre 
 
In addition to a different form of firing the infantry also received instruction in a new 
way of using the bayonet. From its introduction the bayonet had been treated in the 
same manner as the pike and for combat it was held in exactly the same manner as 
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the ‘charge for pike’ position. The soldier turned his body to the right with the musket 
held horizontally under the chin across the chest. The left hand supported the 
musket under the chin while the right arm was fully extended and the right hand held 
the musket butt. Drill for fighting with the bayonet was limited to simply thrusting the 
musket forward, bringing the right hand to the right shoulder and extending the left 
arm, all with the musket held horizontally at shoulder level. It would seem improbable 
that soldiers in hand to hand combat only plied their bayonets in this manner and it is 
possible that this lack of drill, when compared to the extensive instructions for 
musketry, might be partly responsible for the idea that firepower was more important 
than the bayonet. However, the amount of instruction required for an activity is not 
necessarily an indication of its relative importance. 
 
The drawback with this drill when fighting Highlanders armed with sword in the right 
hand and targe on the left arm was that any thrust with the bayonet was easily 
caught on the targe and the musket was also easily knocked aside by the targe 
leaving the back of the soldier exposed to the sword. The solution to this problem 
was simple and introduced by the Duke of Cumberland: ‘his Highness took the pains 
to confer with every Battalion of Foot, on the proper Method of using the Musket and 
Bayonet to Advantage against the Sword and Target’.481 He simply instructed the 
soldiers to reverse the position so that they faced to the left of their unit with the right 
hand under their chin and their left hand on the musket butt. The intention was that 
any thrust with the bayonet would then tend to come at a Highlander’s exposed right 
side instead of the left that was covered by the targe.482 Although Cumberland is 
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usually credited with devising this drill, it is described in an article in the Gentleman’s 
Magazine for January 1746.483 
 
Cumberland’s army came face to face with the Jacobite army of Charles Edward 
Stuart on Culloden Moor on 16 April 1746. What followed was Cumberland’s army 
simply, efficiently and professionally going about its business, particularly the 
infantry. The Jacobite army was organised in two lines, the front consisting of the 
Highland units with the Lowland units and French regulars in the second line. It was 
the Highlanders in the front line that attacked, moving forward in three large bodies. 
That which moved towards Cumberland’s right flank did not make contact. Three 
times it advanced, trying to provoke the infantry into firing too soon, but as 
Cumberland wrote in a letter to Lord Loudon; ‘On our right tho they came on with 
great fury, our Men did not take their firelocks from their shoulders tho they 
advanced three times within less than an hundred yards of us’.484 It was also 
probable that the Jacobites were inhibited by the presence of three squadrons of 
cavalry on that flank. 
 
On the other side of the battlefield the other two bodies of Highlanders coalesced 
into one single mass that struck the battalions of Barrell and Monro. Because of the 
surviving accounts and an accurate list of the strength of Cumberland’s army it is 
possible to examine in some detail the combat that ensued.  
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Barrell’s Regiment took the brunt of the Highland charge. The strength of Barrell’s 
that day was 373, all ranks, of whom 325 were carrying muskets in the three deep 
platoons.485 At this time infantry battalions consisted of nine hat companies and one 
grenadier company. Given the low strength of Barrell’s it is probable that it was 
organised into a total of twelve platoons, giving a platoon strength of twenty seven 
men.486 This would mean that the centre and rear ranks of the ten hat platoons 
contained 180 men and the reserve had 145 men. If they fired as related the 
platoons would have commenced firing at thirty yards in what one eyewitness 
described as a ‘running fire’, followed by the reserve who ‘received them with their  
fire upon the Points of their Bayonets’. 487 They appear to have only fired once before 
the Highlanders reached them, a total of 325 rounds. 
 
Monro’s regiment was the largest battalion on the field with a total strength of 491 
men and 426 men in the platoons.488 An account by a corporal in the regiment states 
‘we fired at about 50 yards Distance...they still advanced, and were almost upon us 
before we had loaden again. We immediately gave them another full fire’.489 This 
probably means that the platoons of the centre and rear ranks fired twice, almost 
certainly tap loading to get in a second round, followed by the reserve. Thus 236 
men fired twice and 190 fired once, a total of 662 rounds. The corporal of Monro’s 
continued that ‘the Front Rank charged their Bayonets Breast high, and the Centre 
and Rear Ranks kept a continual Firing...most of us having discharged nine Shot 
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each’.490 Monro’s suffered a total of eighty two killed and wounded in the battle, 
allowing for which the battalion could have fired approximately two thousand rounds 
at ranges well under fifty metres. 
 
To the right of Monro’s was Cambell’s Royal Scots Fusiliers. Although not 
subsequently involved in hand to hand fighting part of the Highland charge crossed 
its front. With 412 men in its platoons and assuming its reserve did not fire it is likely 
that it fired about 220 rounds at the Highlanders, if it only fired once. The initial fire 
received by the front of the Highland charge was probably in excess of one thousand 
rounds, many at point blank range. The corporal of Monro’s wrote that this ‘made 
hundreds fall’.491  
 
It was at this point that Cumberland’s new bayonet drill came into play and numerous 
letters and accounts speak of its effectiveness. Cumberland himself wrote ‘our Men 
fairly beat them & drove them back with their Bayonets & made a great slaughter of 
them’.492 According to another account ‘the Soldiers mutually defended each other, 
and pierced the Heart of his Opponent, ramming their fixed Bayonets up to the 
Socket’.493 Another eyewitness claimed ‘there being scarce one Soldier in Barreyl’s 
Regiment who did not each kill several Men; and they of Monro’s which ingaged did 
the same’.494 
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Some Highlanders passed around the left flank of Barrell’s and between Barrell’s 
and Monro’s, over-running two artillery pieces in the gap. Pairs of three-pounder 
cannon had been placed between the battalions in the front line and these 
undoubtedly added many casualties, the guns next to Barrell’s firing their last shots 
of grape at only six feet.495 The Highlanders who passed Barrell’s then came under 
fire from regiments in the second line. Subsequently these moved forward to support 
Barrell’s and Monro’s. In particular Edward Wolfe’s regiment marched to the left of 
Barrell’s and placed itself at right angles to the front line where it commenced firing. 
The account of an officer of that regiment says that the battalion fired five or six 
times. The strength of the regiment was 324 in the platoons and if this firing was 
carried out with the front rank and grenadier platoons reserved it would have fired 
between nine hundred and one thousand rounds into the Highlanders at close range. 
Ligonier’s, Bligh’s and Sempill’s regiments also added their weight to this fire with a 
total of 1,157 muskets in their platoons. There is no indication of how many rounds 
they fired, but if, like Wolfe’s, they fired five rounds each that would have been 
another 3,200 rounds. 
 
All in all it would appear that the Highlanders received between six and seven 
thousand rounds from the battalions of British infantry, many at ranges well under 
fifty metres. The strength of the Highlanders who attacked the British left flank 
battalions was about 2,500.496 According to the officer of Monro’s left flank grenadier 
platoon ‘we laid about 1600 dead on the spot’.497 The figures for rounds fired would 
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seem to be reasonably robust, the various sources are consistent. It would also 
seem that most, if not all, were fired at ranges under fifty metres and that a 
considerable proportion were fired at much closer ranges. The area where the 
greatest doubt is to be found is in the numbers of casualties actually inflicted by this 
fire. However, a return of approximately 1600 casualties for six or seven thousand 
rounds is a hit rate of roughly 22% to 26%, which is in keeping with the 23% 
suggested for Fontenoy. Even if the casualty figure is high and includes casualties 
from other parts of the battlefield a figure of 1,000 casualties still gives a rate of 14% 
to 16%. It would be unwise to place too much reliance on these figures, but they do 
give an indication of the capability of British musketry to inflict high casualties at the 
short range that they seem to have preferred to engage at. Every soldier with a 
musket had twenty four rounds at Culloden, yet Wolfe’s battalion fired only five or six 
rounds a man.498 It would seem most likely that they stopped firing because there 
was nothing left to fire at. 
 
Following the conclusion of the Jacobite Rebellion the British army returned to 
Europe and on 11 October 1746 was engaged with its allies in the battle of Rocoux. 
Contemporary accounts of this defeat at the hands of the French tell us nothing 
about how the British infantry fought, but do tell that they fought well.499 On 2 July the 
following year the allied army was again beaten at Laffeldt.500 On this occasion one 
detail in a letter from a British officer sheds a little light on infantry combat doctrine. 
The letter confirms La Fausille’s statement that some British battalions attacked the 
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French three times in the fight for possession of the village of Laffeldt. The officer 
gives the example of Wolfe’s regiment to illustrate how the British battalions fought.  
Wolfe’s Regiment carried into the field 24 rounds a man. This they made use 
of. Afterwards they had a supply of 8 rounds a man more. After this was 
spent, they made use of all the ammunition amongst the dead and wounded, 
both of their own men and the enemies. When no farther supply could be had, 
they formed themselves immediately to receive the enemy upon their 
bayonets, and being ordered to retreat did it with the utmost regularity.501 
Wolfe’s battalion was probably involved in trying to repel at least four French attacks 
on Laffeldt as the village repeatedly changed hands. With firing minimised in the 
assault it would appear that Wolfe’s men fired in excess of thirty rounds each in 
defence or six or seven rounds a man against each French attack. This represents a 
considerable amount of sustained firing and paints a different picture to the short, 
sharp bursts of fire followed by the vigorous use of the bayonet that seem to have 
been preferred. It may be that the nature of this fighting, in and around a village, 
hedges are referred to in several accounts, forced the infantry into extended fire 
fights. However, it clearly demonstrates that when necessary British infantry was 
capable of considerably extended periods of sustained fire. 
 
Following the effective end of the war and while peace negotiations were in progress 
the Duke of Cumberland and the army were camped at Eindhoven. The organisation 
of firing was further developed and new instructions were issued on 27 August 1748. 
La Fausille recorded the form of these in a diagram, figure 6.5 below, and further 
details appear in a publication of 1757 that included Kane’s works.502 
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Figure 6.5: Directions for Firings in Battalion by Platoons, Sub-Divisions & Firings 
given by HRH at Eyndhoven, August the 27th NS 1748503 
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According to these instructions a battalion was to be divided into two grenadier 
platoons and sixteen hat platoons. Although Bland, Kane and the 1728 Regulations 
allow for other numbers of platoons according to the size of the battalion the Duke of 
Cumberland was insistent on forming eighteen. As early as 17 May 1744 he had 
ordered all battalions to form sixteen sub divisions, eight half divisions and four 
grand divisions, besides the grenadiers.504 In his first orders for fighting Highlanders 
he again stated that battalions were to form eighteen platoons.505 This may have 
been fine for the battalions of Guards, in 1744 they averaged at about 660 men in 
each battalion, not far short of the establishment of seven hundred privates, giving 
thirty six men to a platoon.506 The relatively small size of line battalions, compared to 
the theoretical establishment, can be seen from the morning state of the battalions at 
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Culloden, where the battalions averaged about 367 privates. Forming eighteen 
platoons would have given a platoon strength of twenty, far below what Bland 
recommended as a minimum.507 In the case of Barrell’s regiment this figure would 
have been eighteen, yet the commander of one Grenadier platoon wrote that he ‘had 
18 men killed and wounded in my platoon’.508 Furthermore, if the grenadier company 
accounted for a tenth of the battalion strength, as one of the ten companies, and 
formed two platoons, then eighteen men would have been the platoon size again. As 
the officer is clear that he had eighteen men killed and wounded in his platoon, and 
not that all of his platoon were killed or wounded, it suggests that, as recommended 
by Bland, the grenadier platoons had been supplemented by hatmen. This further 
suggests that the number of platoons was fewer than eighteen, as has been 
discussed above. 
 
Prior to the directions issued in 1748 there was no suggestion that the sub divisions 
could be used as a fire unit, they were simply for manoeuvring. In the absence of any 
contemporary discussion of the development of the new directions the possibility 
arises that the new departure of using of sub divisions, that is pairs of platoons, as 
firing units was to overcome the problem of platoons that were too small to be 
effective on their own. As before the platoons were divided into three firings, the 
platoons of which could either fire singly, one after the other, or all together in a 
whole firing. However, before these directions could be tested in battle the War of 
Austrian Succession was concluded. 
 
                                                          
507
 Cumberland Papers, Box 14/7 (M). 
508
 Anon, The History of the Rebellion … from the Scots Magazine, p. 197. 
 
  
 
183 
 
There is no doubt that platoon firing was not an easy procedure to execute 
effectively. This was clearly demonstrated at Dettingen, the British Army’s first major 
battle in three decades. There, inexperience caused the infantry, described by La 
Fausille as novices, to open fire spontaneously at far too great a range.509 Although 
the same thing nearly happened again at Fontenoy from then onwards the infantry 
carried out their firing most effectively. That effectiveness was improved by a number 
of changes from the days of Marlborough. Locking up made firing easier for the men 
and may have improved accuracy as a consequence. The Platoon Exercise, priming 
from the cartridge and steel ramrods all contributed to shortening the loading time, 
which could be further shortened under pressure by tap loading. Working against 
these improvements, however, was the change in battalion organisation that meant 
platoons and companies were no longer synonymous. However, in Europe the 
difficulties and complexities were overcome and the experienced infantry fighting 
there were able to realise the full potential effectiveness of their firepower. 
 
The importance of experience was clearly demonstrated during the Jacobite 
Rebellion. Of the fifteen battalions at Culloden that destroyed the Jacobite army five 
battalions had been at Dettingen, another eight at Fontenoy and four had been at 
both. It was also experience that taught that it was better to brave the enemy fire and 
get close before firing and then closing with the bayonet than to give in to instinct 
and fire as soon as the enemy was in range. As La Fausille pointed out, it was the 
apparently more dangerous course of action that led to the fewer casualties.510 
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What is also clear from both the theory and the practice of British Infantry combat 
doctrine during the War of Austrian Succession is that it is still basically the same as 
that developed during the English Civil War. What was also demonstrated during the 
Jacobite Rebellion was that the infantry were capable of adapting the detailed 
execution of their doctrine to suit circumstances and the nature of a specific enemy, 
but that they did so without compromising the underlying principles of maximising 
short range fire and following it with effective use of the bayonet. Nor should the 
importance of the bayonet be underestimated. Perhaps because of the small amount 
of attention paid to it in the drill books, modern writers appear to have missed the 
significance of its use and rather emphasised the infantry’s commitment to firepower. 
That it was an essential element of the way the infantry fought is clearly stated by 
Duroure in his comment on how it had been intended to fight at Dettingen and La 
Fausille in his remarks on Laffeldt. What British infantry generally did not do was get 
into long, sustained fire fights where fire alone would decide the outcome, but when 
necessary they were more than capable of it, as at Laffeldt. 
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7: The Seven Years War in Europe 
 
The mid-eighteenth century saw a considerable amount of theoretical consideration 
of the conduct of war and tactical doctrine. Authors such as Saxe, Folard and Santa 
Cruz wrote extensively on their theories of the best way to conduct war. In Europe 
the military successes of Frederick the Great resulted in the widespread imitation of 
all things Prussian, particularly in the art of war. In the Seven Years War, 1756-1763, 
it also saw what has been described as the first world wide war.511 One 
consequence of this was that for the first time significant numbers of British soldiers 
found themselves fighting far from their habitual European campaigning grounds.  
Within Europe, however, the British Army was again pitted against the French. 
Amongst military historians, even British ones, the emphasis has been on studies of 
Frederick and his army. Studies of the British Army, in the European theatre, have 
been largely limited to biographies and narrative histories. In what little analysis there 
is of combat modern historians have again credited its victories to the firepower of 
the infantry. The comments of McLynn and Black concerning Minden have already 
been noted.512  
 
This chapter will consider the contemporary discussion of doctrine and whether or 
not this had any British dimension or any impact on British doctrine. This 
examination of the theoretical aspect of combat will be complimented by an 
examination of the practical, the changes to drill, both official and unofficial, and the 
consequent performance of the infantry on the battlefield. 
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In mid-eighteenth century Europe the military debate on doctrine was between the 
advocates of l’ordre profonde, or columnar tactics, and those of l’ordre mince, or 
linear tactics. Supporters of the column believed in cold steel and shock tactics and 
included such writers and military theorists as the Spanish Marquis de Santa-Cruz 
and the French Chevalier de Folard.513 Another influential figure was the very 
successful French general, Field Marshal Maurice, Comte de Saxe. His Reveries 
was published in English in 1757, following his death in 1750, although it had been 
written in 1732 under unusual circumstances.514 Saxe had been extremely ill and 
suffering from a fever when he put pen to paper to counter the boredom of his 
illness. Saxe maintained, from personal experience, that infantry fire was largely 
ineffective, although he shared the belief that fire should be reserved until the enemy 
had fired first. His preference was for the combination of shock tactics and cold steel, 
with firepower in a supporting role rather being relied upon to provide victory.515 
Ironically he was subsequently an eyewitness to the terrible effectiveness of British 
infantry firepower at Fontenoy. 
 
Following the War of Spanish Succession there had been little development in 
France in infantry tactics and the method for delivering firepower remained 
unchanged. They had introduced a form of platoon firing in 1707, similar to the 
alternate form of platoon firing, but it was only used in defensive positions.516 Much 
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of the responsibility for this stagnation lay with the officer class.517 Nosworthy has 
written that there was an  
attitude among the nobility making up the officer class. This was the belief that 
what was most important in an officer was valor and honor; if the troops were 
brave enough and led by a daring fellow, any situation could be won.518 
The French experience of British firepower in the War of Austrian Succession, 
however, made a considerable impression. After Dettingen Marshal Noailes wrote to 
Louis XV: 
Their infantry was closed and held themselves brazenly, they conducted a fire 
so lively and so sustained that the old officers never had seen anything like it, 
and so superior to ours one could not make any comparison, this resulting 
from our troops being neither exercised nor disciplined as to be suitable.519 
While the French continued to believe cold steel was their metier they did take steps 
to improve the infantry’s firepower. They began ‘locking up’ and levelling their 
muskets according to the range and in 1750 three methods of delivering fire became 
regulation: fire by ranks, platoon fire, and billebaude or voluntary fire, where each 
soldier fired individually in his own time. Fire by ranks was finally abolished in 1753. 
During the Seven Years War, however, French infantry only occasionally managed 
to employ platoon fire, usually resorting to voluntary fire.520 
Perhaps the most influential figure in the development of warfare in the mid-
eighteenth century was Frederick the Great. Initially Fredrick was an exponent of 
shock action and cold steel, preferring his infantry to attack with the bayonet and 
without firing. However, during the course of the Seven Years War it was the 
Prussian infantry’s ability to generate a considerable volume of fire that gained the 
attention and admiration of British officers. A Dutch officer wrote that the ‘Prussians 
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have certainly brought quick-firing to a greater degree of perfection than the troops of 
any other nation’, but added that they did not rely on it and preferred the bayonet.521 
 
Among the British admirers of the Prussian army’s firepower was James Wolfe, who, 
at the beginning of the Seven Years War was the Lieutenant Colonel of the 20th Foot 
and effectively in command of it. An order of his from 1753 shows how British 
officers were determined to do what they could to improve the effectiveness of their 
battalions’ firepower. At a review of the 20th and the 13th regiments the Duke of 
Cumberland had expressed the opinion that the 13th fired faster than the 20th. The 
Colonel of the 20th, Lord Bury: 
Commanded that we practise the same platoon exercise that they do; for to 
the differences between their platoon exercise and ours, his lordship ascribes 
their superiority in this point... he desires we may begin to practise this 
platoon exercise as early as possible.522 
By the phrase platoon exercise Wolfe was referring to the process of loading a 
musket, rather than the manner of delivering fire. Regrettably his order did not 
explain what it was the 13th were doing that made them faster. It is possible, that as 
regulations often codified what had already been developed, this was a forerunner of 
the changes that would be brought in officially with the 1756 platoon exercise. 
 
With the threat of a French invasion of Britain in January 1755 Wolfe wrote a set of 
instructions for the battalion on how it was to fight if the French landed. These 
included a clear allusion to the Prussian methods of firing. 
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As the alternate fire by platoons or divisions, or by companies, is the most 
simple, plain and easy, and used by the best disciplined troops in Europe, we 
are at all times to imitate them in that respect.523 
It is usually assumed that this is Wolfe the innovator at work, giving him the credit for 
the introduction of more effective Prussian ideas of delivering fire.524 However, one 
of the captains of the 20th was the young Duke of Richmond. Richmond had travelled 
abroad before joining the army and had met Frederick the Great. Although Wolfe’s 
military junior he was a person of considerable influence, being acquainted with the 
Duke of Cumberland, with Henry Fox as his brother-in-law and later serving as Aide-
de-Camp to Prince Frederick of Brunswick.525 A clue that Richmond rather than 
Wolfe may have been behind the innovations introduced to the 20th is found in a 
letter from Wolfe to him after Richmond had become Lieutenant Colonel of the 33rd. 
I have great hope of your success in bringing about such reformations, as you 
think wanting in your Corps... & as your Grace has seen & brought away 
many excellent things from the Armies upon the Continent, they may, by your 
help, become general among our Troops, & improve them.526 
 
Alternate fire, as has been shown, was used in the War of Spanish Succession until 
superseded by the organisation of platoons into three firings. Cumberland had made 
use of alternate fire against the Highland charge at Culloden, but thereafter was 
insistent on the forms of firing laid down in 1748. Of these firing by sub-divisions 
came closest to alternate fire. However, instead of each sub-division firing in turn 
from the flanks to the centre, alternating between the left and right halves of a 
battalion, first the right hand sub-division of each grand-division fired from the flanks 
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to the centre, alternating between the halves of the battalion, and then the left hand 
sub-divisions did the same.527 There is no known explanation of exactly why 
Cumberland objected to alternate fire, but that he did was made clear in a letter he 
wrote when he heard that it was being practiced by troops in 1757. 
I must desire that you will acquaint Sir John Ligonier, for the Army in general; 
& to all General officers commanding Corps, Sir John Mordaunt not excepted, 
that I am surprised to hear that my orders as to the Fireing and Posting of the 
officers, approved & confirmed by His Majesty, are changed according to the 
Whim & Supposed Improvements of every fertile Genius; and that therefore, it 
is my positive order, that... they conform exactly to those Standing orders.528 
In this letter Cumberland is making reference to the New Platoon Exercise of 1756 
which perpetuated Cumberland’s 1748 firings.529 It is notable that with the Duke of 
Richmond leaving the 20th in 1756 Wolfe was quick to comply with the new 
regulations for all that he might complain about them. In his orders for an exercise 
issued in 1756 he instructed that ‘The two regiments shall conform to the practice of 
the army in their firings, and in their telling off the battalion’. He further added that 
‘The firing of the infantry shall begin by platoons followed by that of sub-divisions, 
then by grand-divisions, as they approach nearer and nearer the enemy, so that this 
last firing may cease when they are within a few paces of his line.’530 
 
Leaving aside for the moment the arguments concerning alternate fire, Wolfe’s 
orders of December 1755 also contain a wealth of information on the steps that 
could be taken to improve a battalion’s general combat readiness and firepower, 
regardless of how it was finally delivered. There were clear instructions that stressed 
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the importance of both marksmanship and the use of the bayonet: ‘they are to be 
taught to fire at marks at different distances, and in different situations, to be fully 
instructed in the use of their bayonet’ and ‘to fire, kneeling and standing, to the front, 
to the rear, and obliquely, and from one rank to six deep’.531 Quite how firing was to 
be carried out in six ranks is not explained, but it could simply be a reference to a 
unit parading six deep before forming into three ranks to fire. An explanation of 
oblique fire, however, is to be found in The Complete Militia-Man of 1760. 532 Firing at 
an angle to either side of a battalion presented no difficulty for the front or centre 
rank man. In oblique firing, however, the rear rank man, instead of presenting his 
musket to the right of the man in front of him, presented his musket to either the right 
or left of the men standing next to the man in front of him. The platoon exercise was 
to be practiced under different circumstances as was the use of the bayonet in attack 
and defence, suggesting that there was a lot more unofficial drill for the use of the 
bayonet than that contained in the regulations.533 The use of the bayonet was 
reiterated when Wolfe ordered: 
If the firing is ordered to begin by platoons, either from the wings or from the 
center, it is to proceed in a regular manner, till the enemy is defeated, or till 
the signal is given for attacking them with the bayonets.534 
The regularity of the firing was also something Wolfe emphasised: 
There is no necessity for firing very fast; a cool well levelled fire, with the 
pieces carefully loaded, is much more destructive and formidable than the 
quickest fire in confusion.535 
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Although the Prussian method of delivering fire was admired and imitated it would 
appear that British officers did not share the Prussian view that speed was 
everything.  
 
Wolfe also had instructions for dealing with any attack by a column of infantry. He 
instructed that his soldiers were to carry ‘a couple of spare balls’ and if attacked by a 
column, and time allowed, that part of the battalion facing the head of the column 
was to load the extra balls and then when ‘the column is within about twenty yards 
they must fire with a good aim, which will necessarily stop them a little’.536 
 
One section of Wolfe’s orders that began, ‘There are particulars in relation to fire 
arms that the soldiers should know’ is of particular interest because of the light it 
sheds on some of the minutiae of firing a musket. It pointed out that the power and 
accuracy of a musket did not improve the more powder was used, but that the best 
size of charge was discovered through experience, something very necessary when 
soldiers were issued with powder, ball and cartridge paper to make their own 
ammunition. In relation to this the size of cartridges was also an important matter. 
Muskets became fouled with powder residue after repeated firing and if a cartridge 
was too big it could be difficult to ram home the ball. Too large a gap between 
powder and ball could result in a barrel bursting. Conversely, if a ball was rammed 
home too hard it could inhibit the powder from burning completely, thus reducing the 
power of the shot.537 
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In April 1756 new regulations were issued, first just dealing with the platoon exercise, 
but subsequently expanded in the 1757 Regulations to cover all aspects of drill.538 
Under these regulations battalions continued to be organised for firing as had been 
laid down by the Duke of Cumberland in 1748. There were, however some 
significant changes in the way the soldiers loaded their muskets. Previously, after 
firing, each soldier brought his musket up to the recover position, with the musket 
held vertically in front of him, the lock at about neck height. The front rank rose from 
their kneeling position and the middle and rear ranks stepped back to a distance of 
six feet between each rank before reloading.539 According to the New Exercise the 
ranks were to be at one pace or two feet distance both to fire and reload. This saved 
the few seconds of time taken up opening and closing the ranks to load and to fire. 
Furthermore, instead of first coming to the recover with the musket it was instead to 
be brought straight from the present position for firing straight to the position for 
priming, again saving a few seconds.540 
 
Another difference, albeit an apparently slight one, concerned the use of the rammer. 
Prior to the issue of the New Platoon Exercise of 1756 the 1728 Regulations still 
applied to the loading of a musket, which were themselves unchanged where the 
rammer was concerned from the 1708 Regulations. It took two motions to pull the 
rammer from the stock of the musket, then after turning it round and shortening it so 
the rammer head was at the muzzle it took three motions to use it to thrust the 
                                                          
538
 For the full genesis of the 1756/7 regulations see Houlding, Fit for Service, pp. 198-201. 
539
 Bland states that for firing the ranks should be two paces apart when firing, that is six feet. Bland, Military 
Discipline, p.10 and 1728 Regulations, p.76. 
540
 A New Exercise to be observed by His Majesty’s Troops on the Establishment of Great Britain and Ireland 
(issued April 1756, this edition published, London, 1757) and Anon, New Manual Exercise as performed by His 
Majesty’s Dragoons, Foot Guards, Foot, Artillery, Marines And by the Militia (London, 1758, 2nd Edition, 
Entirely Corrected and Enlarged), p. 15-16. 
  
 
194 
 
cartridge down the barrel. This was followed by withdrawing it to an arms length and 
then ramming ‘down the charge with ordinary force’. It took a further three motions to 
pull the rammer out of the barrel, unless it was a steel one rather than a wooden 
one, in which case it took only two motions.541 The additional weight of a steel 
rammer and its greater strength meant that it could be treated with more vigour as it 
was less likely to break. 
 
The change from wooden to steel rammer was not without its opponents. General 
Hawley was blunt in his opinion in his article Chaos, which he appears to have 
written in 1726 when he was Colonel of the 33rd Foot. 
The iron rammers the Foot are coming into are very ridiculous... if they have 
not some alloy of steel they stand bent and cannot be returned. If they have 
the least too much steel then they snap like glass; in wet weather or in a fog 
they rust and won’t come out.542 
Despite these objections the change over continued, but was slow as can be seen 
from an order of 22 April, 1748, ‘Lord Harry Beauclerk’s Regt. [31st] to send to the 
Train [of Artillery] tomorrow to compleat their iron Rammers’, they were to be 
followed by the Guards and all the line regiments according to seniority.543 
 
The instructions in the 1757 Regulations were that the rammer was to be drawn from 
the musket stock in two motions and then to ‘Ram down the Cartridge quick, and 
with good force; at the rebound of the rammer catch it close at the muzzle.’ One 
further motion was sufficient to get it out of the barrel. A footnote in the regulations 
states, 
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The Firing quick depends chiefly upon the quick Loading, and that chiefly 
upon the dexterity of drawing the Rammer, the ramming down and returning 
the Rammer. This Part of the Exercise therefore requires great practice and 
Attention.544 
This increased vigour and speed in the use of the rammer was only possible 
because of the introduction of the more robust steel rammer. 
 
A battalion was arranged for firing as had been laid down by Cumberland in 1748, 
with two platoons of Grenadiers on the flanks and the hat companies divided into 
sixteen platoons, eight sub-divisions and four grand-divisions. The only difference 
from the 1748 arrangement was that the grand-divisions were now fire units as well 
as units for manoeuvring. While this New Exercise improved on the platoon exercise 
it did nothing to address two significant problems that had caused difficulties with the 
various firings from the 1730s onwards. 
 
When the form of the firings and the division of a battalion into fourteen platoons had 
been fixed on under Marlborough in 1711 a battalion had consisted of one grenadier 
company and twelve hat companies. With the division of the grenadier company into 
two platoons, one on each flank, the hat companies were left to form one platoon 
each.545 In 1717 the number of hat companies had been reduced to eleven, as was 
still the case in 1727 when Bland’s Military Discipline was published and the 
following year when the 1728 Regulations were issued. Although Bland contained 
details for a variety of numbers of platoons the 1728 Regulations still specified 
fourteen.546 In the 1730s, however, the number of hat companies was further 
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reduced to nine, but without any compensatory alteration in the number of platoons. 
In fact, as has been seen, under the Duke of Cumberland the number of platoons 
increased so that the nine hat companies had to form sixteen platoons. 
 
The inevitable confusion caused by breaking up the companies into a different 
number of platoons was further exacerbated by the way the officers of a battalion 
were distributed around the battalion for command and control purposes. This was 
done entirely according to seniority and with no regard for the position of the men in 
an officer’s company. As was spelt out at length in the New Exercise and reinforced 
with the authority of both Cumberland and the King; 
By the above scheme the Colonel and Lieutenant colonel are in the Front, and 
the eldest Captain in the Center of the Rear; a Captain commands each 
Grand Division, the Senior Lieutenants command every other Sub-Division, 
and the remaining eight platoons are commanded by Lieutenants and 
Ensigns.547 
The effect of this was that soldiers were frequently formed with men from other 
companies and more often than not were under the command of officers they did not 
know and who did not know them. 
 
For some years officers had questioned the existence of two separate sets of arms 
drill, the Manual Exercise, which included all the drill involving the musket, and the 
Platoon Exercise, which was for use in the platoons, in action, on the battlefield.548 
The question asked was why was there a need for two drills? This had the potential 
to confuse a soldier in battle, particularly as the Manual required the soldier to cast 
about the musket to his left side, whilst the platoon required him to load with the 
musket to his right. With the issue of the 1756 Regulations the Manual Exercise was 
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restricted to those parts of the musket drill that were not part of the loading and firing 
drill. Loading and firing were now carried out solely according to the Platoon 
Exercise. 
 
The new platoon exercise was not, however, without fault and one change was 
made between the exercise as first issued in April 1756 and as issued in 1758 in a 
second, ‘entirely corrected and enlarged’ edition. Initially the position for priming the 
musket required it to be held at chest height, the muzzle a little higher than the butt 
and resting in the crook of the left elbow and between the thumb and forefinger of 
the left hand, the forefinger resting of the feather spring of the lock.549 This had two 
obvious drawbacks, it was uncomfortable, with the elbow raised unnaturally high and 
supporting the weight of the musket, and the muskets of each rank were liable to get 
in the way of the rank in front. In the revised version the musket was held in the left 
hand at the point of balance with the muzzle raised above the head of the man in 
front.550 
 
With the ranks standing two feet apart for loading there was no longer any need for 
the second and rear rank to close forward in order to lock up for firing. Instead the 
front rank man knelt, pushing his right foot backwards three feet. The second rank 
man stepped back a foot with his right foot, placing it just behind the right foot of the 
front rank man. This allowed him to fire over the head of the front rank man. The rear 
rank man stepped to the right with his right foot so that it was behind the left heel of 
his right hand man. This allowed him to aim his musket between the second rank 
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man to his front and the one to his right.551 The main consequence of these changes 
was that it became possible to form the men with the elbows just touching, reckoned 
as twenty-one inches to each file.552 Prior to this the files had been half an arm’s 
length apart, which is approximately a nine inch gap.553 The effect of this was to 
increase the density of the distribution of muskets in a battalion. The effect of the fire 
of a platoon of thirty six men was concentrated in seven yards rather than ten as 
previously. While this would not have resulted in more casualties amongst the 
enemy it would have concentrated them in smaller area. 
 
John Houlding states that the 1756 regulations reduced the platoon exercise from 
sixty three to twenty four motions, making it easier to learn and increasing the rate of 
fire by at least one round every two minutes.554 Houlding does not say what the rate 
of fire was, and the effect of reducing the number of motions on the loading time was 
minimal. The loading time of a musket was certainly decreased by the elimination of 
the ranks opening and closing and the new priming position. But the number of 
motions that the loading process was divided into made no difference to the 
requirements of the process itself. This was something that Douglass commented on 
in the 1740s in relation to a new platoon exercise developed by Colonel Blakeney. 
He wrote: ‘Lastly the author pretends shortening ye exercise by leaving out ye words 
of command...although ye words are left out yet ye number of motions are not 
decres’d.’555 In other words, it doesn’t matter how the process of loading a musket is 
divided up, it is only by such things as priming from the cartridge instead of a flask, 
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going straight to the priming position from the present and by adopting the more 
robust steel ramrod or tap loading that the process can be speeded up. 
 
Despite these regulations reiterating the 1748 firings there continued to be moves to 
change to alternate firing in the face of considerable high-ranking opposition in the 
shape of the Duke of Cumberland. As has already been discussed in connection with 
its use at Culloden, alternate fire could deliver the fire of a battalion very quickly.556 
An article written in 1757, although apparently not published until 1759, offers a 
possible explanation for the objections to alternate fire. ‘We have imbibed a notion 
that our safety depends upon reserving the greatest part of our fire, and therefore we 
use our men to fire by single platoons.’557 Another officer gave a similar explanation, 
‘The square toes of the army tells us that half the regiment ought to be constantly 
shoulder’d. I have often heard this maxim, but never heard a reason for it.’558 In a 
reiteration of this the Foot Exercise 1757 as found in A System of Camp Discipline 
includes, ‘In the firings by grand Divisions the Officers must give a little more Time 
betwixt each Fire, that one half of the Battalion may always be loaded.’559 This would 
seem to chime with the arguments against alternate fire offered by Bland who 
thought its use left a battalion to open to attack.560 
 
But just as much as alternate fire was objected to, so too there were complaints 
about the authorised methods of delivering fire. One officer wrote in The London 
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Magazine: ‘But at present five or six different methods of firing in a battalion are 
constantly taught and practised.  But, pray, why so many? Since they cannot all be 
good.’561  Firing platoon by platoon was objected to on the grounds that it took far too 
long and left the men standing with muskets loaded waiting their turn. The same 
officer recorded how high he could count between a platoon finishing loading and its 
turn to fire coming round. Unfortunately he did not say how fast he counted other 
than to say it was ‘with moderate quickness’. He claimed he had counted from up to 
180 to 260, which assuming two counts to the second gives a time delay of from 90 
seconds to 130 seconds, but even at three counts a second gives a time of at least 
60 seconds. He went on to say ‘The reason generally given for firing by these 
platoons is, that a constant fire should always be kept up.’562 
 
If firing by individual platoons was too slow then firing by firings or sub-divisions was 
also criticised. Here the objections were based upon the difficulty of coordinating the 
fire of units that were separated from each other, some by the whole width of a 
battalion. This was thought to be particularly difficult when more than one battalion 
was firing at a time and even more difficult in battle. 
In regard to firing by firings, I should think that it must also be impossible for 
the scattered divisions, in action, to hear their signals, whether they be given 
by drums, or voices; and, as the battalion is divided into three fires only, 
perhaps the fire could not be perpetual.563 
This was something that Wolfe had stated when introducing alternate fire to the 20th. 
As the alternate fire by platoons or divisions, or by companies, is the most 
simple, plain and easy, and used by the best disciplined troops in Europe, we 
are at all times to imitate them in that respect, making every platoon receive 
the word of command, to make ready and fire from the officer who commands 
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it; because in battle the fire of the artillery and infantry may render it difficult to 
use any general signals by beat of drum.564 
 
The officer who questioned firing by platoons in The London Magazine also argued 
that perpetual fire was possible with sub-divisions and even grand-divisions, which 
was eight or four fire units, and which raised the question, why fire by individual 
platoons? To demonstrate that perpetual firing with four fire units was possible he 
gave the example of the 2nd Troop of Horse Grenadiers who had done just that.565 
This was a particularly interesting example to use as this was a cavalry unit. At that 
time all cavalry units were required to be able to fight on foot if necessary.566 He also 
informed his readers that Marshal Saxe said a good soldier could fire four times a 
minute, or every fifteen seconds, and that the Prussians had eight platoons in a 
battalion. These, he informs us, were ‘only one word of command behind that which 
it follows’.567 By this he means that if, as with British infantry, the words of command 
to fire a volley were ‘Make Ready, Present, Fire’ then the officer commanding the 
second platoon to fire would order ‘Make Ready’ as the first ordered ‘Present’. This 
would have resulted in something like a two second delay between platoons firing, 
meaning that each platoon fired every sixteen seconds. 
 
This officer made a case the case for a battalion’s fire to be delivered in four firings. 
Another did the same, but adding that in a firing it was not absolutely necessary for 
the platoons to fire perfectly together.568 The view that a constant fire could be kept 
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up using four fire units was challenged in an article commenting upon Observations 
on Firing. 
He imagines, that four platoons are able to keep up a constant succession of 
firing; whereas he will find, upon experiment, that just double that number will 
come nearest the mark he aims at, viz. to keep up an uninterrupted 
succession of fire, and thus to discharge the greatest quantity of ball in the 
least time possible. 
The author of this article went on the recommend to his readers The Complete 
Militia-Man, ‘where he will find the best system of firing we remember to have 
seen’.569 
 
The Complete Militia-Man was an extremely useful publication because it was written 
for civilians taking commissions in the militia and thus contained explanations that 
would not have been necessary for regular officers. The criticism of the authorised 
firings was repeated. 
In my chapter of the firings, I have differed entirely from the practice of the 
army, because I was willing to recommend nothing to the Militia, but was 
essential and practicable upon real service.570 
The anonymous army officer who wrote this was in agreement with the other two 
equally anonymous officers in stating that fire should be reserved to close range, 
‘Experience informs us that the fire of musketry at a distance does very little 
execution’, but that once firing had started it could not be delivered too quickly. 
However, he maintained that it was necessary to have eight fire units. 
It is scarce possible to reserve your fire too long, before you begin; but I am 
certain, that after you do begin, it is impossible to make your succession of 
fire too quick. Let me therefore advise the gentlemen of the Militia, if they ever 
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engage an enemy, not to fire by platoons, but by sub-divisions, or companies, 
provided they have eight companies in their battalion.571 
 
What is noticeable about this discussion in the pages of various English publications 
is that it is entirely concerned with the best way to deliver a battalion’s fire. There is 
no discussion anywhere of the relative benefits of firepower as against cold steel, or 
column versus line. The debates that took place in Europe appear to have 
completely passed by the British officer corps. Although it is not explicitly stated 
anywhere, it is tempting to consider that they were perfectly content with their tactical 
doctrine and it was only improving the execution of that which was of interest to 
them. 
 
Some officers were so convinced of the difficulties of the official firings and of the 
superiority of alternate fire that they introduced it to the troops under their command. 
This is what occurred in 1757 on the Isle of Wight where General Mordaunt was 
preparing a force for an amphibious assault on France. Two of the battalions under 
his command were the 20th, under Wolfe, and the 33rd, under the Duke of Richmond. 
Perhaps under the influence of those two officers, Mordaunt effectively tore up the 
regulations, as the Duke of Richmond wrote in a letter to his brother. 
General Mordaunt has done a thing in his army, which if it is followed by the 
rest the whole nation will be obliged to him for it. He has dared to follow 
common sense and to put into execution what every body has long since 
thought right. He has broke through all the absurd regulations that General 
Napier has been puzzling the army with since he has been Adjutant General. 
He has abolished the manual exercise both old and new, and draws up all the 
regiments as Kingsley’s [20th] used to do, by companies with their own 
officers. 
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This is truly great and you have no idea how much it has already improved the 
other regiments. This is against all order, and some persons are amazed that 
Sir John Mordaunt will undertake it.572 
 
In doing this Mordaunt was risking the wrath of the Duke of Cumberland, who was 
campaigning in Germany, albeit with an army that contained no British troops. Not 
surprisingly Cumberland heard about Mordaunt’s actions and wrote to the Secretary 
at War in no uncertain terms, insisting that the regulations should be adhered to.573 
However, Cumberland had just been badly beaten by the French at the Battle of 
Hastenbeck and at the Convention of Kloster Zeven was forced to accept humiliating 
terms by which his army was disbanded.574 As a result Cumberland resigned all his 
positions, leaving the way clear for the proponents of alternate fire. 
 
Using Wolfe’s Instructions, Richmond’s letter to his brother, which states 
categorically that they were drawing up ‘all the regiments as Kingsley’s [20th] used to 
do’, and The Complete Militia-Man it is possible to examine precisely how alternate 
fire was organised and executed and to analyse its effectiveness. In keeping with the 
Prussian practice the core of alternate fire was eight fire units. In order to simplify the 
organisation of a battalion these were to be eight of a battalion’s ten companies. Of 
the other two companies one was the Grenadier Company. Previously this had been 
divided into two platoons, one on each flank of the battalion. With the company now 
the basic fire unit it was no longer possible to divide the Grenadiers in that manner. 
Instead they were posted as a complete company on the right of the battalion whilst 
the other, tenth company was posted on the left and referred to as a piquet. This 
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term applied to any detachment of soldiers, as Richmond explained in his letter; ‘The 
whole comp[any] of Grenadiers on the right and a detached company or picquet on 
the left.’ In addition to a company acting as a single fire unit it was also divided into 
two platoons that could also be used as fire units if necessary. One further detail, 
found in both Wolfe’s Instructions and Richmond’s letter, is that each company 
retained its own officers with it instead of them being distributed around the battalion 
according to seniority. 575 
 
Figure 7.1: The order of firing of eight companies using alternate fire 
1 3 5 7 8 6 4 2 
Front 
 
 
According to The Complete Militia-Man the first and second companies to fire, being 
at opposite ends of a battalion, were to ‘make ready’ when the battalion commander 
instructed the battalion to ‘Take care to fire by sub-division’. When the order was 
given to commence firing the officer commanding the first company, on the right of 
the battalion, then gave the orders ‘present, followed by ‘fire’. The next company to 
the left was to fire third, after the second company to fire, which was on the other 
flank. The commander of this third company gave the order ‘make ready’ as soon as 
the first company fired. On hearing that first company fire the commander of the 
second company to fire also gave the orders ‘present,’ ‘fire’, at which point the 
company to its right, which was to be the fourth to fire, would ‘make ready’. 
Meanwhile, back on the other flank of the battalion, the officer commanding the third 
                                                          
575
 Wolfe, Instructions, p. 45 and The Duke of Richmond to Lord George Lennox, 9 September, 1757, Bathurst 
Manuscripts, p. 681. 
  
 
206 
 
company to fire, hearing the second fire, gave the orders ‘present’ and ‘fire’, which 
was followed by the fourth company firing.576 As the commander of the third 
company to fire took his timing for the order ‘make ready’ from the first, which was 
next to him, and had only to listen for the second company firing, this largely dealt 
with the difficulty of the separation of the successive companies firing. 
 
Rather than having the grenadier company on one flank and a piquet company on 
the other as practised in the Regular army, The Complete Militia-Man had the 
grenadier company divided into two platoons, one on each flank. Of these, the right 
hand platoon was to ‘make ready’ after the fourth company fired and to fire after the 
fifth, followed by the grenadier platoon on the left flank. The remaining four 
companies followed in a like manner.577 It would seem likely, however, that the firing 
sequence used by the regular battalions did not include the grenadier and piquet 
companies. According to Richmond the battalions formed with, 
The whole comp[any] of  Grenadiers on the right and a detached company or 
picquet on the left. The remaining eight companies form the battalions and 
have all their own officers with them, and practise no other firing but by 
companies from right and left.578 
Wolfe’s Instructions also suggest that the grenadier and picquet companies operated 
semi-independently of the main body of the battalion, covering and protecting the 
flanks or pursuing a beaten enemy.579 
 
The rate of fire or of reloading is difficult to determine, there is no record of any 
officer making use of a watch to time the firings. However, taking the various 
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comments suggesting that four rounds a minute was possible, that eight fire units 
could keep up a continual fire and considering the description of the giving of orders 
for alternate fire in The Complete Militia-Man, some estimation is possible.580 Four 
rounds a minute suggests a reloading time of fifteen seconds, but a unit had to be 
reloaded before an officer could give the first order of ‘make ready’, followed by 
‘present’ and ‘fire’. Allowing time for the front rank to kneel this sequence could take 
approximately five seconds, reducing the loading time to ten seconds, which would 
seem extremely difficult to achieve.  
 
If the firing sequence in eight fire units is considered, the first company to fire was 
expected to make ready again after the seventh company had fired so that it could 
fire again after the eighth. This gave it the six intervals between it firing and the 
subsequent six companies firing in which to reload. Each interval was long enough 
for a company commander to give the orders ‘present’ and ‘fire’ and for his company 
to do just that. It was also long enough for a company to make ready, with the front 
rank kneeling, the second and rear ranks taking their proper position and the 
muskets being cocked. If this interval was three seconds, that gave each company 
eighteen seconds from firing before it had to be reloaded again and ready to ‘make 
ready’.  
 
These figures are, of course, approximations, but they do suggest strongly that a 
battalion was quite capable of delivering all of its fire approximately every twenty 
seconds. Allowing for a battalion on campaign being a little under its official 
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establishment of seventy men to a company, perhaps sixty men, then eight 
companies would discharge 480 rounds. Standing in three ranks with a frontage of 
twenty-one inches a man and with a three foot interval between companies they had 
a total frontage of approximately one hundred yards. If the rate of hits already seen 
at Culloden and Fontenoy is allowed, then a battalion of British infantry employing 
eight companies firing alternately, could, at the preferred range of thirty yards, inflict 
between 100 to 120 casualties on an enemy every twenty seconds. That is one 
casualty for every yard of frontage every twenty seconds. 
 
Arguing against the possibility of this sort of effectiveness a Dutch officer wrote, 
It is observed that, at the battle of Fontenoy, the French had about six 
thousand killed and wounded. Now, on the side of the allies...there were but 
twenty thousand combatants. It is known, these fired away all their cartridges, 
to the number, perhaps, of thirty-six each man: but we will suppose each man 
fired no more than twenty: here were four hundred thousand shot discharged. 
And if, at the same time, we suppose, that only five hundred men suffered 
from the artillery, it is plain, here were seventy-three shot to one person killed 
or wounded. If we consider, besides, how many might suffer from the 
bayonet, the disproportion will also be considerably increased.581 
This argument, however, was effectively dealt with by the author of The Complete 
Militia-Man.  
First, let me assure you that the fire of a regiment, unless it be very near, is far 
from being so terrible as those who are not experienced are apt to imagine. 
One would think that almost every ball must do execution; but this is so far 
from being the case, that, in a general engagement, not one ball in a hundred 
does any mischief, till the armies come within twenty or thirty paces of each 
other. For this reason, if you have any desire to triumph over your enemies, or 
the least regard for your own safety, you will be very cautious not to throw 
away your fire.582 
The inaccuracy of musket fire at any sort of distance was well known and was 
highlighted by Lafausille as contributing to the defeat of the French during the War of 
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Austrian Succession.583 The British infantry was clearly still adhering to the doctrine 
of close range fire delivered with efficiency and accuracy. Whilst other nations might 
have been debating the competing merits of firepower and cold steel, British infantry 
was still balancing firepower with the use of the bayonet. Wolfe’s comments have 
already been noted above.584 The Complete Militia-Man contained directions to 
march up close to the enemy, in this case specifically naming the French, fire and 
then ‘charge your bayonets, march briskly up, and rush, like lions, into the broken 
ranks of the enemy’.585 
 
In connection with the bayonet it has been suggested that Wolfe was responsible for 
the introduction to the British Army of a new form of bayonet drill.586 Rather than held 
breast high as the pike had been, this new method saw the bayonet held much more 
comfortably at waist height. Unlike alternate fire there was no mention of this in direct 
connection with Wolfe, or Richmond, in any contemporary writing. However, it did 
make an appearance in several of the manuals that were written specifically for 
militia units. One of these was written for the Norfolk Militia and in his introduction its 
author acknowledged the assistance received from officers of Wolfe’s and 
Richmond’s regiments.587 It was not until the 1764 regulations were issued that this 
bayonet drill became authorised for use by the regular battalion, although it would 
seem unlikely that something like this was in use by the militia, but not the regulars. 
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On the question of dealing with cavalry the duke of Richmond’s letter tells us that 
amongst other things General Mordaunt abandoned ‘such absurdities as squares 
etc.’.588 Wolfe’s Instructions are silent on the matter. The complete Militia-Man 
repeats advice that had been given since Mackay’s rules.589 
If ever you are attack’d by cavalry, your safety, as in the former case, 
depends entirely on reserving your fire; for if you should foolishly throw it 
away whilst they are at a distance, they will instantly put spurs to horses, and 
drive in among you: but if, on the contrary, you do not fire at all, you may be 
certain they will never come within fifty yards of you with their whole body.590 
 
In 1755, at the same time as the British Army had been striving to improve its 
platoon exercise, the French Army also further developed its own version of platoon 
firing. A French battalion was to form in three ranks rather than four and its twelve 
companies were divided into six platoons that fired alternately from the centre to the 
flanks. There was to be a two second interval between each platoon firing. The 
French, however, saw platoon firing as an essentially defensive tactic, continuing to 
prefer to rely on shock and cold steel in the offensive.591 Consequently they did not 
develop the aggressive combination of firepower and the bayonet in the attack used 
by British infantry. There was also an apparent problem with the quality of French 
musketry. A British officer, George Durant, wrote that the French were bad 
marksmen because they believed a musket ball in flight falls. As a consequence they 
had a tendency to aim high. Whilst this is true with regard to the laws of gravity, it 
was, in fact, necessary to aim low with a musket and the closer the target the lower it 
was necessary to aim. This was because a musket kicked up as it was fired, 
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throwing the shot high.592 Durant went on to write that consequently few British 
soldiers were hit below the chest while muskets being carried at the shoulder were 
hit above soldiers’ heads.593 In Germany in August 1761 Corporal Todd of the 30th 
described an attack against French infantry who ‘fired a whole Volley upon us...but 
scarce Kill’d aman, their shott flying over us’. He continued to describe how, in their 
normal manner, the British battalion continued to advance until within pistol shot 
before firing, which caused the immediate retreat of the French.594 
 
In Germany in 1759 British infantry was ordered by Lord George Sackville to form 
according to the 1749 firings, in sixteen platoons, exclusive of Grenadiers. At first 
sight this appeared to be a retrograde step, but the orders added further details. 
Each company was to be a sub-division, or two platoons, with two companies to a 
grand-division. This organisation is not possible with an establishment of nine hat 
companies, unless the extra company was deployed as a picquet. That these orders 
established, as at least local regulations, the organisation and firings practised under 
General Mordaunt is clear from the part dealing with firing. 
It is recommended to the commanding officers to practice chiefly the alternate 
firing, firing from right and left by grand divisions, sub-divisions and platoons. 
His Lordship expects that the regiments will strictly conform to this order and 
he shall not see for the future one regiment practising differently from another, 
and of course producing confusion in the service.595 
It was with this organisation that British infantry entered the Seven Years War in 
Europe. 
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Leaving aside the various British amphibious raids on the French coast, there was, 
initially, limited participation in the Seven Years War in Europe by British infantry. 
Their first engagement was at Minden where the six British battalions that won the 
day were the only British infantry present. At Corbach just four battalions were 
engaged whilst at Warburg it was primarily the British cavalry that was engaged. At 
Kloster Kamp there were eight battalions with two grenadier battalions formed by 
combining the grenadier companies of those battalions. At both Vellinghausen and 
Wilhelmsthal there were seventeen British battalions, but some sixty or more other 
allied battalions. Despite this numerical inferiority it is arguable that in all their 
engagements British infantry punched above their weight. 
 
At the Battle of Minden on 1 August 1759 the six British battalions present performed 
in such a manner that their feats that day are still annually celebrated by their 
descendant units. An Allied Army under Prince Frederick of Brunswick had lured a 
French army into battle on unfavourable ground. Whilst the battle was still in its early 
stages the British infantry, in the centre of Frederick’s army, misunderstood their 
orders and immediately set off, supported by three Hanoverian battalions, marching 
directly towards the centre of the French army. The 12th, 37th and 23rd regiments 
formed the first line, followed by the 25th, 51st and 20th with the Hanoverians on their 
left flank. In an unusual deployment they were faced by sixty-three squadrons of 
cavalry formed in three lines in the centre of the French army.596 A detailed account 
of what followed was given by a British officer in the 12th which, as the front right 
battalion, saw the hardest of the fighting. 
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When we got within about 100 yards of the Enemy a large Body of French 
Cavalry galloped boldly down upon us; these our Men by reserving their fire 
until they came within 30 yards immediately ruined. 597 
Yet again the infantry held their fire until the enemy were within the preferred range 
of thirty yards. It would be reasonable to assume that under such circumstances the 
battalions fired all their companies together, something that appears to have been 
practiced even if it does not appear in the regulations. Corporal Todd reported 
practicing all the usual forms of firing and ‘vollies’.598  If not a reference to whole 
battalion firings it is difficult to know what else this might refer to. 
 
The British battalions were then charged by fresh cavalry, the Gens d’Armes, which 
‘we almost immediately dispersed without receiving hardly any mischief from the 
harmless Creatures’. The next French attack was made by seventeen infantry 
battalions, which the 12th and 37th wheeled to face. There followed a sustained 
firefight for about ten minutes before the French were driven off. 599  It is highly 
improbable that the British infantry fired without a break for ten minutes. At three or 
four rounds a minute that would have used up most, if not all the ammunition carried 
by the infantry, usually twenty-four rounds a man. It is more likely that they fought a 
quick succession of firefights as enemy battalions were beaten and replaced by 
others. The next French attack was carried out by battalions of Grenadiers and the 
description sheds light on the French infantry’s apprehension about getting into a 
firefight with British infantry. 
The next who made their appearance were some Regts of the Grenadiers of 
France, as fine and terrible looking Fellows as I ever saw. They stood us a 
tug; not with standing we beat them off to a distance, where they galded us 
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much they having rifled barrels, and our Musquets would not reach them. To 
remedy this we advanced, they took the hint, and ran away.600 
A final attack, the officer of the 12th said by infantry, others cavalry and perhaps 
some confusion is understandable in the light of what had passed, partially broke the 
front three battalions, but was beaten by the three battalions in the second line. By 
the end of the battle the 12th had suffered 302 rank and file killed and wounded out of 
480 and 18 officers killed and wounded out of 27. ‘With this remnant we returned 
again the charge, but to our unspeakable joy no opponents could be found’.601 
 
There is insufficient information to analyse this action in terms of rounds fired, rates 
of fire and casualties caused. There is no doubt, however, that it represented an 
unheard of achievement by infantry. The French general, Contades, summarised 
what had had happened and its implications for the French Army. 
As to the cannon, those of our enemy fired quicker, and did more execution 
than ours. Our musquetry, indeed, fired faster and oftener, being discharged 
sooner, and at a greater distance; but the enemy reserved their fire till they 
discharged it in our teeth; by which means they did thrice the execution; and 
then rushing in with their bayonets, prevented our troops from giving any 
more; and I cannot help mentioning, what if I had not seen it, I should have 
thought incredible, that one single column of infantry penetrated and broke 
through three lines of cavalry. This column consisted principally of the English 
regiments, whose intrepid behaviour in this battle, it will be prudent to conceal 
from the troops designed to invade Great Britain from France, less they 
should be intimidated by it.602 
This is a clear recognition of the battlefield doctrine of British infantry, an admission 
of its capabilities and a confession that the French could not match it. 
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The battles of Corbach, Emsdorf and Warburg in 1760 are best known for the 
successful exploits of the British cavalry, which more than made up for Minden 
where they had sat inactive while the French army fled the field. Their commander, 
Lord Sackville was subsequently court-martialled and cashiered. Later that year, on 
16 October 1760, at Klosterkamp an attempt to launch a surprise attack on the 
French ultimately failed, but only after the Allied infantry involved had expended all 
their ammunition. In this engagement the fire of the British infantry was said to have 
been ‘so rapid and deadly that three French brigades were almost wiped out of 
existence'.603 The engagement lasted from before dawn until noon. One small hint as 
to how the British infantry at least might have been able to sustain a fight for so long 
when the standard issue of ammunition was twenty four rounds comes from the diary 
of Corporal Todd. Prior to taking the field in 1761 he recorded how, on 1 June, after 
going through all the ‘firing Motions’ and having all the arms and ammunition 
checked it was ordered that more cartridges should be made up so that every man 
would have sixty rounds.604 On 9 June it was further ordered that the battalions 
should have ‘plenty of Ammunition ready made up in the Tummerils [tumbrils]’.605 
These were in addition to the sixty carried by each man, as in August Todd recorded 
thirty being taken from each man, ‘they having carried with them 60 as before 
Order’d’.606 Whether carrying sixty rounds had been the case at Klosterkamp or was 
a consequence of it is unclear. 
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On the evening of 15 July 1761 Corporal Todd and his battalion were engaged in the 
opening round of the battle of Vellinghausen. The French attacked the Marquis of 
Granby’s British Corps and Todd described how the eight British battalions 
‘performed wonders & Maintain’d their ground against four times their Number’.607 
No doubt their sixty rounds a man helped. The French attack on the Allied army 
under Ferdinand the following day has been described as ‘one of the feeblest ever 
fought by the French army’.608 Todd, however, has left some interesting detail about 
the fight seen from his level. After the first evening’s fighting he recorded that they 
were ordered to check their muskets and to ensure every man had a good flint and 
was properly loaded. Much of the fighting the following day morning was in woods 
and amongst thick bushes where they had frequent recourse to their bayonets.609 
 
The Seven Years War came to an end in 1763 and in 1764 a new set of regulations 
were issued for the British Army. There were some minor changes to the loading and 
individual firing in the platoon exercise. The use of the rammer was further 
quickened as it was drawn from the stock in two motions, turned and put into the 
barrel without first being shortened against the body. After ramming it was similarly 
just turned and replaced in the stock without shortening.610 It would appear that 
having the men in each rank standing so close that they touched the men beside 
them left too little room for ease of loading. The files were now to be four inches 
apart while the distance between the ranks for firing remained at two feet.611 On the 
order ‘make ready’ the second rank men stepped slightly to their right, only moving 
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their right foot. After firing they brought the left foot towards the right for reloading. 
The rear rank took a larger step to the right and followed it with the left foot. They 
also stayed stepped to the right to reload, but after reloading both ranks stepped 
back to the left behind the front rank men.612 While this meant that each file had a 
frontage of twenty five inches instead of twenty one it probably made loading easier 
and thus slightly quicker. This was still closer together than had been the case during 
the War of Austrian Succession. 
 
With regard to the instructions for delivering the fire of a battalion the use of firing by 
individual platoons and by firings had disappeared. Firing was now limited to 
alternate fire by sub-divisions, exactly as described by Wolfe, Richmond and in The 
Complete Militia-Man, or firing by grand-divisions. The only difference was that the 
number of hat companies was reduced to eight after the war and the grenadier 
company was once again divided into two platoons, one on each flank.613 
 
During the Seven Years War in Europe the infantry of the British Army had continued 
to demonstrate their effectiveness and to seek to improve their performance. This 
was not done, however, following any great debate about how battles should be 
fought, whether cold steel was superior to firepower, or column to line, the doctrinal 
debates in Europe seem to have passed by almost unremarked. Instead there was a 
continuing adherence to the doctrine of close range fire followed by the prompt and 
effective use of the bayonet. In doing so they changed the method of delivery back to 
something like it had been at the start of the War of the Spanish Succession, which 
was alternate fire by companies. Bland’s objection to this had been that it left parts of 
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a battalion unloaded and thus too exposed to attack.614 The introduction of firings 
had meant that a part of a battalion’s fire was always available along the whole front. 
Changes in drill and the adoption of other measures, such as the steel rammer, had 
the effect of reducing the loading time to the point where the dangers highlighted by 
Bland were neutralised. This allowed a return to the much simpler alternate fire 
method, which was far easier to control and less likely to break down in confusion. 
This in turn increased the effectiveness of that fire. 
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8: The French and Indian Wars  
 
Whilst a part of the British army was campaigning in Europe a significant part was 
experiencing the less familiar expanses of North America. The nature of the 
environment required the army to adapt to campaigning over huge distances through 
wilderness landscapes and presented many new challenges to an army more 
accustomed to campaigning in Europe.615 It was also faced with fighting against not 
only French regulars, but a very different enemy in the form of Indians and French-
Canadian irregulars. However, despite the obviously very different nature of warfare, 
the bulk of the recent scholarly history written about this war is concerned with the 
narrative of events rather than any analysis of those differences and their 
consequences. An example of this is Anderson’s Crucible of War.616 
 
Historians of the Seven Years War in North America, or the French and Indian Wars 
as it usually referred to in North America, have tended to look most frequently at the 
campaign in 1759 under Major General James Wolfe. This is not surprising as it was 
the decisive campaign that led to not only the defeat of the French and the capture of 
Quebec, but to the expulsion of France from Canada and the establishment of British 
control there. In addition to Wolfe’s strategic achievements Stuart Reid has also 
sought to analyse his wider contribution to the British Army and concludes: 
In the longer term it was Wolfe’s volley and bayonet tactics, first described in 
December 1755, which formed the cornerstone of British infantry tactics in the 
Peninsular War and at Waterloo. ...his influence on the development of the 
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British Army, and in particular on its infantry tactics, was perhaps his real 
legacy.617 
This assessment of Wolfe has been reiterated most recently by Saul David:  
He left, moreover, an important legacy: the simple but effective battle tactic – 
a close quarter volley, followed by a bayonet charge – that British infantrymen 
would use to sweep all (or almost all) before them for much of the next 
hundred years.618 
Both writers are referring to Wolfe’s influence on conventional warfare as 
represented by the Battle of Quebec, where, according to Fortescue, the British 
infantry delivered ‘the most perfect volley ever fired on a battlefield’.619 Wolfe’s part in 
the development of tactics in the European theatre has already been discussed, but 
the Quebec campaign was his first independent command where he could influence 
tactics free of outside interference or objection. 
 
By comparison scant attention has been paid to the demands and challenges of the 
irregular warfare that had to be faced. The campaigns in North America saw the 
establishment, albeit temporarily, of the first light infantry units in the British Army. 
These were raised specifically to counter the threat posed by the Indian allies of the 
French and their own French-Canadian irregulars. Perhaps because their 
contribution is not seen as decisive, or perhaps because their existence was 
temporary, their tactics and methods have been little studied. Fuller’s British Light 
Infantry in the Eighteenth Century is dated and demonstrates a limited availability of 
material.620 Gates’ The British Light Infantry Arm touches on the subject in his first 
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chapter, but the French and Indian War is outside the main scope of his work.621 
More recently there has been a useful publication by Osprey, but the limited size of 
their publications means that it can only serve as an introduction to the subject.622 
 
The most comprehensive, recent treatment of the development of light infantry and 
Indian fighting is in Brumwell’s Redcoat. He deals with all aspects of the war in North 
America and addresses the nature of irregular warfare and the tactical evolution of 
the redcoats.623 His account of the development of British light infantry and its 
experiences is thorough, but in keeping with most military historians he neglects the 
procedures by which this form of warfare was conducted, making it difficult to 
indentify any underlying tactical doctrine. He writes: 
The mixture of regular and irregular warfare which characterised these 
campaigns demanded diverse combat skills; the resulting fusion of Old and 
New World techniques created troops capable of fighting in both the 
conventional fashion of Flanders and in a more flexible manner that owed little 
to the traditions of Dettingen and Fontenoy.624 
What he does not do is give any description of those combat skills and techniques or 
the doctrine underpinning them.  
 
Brumwell has also claimed, the ‘‘American Army’ acquired an ethos and tactical 
doctrine that set it apart from other British and European armies’.625 This chapter will 
examine the changes in the tactics and the processes of combat that occurred in 
North America and whether or not a combat doctrine did develop that was different 
from what had developed before in Europe, particularly where irregular warfare was 
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concerned. This will include an examination of Wolfe’s contribution to conventional 
warfare in the new theatre.  
 
It was clearly understood that the nature of warfare against Indians was different 
from anything experienced in Europe or even the highlands of Scotland. What would 
seem not to have been appreciated was just how different it was. Writing after the 
war, Colonel, later Brigadier, Henry Bouquet summarised the tactics of the Indians. 
The first, that their general maxim is to surround their enemy. 
The second, that they fight scattered, and never in a compact body. 
The third, that they never stand their ground when attacked, but immediately 
give way, to return to the charge.626 
This type of warfare was far removed from Europe where solid lines of infantry three 
deep and manoeuvring in an open landscape could fire shattering vollies at ranges 
of thirty yards. 
 
Just how different this was became apparent when Major General Braddock’s 
expedition against Fort DuQuesne was thoroughly defeated on 9 July, 1755 at the 
Battle of Monongahela. Braddock was aware that the army’s usual tactics would 
need to change in order to combat the Indian threat and he took steps to do that. In 
March he had issued instructions on how the battalions were to conduct their firing. 
One company was nominated as a second grenadier company and was to be posted 
on the left of the battalion while the grenadier company took the right. The eight 
remaining companies were retained intact and either formed single fire units or were 
divided into two platoons. When firing, the right hand of the eight companies fired 
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first, followed by the left hand company, and so on, alternating right and left towards 
the centre. The two grenadier companies fired last, but not until the first companies 
to fire were loaded again. The firing was to be ‘as fast as possible’. Orders were to 
be given by the officer commanding a company.627 This method of delivering fire was 
nothing more or less than the alternate fire system that had been introduced by 
Wolfe to his regiment just two months earlier and is here in use some three years 
before Mordaunt introduced it to his command on the Isle of Wight. 
 
On the march and in order to secure the numerous wagons from attack by Indians 
the main body of the infantry marched on each side of the wagons, company by 
company and in two files. In case of attack the infantry were to simply face outwards 
forming a two deep line on each side of the road. An advance guard preceded the 
main body. A few miles short of Fort DuQuesne the advance guard was engaged by 
a force of Indians and French infantry.  
The French...threw themselves behind trees as soon as they saw the English 
& began to fire their muskets. The Indians...took up their positions at the base 
of each tree with their customary shrieks.628 
After giving an initial platoon volley the officer commanding the advance guard, 
observing their Confusion and being apprehensive of a second Attack of the 
same kind, immediately ordered the Men to draw back, and posted them 
singly behind Trees, in the Indian Manner; where probably they would not only 
have maintained themselves, but might have done execution against the 
Enemy, had not the General, who came up from the Rear upon the first Fire, 
upbraided them for Cowards, and with his Sword drawn forced them in a 
Manner to return to their Ranks.629 
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The consequence of this was that rather than holding their ground until the main 
body could be organised to meet the attack, the advance guard and their supports 
were driven back onto the main body, causing considerable confusion. The Indians 
then encircled the whole British column and continuously fired from cover at the 
British infantry standing in the open in rank and file. 
They having always a large marke to shoute at and we having only to shoute 
at them behind trees or laid on their Bellies. We was drawn up in large Bodies 
together, a ready mark. They need not have taken sight at us for they Always 
had a large Mark, but if we saw of them five or six at one time [it] was a great 
sight and they Either on their Bellies or Behind trees or Running from one tree 
to another almost by the ground.630 
Some attempts were made to close with the Indians with the bayonet, but these 
came to nothing as the Indians shot down the officers and avoided any close 
contact. Some of the American provincial troops took cover behind trees to return the 
Indian’s fire, but many of these were shot from behind by the wild vollies that came 
from the British infantry whenever they caught a glimpse of a target.631 One British 
soldier claimed that it was these Americans who caused what casualties were 
inflicted on the enemy.632 
 
Remarkably the British infantry held their ground for about three hours, only finally 
breaking when they ran out of ammunition.633 According to a contemporary 
newspaper report the soldiers told their officers that it was pointless shooting at trees 
and bushes, but that they would fight their enemy if they could see him.634 The 
French and Indians had also made a point of picking off the officers, which 
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contributed to the lack of fire control and the general state of confusion and, 
ultimately, panic.635 As the French themselves reported: 
The Indian mode of fighting is entirely different from that of us Europeans, 
which is good for nothing in this country. The enemy formed themselves into 
battle array, presented a front to men concealed behind trees, who at each 
shot brought down one or two, and thus defeated almost the whole of the 
English.636 
In the aftermath of this defeat one British officer complained that Braddock had given 
orders to fire by platoon, which was inappropriate for the situation they had found 
themselves in.637 Braddock was mortally wounded in the battle and unable to defend 
himself. However, this lack of control of the infantry’s fire, along with an ignorance of 
the nature of the enemy, was also identified by the French as contributing to the 
result. 
If on terrain without real problems, such a disaster could happen to brave and 
well-disciplined troops, through an inability to direct fire & ignorance of the 
nature of the enemy they were engaging, then this provides a good lesson 
that these two aspects of warfare should receive close attention.638 
 
At the time much of the blame for the defeat was laid on the behaviour of the rank 
and file.639 Wolfe, still in Britain, wrote that ‘the cowardice and ill-behaviour of the 
men far exceeded the ignorance of the chief’.640 Stanley Pargellis has argued more 
recently that the blame lay with Braddock’s failure to apply basic military precautions 
when on the march through enclosed country, be it in Europe or North America. This 
allowed the column, in the first instance, to be surprised and then to be unable to 
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react correctly to the attack.641 However, even if the British had not been surprised 
and had been able to form an ordered two deep line against the attack, it is unlikely 
that they would have defeated the French and Indians. As the two French reports 
quoted above make clear, European style combat procedures were rendered 
impotent in the face of the irregular procedures. It was impossible for the British 
infantry to apply their traditional combat doctrine of first disrupting the enemy with 
effective musketry and then dispersing him by means of the bayonet. Monongahela 
was a victory of individual, aimed fire from cover over massed vollies delivered from 
in the open. 
 
The effectiveness of irregular warfare was also demonstrated a few months later on 
8 September 1755 in an engagement between British provincial forces and a French 
force of regulars, Indians and Canadians. The French were making a pre-emptive 
strike against a force advancing to attempt the capture of Fort St. Frederic. The 
ensuing fight was a long, confused affair that ended in victory for the provincial 
forces and the establishment of Fort William Henry while Fort St. Frederic remained 
in French hands. During the battle the irregulars on both sides made full use of the 
available cover, even the French regulars, after firing a few platoons ‘went into the 
Indian way of Fighting, squatting below the Shrubs, or placing themselves behind the 
Trees’.642 
 
The British Army’s response to the difficulties of this sort of warfare was twofold. One 
measure was to endeavour to train the regular battalions in the rudiments of irregular 
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warfare or bush fighting. The second measure was the introduction of their own light 
troops to take on the French irregulars on their own terms. One of the first and 
perhaps the most famous of these were Rogers’ Rangers. This was not a regular 
British Army unit, but formed of Anglo-Americans. It was one of several ranger units, 
most of which proved themselves unreliable and ill-disciplined. Consequently British 
commanders determined to form their own light infantry subject to regular army 
discipline. However, many of the officers of the regular light infantry served with 
Rogers and learnt their bush craft from him. Rogers subsequently wrote down his 
rules for irregular warfare and these can be said to have formed the basis for the 
operational methods of British light infantry. 
 
He first required that rangers carried sixty rounds of powder and ball. This was 
necessary because they spent considerable periods away from bases where they 
might resupply. He wrote extensively about the tactics of warfare in the woods, 
including a number of points that deal specifically with combat methods. If the enemy 
was firing he advised ‘fall or squat down, till it is over, then rise and discharge at 
them’. When advancing against an enemy his instructions were for the rangers to 
keep well apart from each other and move from tree to tree in two lines, the first 
some ten or twelve yards ahead of the other. After the first line fired the second was 
to pass through and fire in turn while the first line reloaded. By this means the two 
lines could advance whilst keeping up a constant fire on the enemy. If receiving an 
attack his instructions were: 
In general, when pushed upon by the enemy, reserve your fire until they 
approach very near, which will then put them into the greatest surprise and 
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consternation, and give you an opportunity of rushing upon them with your 
hatchets and cutlasses to the better advantage.643 
There are two features of these instructions that stand out. One was the requirement 
for keeping up a constant fire; the other was the use of firepower backed up by close 
quarter combat. 
 
Captain Knox added further details about the ammunition of the Rangers. He 
described them as carrying a bag which ‘contains bullets, and a smaller shot, of the 
size of full-grown peas: six or seven of which, with a ball, they generally load’. This 
was also a practice of the French irregulars who are described as always loading 
with six or seven ‘buck shot’ as well as a normal ball.644 
  
Bouquet also had his views on training light infantry.  
They will be taught to handle their arms with dexterity; and without losing time 
upon trifles, to load and fire very quick, standing, kneeling or lying on the 
ground. They are to fire at a mark without a rest, and not suffered to be too 
long in taking aim.645 
The emphasis had shifted to the effectiveness of the fire of the individual rather than 
a battalion, company or platoon. This new emphasis was also seen in other 
proposals concerning the development of light infantry. 
 
One of the first proposals for forming light infantry from amongst the regular infantry 
came from Major George Scott in early 1758. He wrote to Lord Loudon, who had 
arrived in North America in July 1756, replacing Braddock as Commander-in-Chief, 
with proposals on how they should be equipped. He recommended a firelock that 
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was shorter and lighter than the standard Long Land Pattern Musket with its forty six 
inch long barrel. Apart from being less of a burden a shorter, lighter musket was also 
quicker to bring to the aim and easier to keep on target, thus improving accuracy, 
particularly against briefly seen or moving targets. Furthermore the barrel was to be 
blackened, which served two purposes. It prevented the position of the firer being 
given away by sunlight reflecting off it and it also prevented reflected sunlight 
dazzling the firer. The musket was still to be provided with a bayonet, but it was to be 
short and light and in the form of a knife, making it a dual purpose item. Scott 
maintained that in the absence in North America of cavalry it did not need to be as 
long as the usual seventeen inches. The advantage of the lighter bayonet was the 
reduction in weight of the musket at the muzzle end, thus improving aiming. 
 
Ammunition, in the form of cartridges, was to be carried in a tin cartridge box that 
would protect the ammunition from the damp. In a significant change Scott proposed 
a return to using priming horns, abandoned in the 1740s, instead of priming from the 
cartridge. These were to be filled with finer pistol powder, His argument was that the 
finer powder was easier to ignite than the slightly coarser powder used in muskets 
and that priming from a horn would avoid any loss of powder from the cartridge, 
ensuring the musket got a full load. He claimed that as much as half the powder in a 
cartridge was sometimes lost in priming, with the consequence that the resultant 
shot had neither its intended force nor range.646 The return to the use of priming 
flasks could be seen as a retrograde step, their abandonment had speeded up the 
loading process. However, since, according to Bouquet, light infantry were to load 
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without ‘losing time upon trifles’ and were not handicapped by standing in closely 
packed ranks and files it is possible that there was no real loss of speed in reloading. 
 
Loudoun, however, had already authorised the raising of what was the first regular 
light infantry regiment in the British Army, the 80th under Thomas Gage. A list of 
items supplied for equipping this new unit specifies a cost for ‘Cutting and finishing’ 
the 540 firelocks supplied, that is shortening them and possibly blacking the barrels 
as well. In addition 540 shot bags and powder horns were supplied.647 
 
In May 1758 Major General Jeffrey Amherst was recently arrived in North America at 
Halifax, Nova Scotia, where he was making preparations for his assault on the 
French fortress of Louisbourg.  He ordered the formation of light infantry from 
amongst the regular battalions, which were placed under the command of Major 
Scott. The men drafted from  
the regiments, that have been any time in America, are to furnish such as 
have been most accustomed to the woods, and are good marksmen; and 
those from Europe are to furnish active marchers, and men that are expert at 
firing ball.648 
Amherst subsequently ordered that this light infantry were to exchange their long and 
heavy Long Land Pattern firelocks for the lighter, shorter firelocks carried by the 
artillery.649 In his instructions for how they were to fight the influence of Rogers was 
clear, they were to ‘generally fight in a single rank’ and avoid huddling together, thus 
presenting their enemy with a target. They were apparently expected to load their 
muskets from powder horns, rather than just priming, as they were instructed to be 
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careful not to over load their guns and to have tow or paper ready cut to serve as 
wadding in the place of the paper of a cartridge.650 
 
Early in 1759 Amherst, by then the fourth Commander-in-Chief in North America in 
as many years following Braddock, Loudoun and Abercromby, issued further 
directions for the equipment of the light infantry. In particular he stated that they were 
not to carry bayonets, instead they had a ‘tomahock’.651 Wolfe, however, once at 
Quebec, ordered the light infantry to carry them again, ‘as the want of ammunition 
may sometimes be supplied with that weapon’ adding that lack of ammunition was 
no excuse for a man to leave his post and that at night the bayonet was preferable to 
fire.652 
 
Steps were also taken to train the regular battalions so that, if not as specialised as 
the light infantry, they could at least hold their own against the Indians and French 
Canadian irregulars. The Duke of Cumberland had insisted to Lord Loudoun that all 
American recruits to the army should be taught according to regulations.653 Wolfe 
had commented; 
My Lord Loudoun... did adhere so literally and strictly to the one – two and the 
firings by the impracticable chequer, &c., that these regiments must 
necessarily be cut off one after another unless they fall into some method 
more suited to the country and the kind of enemy they have to deal with.654 
This is somewhat harsh on Wolfe’s part and it must be remembered that he was 
writing to Lord Sackville, a man of considerable influence and was promoting 
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himself. In fact Loudoun did take measures to suitably train his infantry for bush 
fighting. In respect of the newly formed Royal American Regiment he wrote to the 
commanding officers of its three battalions in December 1756 insisting that the 
soldiers were trained to fire at marks and to learn to load and fire kneeling and lying 
on the ground.655 
 
One of Loudoun’s Brigadiers, John Forbes, wrote of the necessity for training troops 
in the specialist nature of bush warfare. When attacked he believed that untrained 
troops would be killed or flee whereas a trained and experienced bush fighter would 
take cover ‘behind some tree stumps or stone, where he becomes his own 
Commanding Officer, acting to the best of his judgement for his own defence and 
General Good of the whole’, thus squarely placing the emphasis on the individual 
soldier rather than a unit.656 In a letter to Bouquet he recognised the need to adapt to 
the local form of warfare, ‘And I must confess in this country, we must comply and 
learn the Art of War from Enemy Indians or anything else who have seen the 
Country and Warr carried on in it’.657 It was possibly Forbes who introduced the order 
‘tree all’ into the regulars’ repertoire. If ambushed or otherwise surprised this order 
resulted in the men immediately seeking cover individually behind trees or rocks. 
From there they could return fire, again individually.658 
 
In 1758 Forbes led an expedition to capture Fort DuQuesne, which was abandoned 
by the French in the face of his advance and renamed Fort Pitt by Forbes, who died 
soon after taking possession of it. Prior to the expedition setting out Forbes had 
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spent considerable time and trouble training his command. A letter to him from 
Bouquet speaks of the need to buy two or three hundred barrels of gunpowder in 
order to train provincial recruits and ‘to drill our troops in forest warfare’. The same 
letter also spoke of the need to provide the provincials with lead in bars. This was 
because some of them were armed with rifles, weapons that were not of a military 
calibre, and it was thus necessary for the provincials to cast their own balls for 
these.659 The rifle was a more accurate weapon than the issue musket, but the 
necessity for the balls to be a tight fit, in order to grip the rifling that imparted spin to 
the ball thus improving accuracy, meant that they were slower to load. A few were 
issued to marksmen amongst the regulars, but they were most commonly found in 
the hands of Indians and irregulars. The rifle seems to have had little impact on the 
warfare of the day and was not seen in any number in the British Army until the 
formation of the 95th Rifles during the Napoleonic Wars. It did not reach the hands of 
the ordinary redcoat until the mid-19th century when the development of the Minie 
ball overcame the loading problem. 
 
The training of Forbes’ men included ‘running & firing in the Indian Manner’.660 The 
Rev. Thomas Barton who accompanied the expedition has also left a description of 
how this firing was organised. For battle the men formed in a single rank and were 
divided into platoons of twenty. There was no attempt to coordinate the fire of the 
different platoons, but within each platoon the men fired individually, starting with the 
right hand man, followed by the left hand man and then alternating right and left until 
the fire reached the centre of the platoon. Before the fire reached the centre the first 
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men to fire were reloaded and ready to fire again. By this means a continuous fire 
was maintained across the front of each platoon in the same manner as it was by 
companies in battalions using the alternate fire system. 661 Bouquet’s Order Book for 
the same expedition adds the detail that each platoon was to be commanded by an 
officer or a sergeant.662 
 
Also in the summer of 1758 Amherst was leading his army against the important 
fortress and port of Louisbourg. It is clear that Amherst had little respect for the 
Indians and their way of war, calling them cowards and barbarians and expressing 
astonishment that they had managed to beat Braddock. However, he clearly 
understood how they fought and how to beat them. 
Their whole dependence is upon a tree, or a bush, you have nothing to do, 
but to advance & they will fly, they never stand an open fire or an attack. Our 
irregulars and light Infantry are certainly of great use & should always 
accompany an Army in this Country, as these troops drive them out of their 
shelter, harass them continually & beat them in their own way.663 
Amherst’s orders to his regulars for a field day dealt with an advance by four 
battalions lead by an advance guard of two platoons. If attacked the left hand of 
these two platoons was to fire ‘singly’, that is each man individually. This was to be 
followed by the right hand platoon firing ‘the whole together’, after which the left hand 
platoon was to begin firing again as before. It is difficult to see what Amherst thought 
this mix of firing styles might achieve. It is possible that he thought the individual 
firing would protect the platoon firing a single volley from the attentions of irregulars 
who fought as individuals whilst the sheer power of a platoon volley might overwhelm 
or, at least intimidate, an enemy and prevent them from advancing while the 
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following battalions deployed. These four battalions were to form two lines, with the 
flank sub-divisions wheeled outwards to protect the flanks. After the two leading 
battalions had fired the second line was to pass through and fire in turn.664 To pass 
through each other would require the battalions to be in a very loose order and 
possibly in a single rank. This is very much like Rogers’ fire and movement tactic, but 
on a much larger scale. 
 
In early December 1758 Forbes left Fort Pitt to return to Philadelphia where he died 
the following March. In his absence Bouquet gave instructions to Colonel Hugh 
Mercer who was charged with the defence of the Fort. In these he wrote; ‘Your best 
marksmen only should fire from the Fort, The other to load for them; Each man 
having two muskets’.665 In this order there is an echo of Field Marshal Saxe. In his 
Reveries he had advised that the most effective fire could be achieved in a similar 
method with one man firing while four loaded for him.666 In both cases the result was 
to make the most effective use of the best individual marksman available. 
 
By June 1759 Amherst had replaced Abercromby as the Commander-in-Chief in 
North America and was assembling his army at Fort Edward. There, both newly 
arrived provincial troops and the regulars were kept busy, firing at marks and 
practicing ‘forming and dispersing in the woods, and in other exercises adapted to 
the peculiar method of carrying on war in close-covered countries’.667 However, this 
was the year in which the outcome of the war was decided and that happened in 
open and relatively conventional battle against the French. 
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It has already been shown above that early in 1755 Braddock had ordered his troops 
to make use of the alternate system of delivering a battalion’s fire and that at the 
same time Wolfe had been introducing alternate fire to his battalion in England. This 
was clearly contradictory to the regulations then in force, which, for the delivery of 
fire, were the regulations authorised by the Duke of Cumberland in 1748. Prior to 
becoming Colonel of the 14th Foot in 1753 and a Major-General in 1754 Braddock’s 
entire career had been in the Coldstream Guards and thus very much under the eye 
of the Duke of Cumberland, who seems to have been instrumental in getting 
Braddock his North American command.668 Whilst the influence of the Duke of 
Richmond on the young Lieutenant Colonel Wolfe has been considered, a different 
explanation offers itself for Braddock’s innovation. During the War of Austrian 
Succession Frederick the Great had acquired a considerable reputation for his 
successes against the Austrians, much of which was due to his infantry. In 1754 a 
translation of the Prussian Infantry manual was published in London that contained 
detailed instructions on how the Prussians executed alternate fire, using eight fire 
units in a battalion.669 The two battalions with Braddock had come from the Irish 
Establishment and were thus well below full strength.670  They had been brought up 
to strength by drafts from other battalions and recruiting in America. It would seem 
probable that Braddock, recognising that these battalions lacked cohesion and 
training, tried to keep things simple by introducing the far less complex Prussian 
alternate fire instead of Cumberland’s complex system of 1748. 
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Braddock’s replacement, Loudoun, has already been noted as adhering strictly to 
regulations, but it has to be borne in mind that the 1756 Platoon Exercise had just 
been issued and that Loudoun had been given very specific instructions about 
adhering to them. Loudoun’s successor, Major General Abercromby, had gone out to 
America with Loudoun and so was operating under the same understanding. When 
Abercromby replaced Loudoun as Commander-in-Chief in early 1758 he also 
received assistance in the form of the arrival of new senior officers. To lead the 
attack against Louisbourg was Major General Amherst, assisted by Brigadier James 
Wolfe. Brigadier Lord Howe was to assist Abercromby in his attack on Fort Carillon. 
 
In July Abercromby launched his attempt against Fort Carillon. It ended in disaster. 
Lord Howe was killed in an opening skirmish and Abercromby hurled his regulars 
forward in a frontal assault, without artillery support, against French field works 
protected by an abatis of felled trees. The regulars were shot down without reaching 
the French and Abercromby was forced to retreat. Abercromby was recalled and 
command passed to Amherst in September 1758. 
 
Although Amherst formed light infantry and took measures to adapt his regulars to 
irregular warfare he appears to have taken no steps to alter the drill that the regulars 
would use against the French regulars they would meet at Louisbourg, other than to 
order that they should load their muskets with two balls.671 The assault on 
Louisbourg was preceded by an amphibious landing under fire in which Wolfe played 
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a conspicuous role in achieving a successful landing. The assault on Louisbourg 
itself was an almost European siege and Louisbourg surrendered on 26 July 1758. 
 
Amherst had served on the Duke of Cumberland’s staff, but he was quick to put 
aside the 1748 firings and introduce alternate fire to the army now under his 
command.672 In April 1759 he had ordered each battalion to form a light infantry 
company, but in May he withdrew those and the grenadier companies of each 
battalion in his command, then in Albany, to form composite light and grenadier 
battalions. The remaining eight companies were 
at all times to be told off in four grand divisions, eight subdivisions, and 
sixteen platoons; and this must be done without breaking the companies, if 
the numbers be nearly equal, except in[to] the platoons, that each company 
must be subdivided to form two platoons. The Officers will be posted, as much 
as the service will permit, to the companies they belong to.673 
By specifying that the companies, so long as they were all roughly the same size, 
should form the basic fire unit and only be divided to form two platoons, all with their 
own officers, Amherst was placing considerable emphasis on the benefits of the 
natural cohesion to be found in companies where the men lived together and were 
commanded by officers they knew. 
 
Meanwhile, at Louisbourg, Wolfe was preparing his army for the attempt on Quebec. 
Captain John Knox of the 43rd recorded the preparations. It would appear that there 
was some concern amongst battalion commanders about ‘a new system of 
discipline’. This could have been a reference to either the introduction of alternate 
fire by Amherst or the new 1757 Regulations or, indeed, both. When this issue was 
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raised with Wolfe he is reported to have responded with ‘Pho, pho! – new exercise – 
new fiddlesticks; if they are otherwise well disciplined and will fight, that’s all I shall 
require of them’.674 
 
One of the battalions not familiar with the new exercise would appear to have been 
Knox’s. Prior to setting out to join Wolfe’s army in May 1759 they had spent twenty 
two months manning various garrisons in Nova Scotia.675 Whilst in garrison they had 
done what they could to maintain military efficiency, but it is no surprise that such 
things as the 1757 Regulations and the new fashion for alternate fire had passed 
them by. However, prior to leaving their garrisons to join the main army Knox 
recorded: 
The 43d regiment are at exercise every morning, and discharge ammunition 
cartridges; in the afternoon the men are employed in firing at targets, in which 
they are encouraged by presents from their Officers, according to their several 
performances.676 
The practice of individual marksmanship is a constantly recurring activity amongst all 
troops throughout the war in North America.  
 
Once with Wolfe’s army the 43rd appear to have been quickly introduced to the new 
method of delivering a battalion’s fire. Knox described firing alternately from right and 
left to the centre by platoons, sixteen in all, and then by sub-divisions, each platoon 
or subdivision under the command of its own officers. Whilst this was another 
description of the conduct of alternate fire Knox added two interesting observations. 
First he described its effectiveness. The exercise was carried out in a field of wheat 
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and he wrote ‘I never saw grain closer cut down by the reap-hook, or scithe, than this 
was’. Knox also recorded that ‘the method we were ordered to observe did not admit 
of any confusion, though we fired remarkably quick’.677 This was the unbiased view 
of a professional officer that alternate fire was accurate, effective and could be 
delivered quickly and without confusion, confirmation of its superiority to 
Cumberland’s 1748 firings.  
 
Nor was the use of the bayonet neglected, in a passage redolent with the contempt 
of a seasoned professional Knox described a demonstration by a sergeant from 
another regiment of what he called ‘a new method of pushing bayonets’, which 
caused considerable mirth amongst the men. It may have been new to Knox, but this 
new drill was nothing less than the old style of charging a musket and bayonet like a 
pike. It would appear that the 43rd had long since given that up, presumably in 
preference for the new style of holding the musket and bayonet levelled at waist 
height. Knox described how the sergeant held the firelock ‘which he poked out 
before him, in like-manner as an indolent hay-maker turns hay with a forked pole’. 
His verdict was ‘I thought it ludicrous’.678 
 
In July 1759 Amherst gave orders that his infantry were to form and fight in just two 
ranks ‘as the enemy have very few regular troops to oppose us, and no yelling of 
Indians, or fire of Canadians, can possibly withstand two ranks.’679 This development 
appears to have been general throughout North America as Wolfe’s Army used it at 
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Quebec and the following year Amherst recorded exercising infantry in both three 
and two deep lines.680 
 
The analysis of the effectiveness of the new bush fighting techniques for regulars, 
light infantry and rangers reveals that success against the French and Indian 
irregulars did not come quickly and that there were many other factors involved 
besides actual combat techniques. However, British infantry at least began to be 
able to hold its own against irregulars so that it could engage the French regular 
forces in the engagements that would decide the outcome of the war. Accounts of 
Wolfe’s campaign against Quebec are full of accounts of the continuous low intensity 
warfare that epitomised irregular combat. One account confirms the individual nature 
of both the the firing and the close quarter combat. A soldier of the 35th described a 
skirmish where he saw an Indian aim at him, but miss, he then aimed at the Indian 
and missed in turn, whereupon the Indian threw his tomahawk at him, but missed, 
and the soldier threw it back and missed. The soldier was then attacked from behind 
and hit in the back with a tomahawk, but escaped.681 On another occasion at 
Quebec: 
An Indian Swam over... with an intention as we suppose to Scalp a Centry, 
but on the Centry running up to him and presenting his piece to his breast he 
got down on his knees threw away his knife and deliver’d himself up.682 
 
Gradually the British infantry began to acquire a degree of ascendancy over their 
irregular opponents. One officer recorded that small parties were constantly attacked 
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by the enemy who was always repulsed, but not without casualties. He added ‘These 
skirmishes had indeed the good effect of using our men to the woods, and 
familiarising them with the Canadians and Indians, whom they soon began to 
despise.’683 By October 1759, after the fall of Quebec, a NCO was able to record that 
‘By this time our small reconnoitring detachments began to appear terrible among 
the skulking parties of Canadians and Indians.’ He described how the Indians would 
not face them in the open, but would lie in ambush at the edges of woods, firing and 
then rushing out to attack. At length the Indians ‘learned us to be as good hunters as 
themselves’ so that a small number of British were often able to see off larger 
numbers of Indians. He gave as an example an incident where a sergeant with a 
corporal and twelve men was cut off from his regiment by a large body of enemy 
irregulars. Four days later the party returned having lost only two men.684 
 
The competence of the British infantry in Indian fighting was most notably 
demonstrated at the fight at Bushey Run on 5 and 6 August 1763. The Treaty of 
Paris, signed on 10 February 1763 had brought an end to hostilities between Britain 
and France, but in North America an Indian uprising, Pontiac’s War, broke out on the 
western frontier. Colonel Bouquet was leading a relief column to Fort Pitt when his 
convoy was surrounded and pinned down by Indians near a stream that gave its 
name to the battle. Bouquet and his men took up a position on a hill where they 
constructed a makeshift breastwork with bags of flour. Of the first day of the battle 
Bouquet remarked on ‘the cool and steady behaviour of the Troops, who did not fire 
a Shot without orders, and drove the enemy from their Posts with fixed Bayonets’. 
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Robert Kirk of Montgomery’s Highlanders wrote that when charged with bayonets the 
Indians ran away, but as Bouquet wrote, only to return to the attack. On the second 
day of the fight British casualties were mounting and Bouquet’s force was short of 
water. He therefore contrived to lure the Indians into an unfavourable position. He 
weakened part of his defensive perimeter, which the Indians mistook for an 
indication of retreat and attacked vigorously. However, Bouquet had used the 
withdrawn infantry to make a flanking move against the Indians. As they attacked 
they were caught in the open where they received the full fire of four companies 
followed by a bayonet charge. Bouquet referred to the ‘irresistible Shock of our Men, 
who rushing in among them, killed many of them, and put the rest to flight’.685 Kirk 
wrote ‘we met them with our fire first, and then made terrible havock amongst them 
with our fixt bayonets’. 686 
 
Platoon fire was also shown to be effective against Indians under the right 
circumstances. During some of the low level skirmishing at Quebec ‘the Rangers, 
Light Infantry and advanced parties continued popping with the enemy...Captain 
Campbell...ordered a part of his Company to fire a volley at them, when the firing 
almost ceased’.687 Again, in 1761during a campaign against the Cherokee, in the 
midst of skirmishing between light infantry and Indians, a regularly formed battalion 
took decisive action: 
A close Fire from the Regiment for some Minutes, and Orders punctually 
executed of throwing a Platoon of Fire into every Bush where the least smoke 
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appeared, saved the Lives of a number of brave Fellows, drove the Indians 
back to great Distance.688 
 
Whilst success against Indians and French Canadian irregulars enabled the British 
Army to prosecute the war it was in open battle against French regulars that the 
outcome of the war was decided. In July 1759 British forces were besieging Fort 
Niagara when a French relief force approached. This force of some 800 French 
regulars and militia and 300 Indians was opposed by 464 British regulars, mostly of 
the 46th, under the command of Lt. Col. Eyre Massey at La Belle Famille. Seeing that 
the French had regulars Massey ordered his front rank to fix bayonets, an indication 
that bayonets were considered inappropriate against irregulars, presumably because 
of the difficulties of getting in close enough to use them and the negative effect on 
accuracy of the weight of a bayonet on the muzzle of the musket. In another 
indication of the influence of irregular warfare Massey ordered his whole line to lie 
down. Massey estimated that the French, who advanced in column along a road, 
fired twice in their advance, about 500 rounds, then, when his men ‘could almost 
reach them with our Bayonets’ he gave the order to fire. Massey described the 
troops that met the French head on as a grand-division and wrote that it fired seven 
rounds standing. As he wrote that he ‘gave the Word for the Whole to Fire’ it would 
seem most likely that he fired as a grand division. With his light infantry, 108 men, 
covering his left flank this grand division probably numbered about 225, supported by 
the grenadiers of the 46th and a picket of the 44th, about 125 men, who were 
covering the right flank. At the same time his grenadiers outflanked the French ‘and 
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by their pouring in all their fire, on the Enemy’s Flanks, kill’d great numbers, and in 
my opinion was the occasion of breaking them’. Massey’s force then advanced and 
fired another eight rounds, ‘by constant firing’, making fifteen in all, and then charged 
with the bayonet.689  
 
Massey’s force was considerably outnumbered, by about two to one without counting 
the Indians accompanying the French. Massey’s own Iroquois allies did not engage 
the French until they were already retreating. Because he had detached his 
grenadiers and light infantry to cover his flanks the main assault of the French pitted 
approximately 800 French against 225 men directly to their front and perhaps 125 on 
Massey’s right flank. When numbers were evenly matched British battalions appear 
to have usually found it necessary only to fire once or twice before charging with the 
bayonet. Here, outnumbered four to one, the main body of the 46th fired seven 
times, perhaps 1500 rounds. If the grenadiers and picket on his right did the same 
that would have been another seven or eight hundred rounds and although Massey 
reported that half the grenadiers were killed or wounded he expressed the view that 
this fire into the French flank was decisive. The initial fire of the British infantry was 
clearly sufficient to stop the French attack in its tracks, probably helped by the 
French advancing in column so that the head of the column attracted the main 
weight of the British fire. The heavy casualties suffered by the grenadiers might have 
been a consequence of them facing the long flank of the French column from which 
fire was returned while the main British body faced the relatively narrow head of the 
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column. The disparity in numbers meant it took longer, perhaps two or three minutes, 
less if tap loading, to deliver the fire to cause sufficient casualties to break the 
French. Massey had to rely on his firepower in order to avoid being overwhelmed by 
French numbers. When the French began to retreat a further eight rounds a man 
were fired and Massey’s reference to ‘constant fire’ suggests that he switched from 
vollies of the whole body together to firing by sub-divisions or platoons. When 
Massey was sure that the French were sufficiently broken he then sent them on their 
way with a bayonet charge. 
 
The battle that effectively decided the outcome of the war in North America was 
fought on the Plains of Abraham, in front of Quebec, on 13 September 1759. Wolfe 
had contrived to land his army upstream of Quebec under cover of darkness and 
Montcalm, the defender of Quebec, marched out to meet him. The decisive action 
was between six of Wolfe’s battalions and seven of Montcalm’s. In Wolfe’s six 
battalions facing Quebec there were a little more than 1700 muskets and Montcalm’s 
numbered a little under 2000, but supported by about 1500 irregulars. Five other 
British battalions were covering Wolfe’s flanks and rear.690 At least one of Wolfe’s 
battalions was drawn up in two ranks, Anstruther’s 58th on the extreme left of the 
line. An account by a soldier in that battalion also recorded that the files were three 
feet apart. No other account mentions this and it is possible that the 58th were forced 
to spread themselves so thin in order to cover the ground between the main line and 
the position of the battalions protecting their left flank. Elsewhere, although not 
specifically mentioned, it seems probable that the infantry were formed two deep 
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with files at a more conventional spacing in accordance with Amherst’s general 
orders.691  
 
As the French advanced they began firing at the British line from about 100 yards 
away or more, which fire was steadfastly ignored.692 According to Knox, the 43rd at 
least was ordered to lie down.693 At least four of Wolfe’s six battalion’s reserved their 
fire until the French were less than forty yards away. One battalion, the Louisbourg 
Grenadiers, are recorded to have waited until the range was less than twenty 
yards.694 Wolfe had ordered that the muskets should be loaded with two balls.695 
Townshend, commanding the battalions covering the left flank described the fire of 
the British line, ‘it was regular proved effect and constant – they were routed in three 
discharges,’ while  Lt. Fraser with the 78th wrote that the firing continued for six or 
eight minutes.696 Johnson with the 58th wrote ‘we poured in such a discharge; and 
which we continued, with such a regular briskness, as was visible to all, by the god 
effect it produced.’697 Humphreys with the 28th wrote that the firing ‘was so well 
continued, that the enemy everywhere gave way.’698 Knox recorded ‘a well timed, 
regular, and heavy discharge of our small arms, such as they could no longer 
oppose, hereupon they gave way, and fled with precipitation’, adding: 
The forty-third and forty-seventh regiments, in the center, being little affected 
by the oblique fire of the enemy, gave them, with great calmness, as 
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remarkable a close and heavy discharge, as ever I saw performed at a private 
field of exercise, insomuch that better troops than we encountered could not 
possibly withstand it: and, indeed, well might the French Officers say, that 
they never opposed such a shock as they received from the center of our line, 
for they believed every ball took place, and such regularity and discipline they 
had not experienced before; our troops in general, and particularly the central 
corps, having levelled and fired,- comme une coup de canon.699 
This firing was followed by a general advance with the bayonet, or, in the case of 
Fraser’s 78th Highlanders, the broadsword.700 The fighting was not over, some 
French fought a rearguard action as they withdrew into Quebec, but the battle was 
won, although Wolfe himself was killed in the moment of victory. The French 
commander, Montcalm was also killed and Quebec surrendered on 18 September 
1759. 
 
The Battle of Quebec was won by a classic combination of firepower and the 
bayonet. The French attack was met at a range of less than forty yards with the fire 
of approximately 1700 muskets, each loaded with two balls and wielded by soldiers 
who were arguably better shots than any British soldiers before. Townshend’s three 
discharges would have delivered about 5,000 rounds, or 10,000 balls, at the 2,000 
French attacking the British line. All the eyewitnesses are clear that the firing was 
continued after the initial volley. Three of them make use of the word regular, 
suggesting that after an initial full battalion volley the firing continued by sub-divisions 
employing alternate fire. It is perhaps little wonder that one French officer wrote ‘Our 
troops gave the first fire, the British the second, and the affair was over.’701 
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In April 1760 the French attempted to recapture Quebec and Murray, commanding 
the British defenders, decided to meet the French in battle, outside Quebec at Sainte 
Foy. The British were heavily outnumbered and this, combined with tactical errors by 
Murray resulted in defeat. The British battalions had been forced to form in two ranks 
with three feet between files in order to cover their front, but this was too thin and 
they were overwhelmed by French numbers, particularly when their supporting 
artillery began to run out of ammunition.702 A small spotlight was thrown on the 
character of infantry combat in this battle when Lieutenant Eubele Ormsby of the 
Grenadier Company of the 35th was subsequently tried by court martial, accused of 
cowardice. 703 Ormsby’s company was involved in fierce fighting for control of a 
windmill on the British right flank. He described how the company first fired in a 
regular manner with the front rank kneeling. Other soldiers described the subsequent 
advance to the windmill in confusion and small bodies and how Ormsby had directed 
them where to fire. One told the court martial that he lost all his ammunition and went 
to get more, but without saying how or from where, presumably the officers of the 
court knew and this was not considered worthy of mention. Another said he had 
fallen behind the company in order to change his flint. 
 
From the record of this court martial small snippets of information can be gleaned 
about the minutiae of the management of British infantry fire. The company was 
divided into two platoons that at times operated separately, although in close 
proximity to each other. There appears to have been some means for soldiers to 
replenish their ammunition, although this could simply have been taking it from the 
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dead and wounded. When a soldier need to change a flint he appears to have just 
fallen out and got on with it. Ormsby was cleared by the court martial. 
 
Following the battle, Quebec held out until relieved by the Royal Navy. On 8 
September 1760 Montreal surrendered and the war with France in North America 
was over. In the absence of cavalry and the limited participation of artillery, save in 
siege warfare, it was a war won by the infantry. Following serious, initial setbacks the 
infantry had adapted to a completely new form of warfare, irregular, bush fighting. It 
learned from allies and enemies and achieved at least parity and occasionally 
superiority over enemies raised knowing only that form of war. This was done, 
however, without any change in the infantry’s traditional combat doctrine. The 
efficiency of the firepower of a battalion was replaced with the efficiency of the 
individual. The adaptability of the infantry allowed individual marksmanship to 
replace volume and speed of fire as the prime desirable quality. In the case of the 
light infantry this objective was pursued with the assistance of specially adapted 
firelocks and other equipment and specialist training. The object was still to 
overwhelm and disrupt the enemy with firepower and then to close with the bayonet, 
broadsword or tomahawk to disperse him and drive him off. This was not always 
easily achieved, particularly when actually getting to grips with an enemy such as the 
Indians who would simply retire in the face of superior firepower, but the end result 
was the same. When the infantry could get at their irregular opponents with the 
bayonet, as at Bushy Run, the Indians had no answer to it. 
 
When it came to more conventional, European style combat the infantry were 
arguably better than ever. Not only did they adopt the alternate fire system with all its 
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advantages of speed and simplicity, but they were, at the least, competent 
marksmen and the effectiveness of their fire can only have been increased, 
particularly at the short ranges they continued to prefer.  The British, as Knox put it, 
do not expend their ammunition at an immense distance; and if they advance 
to engage, or stand to receive the charge, they are steady, profoundly silent 
and attentive, reserving their fire until they have received that of their 
adversaries, over whom they have a tenfold advantage.704 
 
The campaigns in North America also saw the appearance of the two deep line as 
part of the tactical repertoire of British infantry. Its success against the French at La 
Belle Famille and Quebec was an early forerunner of the way the infantry would fight 
under the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsular War. However, despite this increased 
reliance on firepower the infantry also retained their penchant for close quarters 
combat. At both La Belle Famille and Quebec it was the bayonet that completed the 
work that firepower had begun and completed the victory. Even at Sainte Foy a 
French officer remarked how the British infantry had ‘advanced upon us with their 
bayonets, which, according to custom, threw us into confusion, and compelled us to 
give up the contest’.705 
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9: Conclusion 
 
The starting point for this research was the work of modern writers of military history, 
amongst whom there is a widely held consensus that the infantry of Britain’s armies 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries repeatedly achieved a high level of 
effectiveness and superiority over their enemies in firepower and relied on that 
firepower to win battles. Although that assessment is justified by the narrative of the 
history of the British Army there has not been a sufficiently searching investigation to 
explain how that superiority was first achieved and then maintained over such a long 
period.  
 
As a result of this work that explanation has been established. In doing so it has 
been possible to identify the tactical doctrine and battlefield combat techniques of 
British infantry and to analyse their effectiveness, starting with the English Civil Wars 
and then tracing a continuous line of development of doctrine and technique up to 
1765, in the immediate aftermath of the Seven Years War. In identifying that line of 
development it has also been possible to identify previously unrecognised aspects of 
doctrine and technique, and to pinpoint times when key changes were brought 
about, such as the introduction of the organisation of platoons into firings. As a 
consequence of this detailed analysis some long held misconceptions can be 
identified and corrected, such as that concerning the form that platoon firing first 
took. 
 
There are some related tactical issues that had a bearing on the successes of British 
forces that have not been considered here, such as the actions of the other sections 
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of the army. On occasion artillery played its part, particularly during the period when 
battalions had pairs of guns attached to them to bolster their firepower. For instance, 
at Culloden there was a pair of three pounder cannon in every gap between the 
battalions in the front line. One of those between Barrell’s and Monro’s fired it’s last 
round of grapeshot at a range of only six feet. While it is usually stated that the rate 
of fire of artillery was two rounds a minute, there is evidence to suggest that far 
higher rates of fire were achievable, sometimes in excess of ten rounds a minute, 
with clear implications for battlefield effectiveness. At Fontenoy and Minden, 
however, the infantry were deprived of this support, although the Royal Artillery did 
come in to action to give some protection the right flank of the infantry at Minden. At 
Quebec the single cannon that the Royal Artillery got on to the battlefield is recorded 
as causing significant casualties. However, the artillery of the period covered is 
outside the scope of this work and it worth pointing out that the contemporary 
correspondence of infantry is largely silent on the matter. 
 
The influence of the other part of the army, cavalry, has also been omitted. Its 
actions, such as at Warburg, and inactions, as at Minden, were often vitally important 
to the success or otherwise of British forces.706 The charge of the allied cavalry at 
Laffeldt enabled the infantry to make their retreat successfully.707 But the way the 
cavalry fought did not influence the methods of the infantry and the two arms 
frequently fought their own, separate battles. 
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The nature of the enemy, almost invariably the French, was also important. Given 
the repeated success of British infantry against them, it is surprising that the French 
did not adopt any of their combat techniques. However, while the British were always 
fighting the French, the reverse is not true. France had many enemies during the 
period under consideration and Britain was a relatively minor military power, so far 
as its army was concerned, and thus was of limited influence on the art of warfare 
outside its own forces. On a global scale the Royal navy was far more important. In 
addition the French consistently held to the belief that their forte was the attack and 
that in the attack firepower was less important than élan and the bayonet. 
 
In order to carry out this work it has been necessary to employ a new, practical 
military history approach, which is concerned with the detailed study of the practices 
and procedures of armed forces, understanding precisely how they went about doing 
things. This has been achieved by a detailed examination of drill books and manuals 
and contemporary discussion of combat techniques. This has made possible both 
the interpretation of those sources and the identification of previously unrecognised 
drills and developments, such as platoon firing as described in Mackay’s Rules and 
the introduction and organisation of firings. This has in turn ensured the correct 
interpretation of contemporary accounts and allowed the analysis of the 
effectiveness of actions taken on the battlefield.  
 
At the start of the period under consideration the first armies to engage in the English 
Civil Wars did so in a completely textbook manner, employing long established 
methods of delivering musket fire. At Edgehill in 1642 it was found that the level of 
fire generated, although sustainable, was insufficient to force a conclusion in a 
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firefight between infantry regiments. There was subsequently a very rapid, 
nationwide change, which appears to have started within weeks of Edgehill, to 
delivering the infantry’s fire in very short, sharp bursts at very close range, followed 
by an immediate assault. This was found to be a very effective technique against 
both cavalry and infantry and became used almost to the exclusion of other, earlier 
ways of delivering fire and meant that infantry could defend themselves against 
cavalry without resorting to squares or other all round defensive formations. 
 
It is likely that this development owed something to the techniques introduced by 
Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden in the 1630s, but British infantry developed those 
techniques and took them to a new level. This development occurred in isolation and 
was not matched by anything similar in Europe, where the use of this method of 
fighting by troops from Britain achieved dramatic results. When English armies took 
to the field in the years immediately after the Civil War they employed this technique 
against Spanish troops at the Battle of the Dunes in the presence of French allies. 
After the Restoration of the Monarchy, at Ameixial, they again used it against 
Spanish troops, this time in the presence of Portuguese allies. The impact on friend 
and foe alike was considerable and nothing quite like it had been seen before on a 
European battlefield. It was not, however, adopted by any other European army and 
there are a number of possible reasons for that. It did not solve the problem of 
combining effective fire with sustainable fire, which was the real problem. It might 
simply not have suited the way other armies chose to fight, but it might also be a 
reflection of the limited influence of Britain and her army in the second half of the 
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seventeenth century. Chandler describes the British infantry of the 1680s as 
‘amateur and immature’.708 
 
One of the key developments in the way British infantry delivered its firepower 
occurred in 1689 following the Glorious Revolution and the accession to the thrones 
of England and Scotland of William III. It has long been assumed that the 
introduction of platoon firing to British infantry took place in Flanders where the Duke 
of Marlborough was leading an English contingent as part of a Dutch army. It is now 
possible to demonstrate that platoon firing was also almost simultaneously 
introduced to the Scottish Army and to William’s English troops campaigning in 
Ireland. Furthermore the precise form that it took has also now been identified and it 
is different in many aspects from the form that platoon firing is usually stated as 
having first taken. For instance, the platoons were not at first organised into firings. 
The great benefit of this new technique was that it allowed the same organisation 
and formation to deliver fire in a manner that was both sustainable and effective and 
at a rate that could easily be controlled. As such it was a perfect development for 
British infantry with their preference for close range fire followed by an assault and it 
also proved effective against cavalry. 
 
During the course of the Nine Years War the pike was replaced by the bayonet, the 
matchlock musket by the firelock or flintlock musket and the cartridge replaced the 
bandoleer. By the start of the War of Spanish Succession a battalion, now consisting 
of twelve companies or platoons of hatmen and two platoons of grenadiers, could fire 
one of its platoons every few seconds and still have the first platoon that fired 
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reloaded and ready to fire again by the time all the others had fired. Over the course 
of half a century the firepower of British infantry had effectively doubled. 
 
If the original form of platoon firing was different from the form that is usually 
described, it is now possible to say when that more usually recognised form, which 
organised the platoons into firings, was introduced. It is also possible to demonstrate 
that it was still not organised quite as is usually described. The introduction of firings 
took place in Ghent where the British infantry were quartered during the winter of 
1706-1707. Organised by Major General Ingoldsby there is some evidence to 
suggest that the idea had its origins in the Royal Regiment of Ireland. Whatever its 
exact origins it is clear from manuscript evidence that it did not at first take what 
might be called the classic form referred to by modern historians in which a battalion 
formed three firings each of six platoons. In their first form the firings made use of 
fifteen platoons, six in the first two firings and three in the third. It was this form that 
was employed in the oft quoted engagement at Malplaquet in 1709 between the two 
‘rival’ Royal Regiments of Ireland in the British and French armies. By the end of the 
War of Spanish Succession a battalion was forming in fourteen platoons with a first 
firing of six platoons and the second and third of four platoons. This is the form 
described in the official drill manual of 1728.709 The form with eighteen platoons is 
just one of the many variations suggested by Humphrey Bland in 1727 and appears 
in Kane’s book of 1745.710 It only becomes the usual form at the insistence of the 
Duke of Cumberland in the 1740s. It would appear likely that the misapprehension 
that Kane described the early form of platoon firing has occurred because Kane’s 
                                                          
709
 1728 Regulations, p. 80. 
710
 Bland, Military Discipline, p. 69; Kane, Campaigns, p. 112. 
 
  
 
258 
 
book was a history of the War of Spanish Succession with his views on drill attached. 
It has been assumed that the drill was of the period of the war whereas it represents 
the views Kane held in the 1730s. 
 
The organisation of platoons into firings was undoubtedly an effective development, 
but part of its strength in the form it took at the end of the War of Spanish succession 
was because each platoon was also a company. This meant that each platoon was 
of a big enough size for its fire to be effective and that the men were under the 
command of their own company officers. Subsequently, however, the number of 
companies was reduced from thirteen to ten, which meant that companies had to be 
broken up to form platoons. Furthermore, Cumberland insisted not only on the 
increased number of platoons, but also that officers were posted to platoons by 
seniority, meaning that men were frequently commanded by officers they did not 
know.  These changes made the management of a battalion’s fire a far more 
complex business and the effectiveness of firings began to be questioned. 
 
Leaving aside these difficulties, however, it is informative to compare the orders 
given by Montrose for the battle at Tippermuir in 1644 and the remarks made by 
LaFausille on how the infantry fought at Laffeldt in 1747.711 Although divided by over 
a century they are, in essence, the same. Both describe defeating the enemy by the 
close range delivery of fire followed by an immediate assault. 
 
Despite early difficulties with platoon firing at Dettingen, caused by inexperience and 
a lack of training, it served its purpose well through the rest of the War of Austrian 
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succession. The exceptions were the battles of the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-1746 
when the complexities of firings were not able to cope with the rapidity of the 
Highland charge. Instead Cumberland reverted to using alternate fire in order to 
deliver the fire of his battalions more quickly and this was used to devastating effect 
at Culloden. Against a more conventional enemy the use of standard platoon firings 
continued to be effective. 
 
By the start of the Seven Years War, however, the adherence to the use of platoon 
firings was being widely questioned and challenged by officers such as James 
Wolfe. They were advocating the adoption of the Prussian version of platoon fire, 
which was simply a version of alternate fire using eight fire units, platoons, 
companies or sub-divisions. Eventually, following the resignation of Cumberland the 
British infantry was free to adopt this system and it became part of the official 
regulations in 1765 after being in widespread use during the Seven Years War. In 
essence it was little different from the alternate fire in use before 1706, and so raises 
the possibility that the introduction of firings was a mistake, given that the army 
subsequently returned to using alternate fire. 
 
Bland spelt out the objection to the early form of alternate fire. As it involved twelve 
companies, with six companies firing in succession in each wing, an unacceptably 
broad portion of the front of a battalion could be left unloaded at any time, and thus 
vulnerable to attack.712 The advantage of organising the platoons in firings was that 
the available fire was spread across the whole battalion rather than being 
concentrated at just one point in each wing. This worked well when platoons were 
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whole companies and there were just fourteen platoons. As the number of platoons 
increased and the number of companies was reduced the whole process became 
increasingly complex and the firepower of an individual platoon decreased. That 
there was some recognition of this is clear from Cumberland’s introduction of sub-
divisions comprising two platoons as a fire unit. The advantages of alternate fire by 
companies over the use of platoons in firings were that it was simpler, companies 
remained together under their own officers, there was no complex order of firing, and 
the basic fire unit became larger. Furthermore Bland’s objections were no longer 
valid for two reasons. Firstly, the rate of fire of the infantry had increased 
dramatically with improved drill, priming from cartridges and steel ramrods, which 
meant that the companies were unloaded for a shorter time. Secondly, only eight fire 
units were involved, rather than fourteen, which meant that, proportionately, any 
unloaded part of a battalion’s front was smaller.  
 
Throughout all the changes and argument about the best way to deliver effective fire 
two things did not change. One was the range, thirty yards or less, at which it was 
preferred to open fire. The second was the use of the bayonet to finish what 
firepower had started. Those arguments that did occur were simply about the best 
way to deliver the fire of a battalion, the doctrinal debates going on in Europe appear 
to have passed by the British Army with little effect. 
 
There is no doubt that British infantry throughout the period under consideration was 
largely successful on the battlefield, often against considerable odds. On the few 
occasions when they were beaten there were often other factors at play and they 
soon recovered from those setbacks. Examples of this were Prestonpans, against 
  
 
261 
 
the Jacobites in 1745, and Monongahela, against irregulars in 1755. This success 
was largely due to the infantry’s efficiency with firelock and bayonet and their 
adherence to their tactical doctrine. A factor of some importance in achieving this 
success was the character of the soldiers themselves. The doctrine that they 
executed required a considerable amount of confidence and the counter-intuitive 
recognition that it was safer to ignore the fire of the enemy and reserve a battalion’s 
fire until the range was reached at which it would have the most and the quickest 
effect. They could also display considerable resilience if not down right 
stubbornness. At both Marston Moor and Naseby royalist infantry put up very 
stubborn resistance. The battle of Fontenoy may have been a defeat, but the British 
infantry were not beaten, as French cavalry discovered to their cost. At Monongahela 
the infantry only broke after three hours when all their ammunition was expended, 
saying they would fight if they could see their enemy. At Minden the 12th Foot had 
suffered 302 rank and file killed and wounded out of 480 and 18 officers killed and 
wounded out of 27 and yet were still prepared to fight. 
 
If the infantry’s performance at Dettingen was initially less than ideal it is perhaps not 
surprising. The last major battle for the British Army had been Malplaquet in 1709, 
thirty years earlier, and thus the vast majority of the army had never seen action, the 
small minority who had were senior officers who had been junior officers in 1709. 
Nonetheless, as the actions and comments of officers like Wolfe make clear, the 
army was at least familiar with the theory of their doctrine, what they had to do was 
relearn confidence in it. Relearn because although the techniques for the delivery of 
an infantry battalion’s fire underwent a number of changes between 1642 and 1765 
the underlying tactical doctrine did not. This can be summarised as reserving fire 
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until within a range of thirty yards, then delivering fast and accurate fire to overwhelm 
the enemy’s resolve, before driving them off with a vigorous bayonet charge. 
 
Since this doctrine had lasted and been effective for such a long time the question 
arises, did it continue after the period covered by this thesis? All the indications are 
that it did. The work of Spring on the American War of Independence and Nosworthy 
on the Napoleonic Wars have already been referred to.713 The actions of British 
infantry in stopping and defeating French columns at La Belle Famille and Quebec 
are precursors to any number of battles in the Peninsular War and Waterloo.  
 
 In deed it is worth considering the words of one modern British infantry NCO;  
The sight of men jumping out of the Warrior with incoming fire hitting the 
vehicles yet still no hesitance to go forward is because of the self-belief in 
their ability, and the knowledge that the only way to stop the incoming fire is to 
fire back and close with and kill the enemy. 
 
CSM Falconer was writing of his time in Basra in 2004 and yet he expressed an 
underlying doctrine that would be recognised by any British infantryman from 1642 to 
1765. He also wrote about the ‘confidence that the soldiers had in the system and 
themselves.’714 
 
The long term success of British infantry in combat was the result of the adherence 
to a simple, but very effective combat doctrine. It was born in the nationwide strife of 
the English Civil Wars. It was honed and improved in the cockpit of Europe. It was 
adapted to overcome Scottish Highlanders and North American Indians. Changes in 
the practices and procedures of its application sought only to improve the delivery 
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and effectiveness of that doctrine. The professionalism and confidence with which it 
was applied made Britain’s redcoats a force that repeatedly succeeded against 
numerically superior enemies.  
  
 
264 
 
Bibliography 
1: Manuscripts 
British Library 
Cumberland Papers (on microfilm) 
Add Mss 21506, f. 98, [John Churchill, Earl, afterwards Duke of] Marlborough to 
William Blathwayt, Secretary at War; Maestricht, Breda, 29 May, 1689 
Add Ms 21640 Forbes Papers 
Add Mss 23642, miscellaneous papers and correspondence of Lord Tyrawley, 1679-
1759 
Add Mss 27892, Douglass, Brig. Gen. James, Schola Martis, or the Art of War 
Add Mss 29477, "The exercise of the Firelock and Bayonett, with ye Doublings and 
Hollow Square," with copies of orders and regulations by the Duke of Marlborough 
by Capt. John Foster, of Dulwich 
Add Mss 45662 Journal of Richard Humphrys, 28th Foot 
Add Mss 61163, Ingoldsby Correspondence 
Add Mss 61371, f. 119, Marlborough’s instructions to Ingoldsby, 4th November 1706 
Add Mss 61398, Adam Cardonnel’s letters, June 06 to Sept 07 
Add Mss 61408, Josiah Sandby, Journal 
Cornwall Record Office  
DD.RH.839 (formerly DD.R.H.388), Anon, Exercise of Firelock and Bayonet... 
appointed by his Excie. Lieut. Genll. Ingoldsby 
Historical manuscripts Commission 
J. M. Heathcote Esq. (London, 1899) 
Leybourne Popham (London, 1899)  
Mrs. Frankland-Russell-Astley of Chequers Court, Bucks (London, 1900) 
The Earl of Buckinghamshire (London, 1895) 
The Earl of Bathurst (London, 1923) 
M L Clements (London, 1913) 
  
 
265 
 
 
National Army Museum 
NAM 6807/392A+B, Journal of Robert Stearne, 2 vols. 
NAM 7510/92, A copy of a letter written by an officer of the 12th Foot to his mother on 
the 9th August 1759 
NAM6807.205,The Exercise of the Firelock and Bayonett that was ordered to be 
used by all the Regimts in Ireland 1723 
Dutch Nationaal Archief,  
Familiearchief Van Wassenaer van Duvenvoorde, Inv. Nr. 1223, Stukken van Willem 
Baron van Wassenaer, colonel-commandant van het eerste bataljon gardes 
Kent County Record Office 
Amherst MSS 
Nottingham University 
Hallward Library, Galway Collection, Ga 12835 
Huntington Library, California 
Loudoun Papers, LO 1060, 5065, 5072, 5074, 5075, 6927 
National Archives of Scotland 
Register House Series (Microfilms) 4/86/2 
National Archives 
 WO34/53 
WO71/68 
 PRO 30/8/49 
  
 
266 
 
2: Regulations, by date 
 
An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline (London, 1676) 
An Abridgement of the Military Discipline Appointed by His Majesty to be used by all 
His Forces in His Ancient Kingdom of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1680) 
An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline (London, 1685) 
The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions, According to the Words of Command, 
As they are Explained. As also, the forming of Battalions, With Directions to be 
observed by all Colonels, Captains, and other Officers in Their Majesties Armies 
(London, 1690) 
The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions, According to the Words of Command, 
As they are Explained. As also, the forming of Battalions, With Directions to be 
observed by all Colonels, Captains, and other Officers in Their Majesties Armies. 
Like wise The Exercise of the Dragoons Both on Horse-back and Foot. With the 
Rules of War in the day of Battel, when Encountering with the Enemy (Edinburgh 
1693) 
The Exercise of the Foot with the Evolutions (Dublin, 1701) 
The New Exercise of Firelocks & Bayonets; Appointed by his Grace the Duke of 
Marlborough to be used by all the British Forces (London, 1708) 
Exercise for the Horse, Dragoons and Foot Forces (London, 1728) 
A New Exercise to be observed by His Majesty’s Troops on the Establishment of 
Great Britain and Ireland (issued April 1756, this edition published, London, 1757) 
New Manual Exercise as performed by His Majesty’s Dragoons, Foot Guards, Foot, 
Artillery, Marines And by the Militia (London, 1758, 2nd Edition, Entirely Corrected 
and Enlarged) 
A New Manual and Platoon Exercise, with an Explanation (Dublin, 1764) 
The Manual Exercise as Ordered by His Majesty in 1764 Together with Plans and 
Explanations of the method generally practis’d at Reviews and Field Days (Boston, 
1774) 
 
  
 
267 
 
3: Published Primary Sources 
 
Abbreviations 
JSAHR; Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 
 
Albemarle, George Monck, Duke of, Observations upon Military and Political Affairs 
(London, 1671)  
Alexander, Brigadier R, (ed.), The Capture of Quebec. A Manuscript Journal Relating 
to the Operations Before Quebec From 8th May, 1759, to 17th May, 1760, Kept by 
Colonel Malcolm Fraser. Then Lieutenant in the 78th Foot (Fraser’s Highlanders), in 
JSAHR, vol. xviii, (1939) 
Anon, A System of Camp Discipline.., to which is added General Kane’s Campaigns 
of King William (London, 1757, 2nd edition) 
Anon., A True Description of the Discipline of War both for Horse and Foot (no place 
or date) 
Anon., An Express Relation of the Passages and Proceedings of His Majesties 
Armie, under the command of his Excellence the Earle of Newcastle (no place, 
1643)    
Anon, British Glory Reviv’d (London, 1743) 
Anon., The Complete Militia-Man (London, 1760) 
Anon., The Field of Mars, Being an Alphabetical Digestion of the Principal Naval and 
Military Engagements (London, 1781), 2vols 
Anon., Generall Lessley’s Direction and Order for the exercising of Horse and Foot 
(London, 1642) 
Anon, The History of the Rebellion in 1745 and 1746 Extracted from the Scots 
Magazine (Aberdeen, 1755) 
Anon, The Journal of the Battle of Fontenoy... translated from the French (London, 
1745) 
Anon, The Report of the Proceedings and Opinion of the Board of General Officers 
on their Examination into the Conduct, Behaviour, and Proceedings of Lieutenant-
General Sir John Cope (London, 1749) 
Barriffe, William, Military Discipline: or the Young Artillery Man (London, 1635) 
Barriffe, William, Military Discipline: or the Young Artillery Man (London, 1639) 
Batt:, Gil:, Some Particular Animadversions of Marke, for the satisfaction of the 
contumatious Malignant (London, 1646) 
Bell, Robert (ed.), Memorials of the Civil War, comprising the Correspondence of the 
Fairfax Family (London, 1849) 
Willson, Beckles, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London, 1909) 
Bishop, Matthew, The Life and Adventures of Matthew Bishop (London, 1744),  
  
 
268 
 
Bland, Humphrey, A Treatise of Military Discipline (2nd edition, London, 1727) 
Blodget, Samuel, A Prospective Plan of the Battle near lake George and the Eighth 
Day of September, 1755 (London, 1756) 
Brockington, Jr., William S. (ed.), Monro, His Expedition with the Worthy Scots 
Regiment Called Mac-Keys (Westport CT, 1999), (first published London, 1637) 
Carlyle, Thomas, Oliver Cromwell’s Letter and Speeches, (London, 1849, 2nd Ed.)  
Chadwyck Healey, Charles E. H. (ed.), Bellum Civile, Hopton’s Narrative of his 
Campaign in the West (London, 1902) 
Chandler, David G. (ed.), A Journal of Marlborough’s Campaigns During the War of 
the Spanish Succession, 1704-1711, by John Marshall Deane (JSAHR, Special 
Publication no. 12, London, 1984),  
Clarke, Rev. J. S., (ed.), The Life of James the Second King of England, etc, 
collected out of memoirs writ of his own hand (London, 1816) 
Coe, Richard, An Exact Diarie or a Briefe Relation of the Progress of Sir William 
Wallers Army (London, 1644) 
Collings, Richard, The Kingdomes Weekly Intelligencer, 24 June to 1 July (London, 
1645)  
Cormack, Andrew, and Jones, Alan (eds.), The Journal of Corporal Todd, 1745-1762 
(Stroud, 2001) 
Cruso, John, Militarie Instructions for the Cavallrie (Cambridge, 1631) 
Dalrymple, Campbell, A Military Essay (London, 1761) 
D’Auvergne, Edward, A Relation of the Most Remarkable Transactions of the Last 
Campaign, 1692 (London, 1693), 
D’Auvergne, Edward, The History of the Last Campagne in the Spanish Netherlands, 
Anno Dom. 1693 ( London, 1693) 
Davis, N Darnell, ‘British Newspaper Accounts of Braddock’s Defeat’, The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, October 1899 
Doughty, A and Parmalee, G W, The Siege of Quebec and the Battle of the Plains of 
Abraham (six volumes, Quebec, 1901) 
George Durant, ‘Journal of the Expedition to Martinique and Guadeloupe, October 
1758 – May 1759’, in Alan J Guy, R N W Thomas and Gerard J deGroot (eds.), 
Military Miscellany I (Stroud, 1997) 
Elton, Richard, The Compleat Body of the Art Military (London, 1668)  
Fairfax, Sir Thomas, Short Memorials of Thomas Lord Fairfax (London, 1699) 
Faucitt, William (trans.), Regulations for the Prussian Infantry, Translated from the 
German Original (London, 1754) 
Faulkener, George, The Dublin Journal, 28 January to 1 February 1746, Issue 1971 
Firth, C. H., (ed.), The Clarke Papers (London, 1899) 
  
 
269 
 
Foster, Henry, A true and exact Relation of the Marchings of the Two Regiments of 
the Trained-Bands of the City of London (London, 1643) 
The Gentleman’s Magazine 
Gwynne, John, Military Memoirs of the Great Civil War (Edinburgh, 1822)   
Henderson, Andrew, The History of the Rebellion (London, 1758, 5th Edn.) 
Hamilton, C. (ed.), Braddock’s Defeat (Norman, Oklahoma, 1959) 
Hexham, Henry, The First Part of the Principles of the Art Military (Delft, 1642) 
Hodgson, Capt. John and Slingsby, Sir Henry, Memoirs written during the Great Civil 
War (Edinburgh, 1806) 
Howell, James, Proedria vasilike a discourse concerning the precedency of kings 
(London, 1664) 
Hughes, Michael, A Plain Narrative and Authentic Journal of the Late Rebellion 
Begun in 1745 (London, 1747) 
Kane, Brigadier-General Richard, Campaigns of King William and the Duke of 
Marlborough, Also A New System of Military Discipline, for a Battalion of Foot on 
Action (London, 2nd ed.1747) 
Kirk, Robert, The Memoirs of Robert Kirk, Late of the Royal Highland Regiment, 
Written by Himself (Limerick, 1791) 
Knoch, ‘The insufficiency of fire-arms for attack or defence, demonstrated from facts, 
&c’, The Edinburgh Magazine, vol. 3 (Nov 1759) 
Knox, Captain John, An Historical Journal of the Campaigns in North America for the 
Years 1757, 1758, 1759 and 1760 (3 vols., London, 1769) 
Lachapelle, Ofwersteleut Iulius Richard De, Een Militarisch Exercitiae Book 
(Stockholm, 1669) 
Le Blond, Guilllaume, Elemens de Tactique (Paris, 1758) 
Lister, Joseph, An Historical Relation of the Life of Mr Joseph Lister (Bradford, 1821) 
Lloyd’s Evening Post and British Chronicle 
London Chronicle (Semi Annual) 
London Evening Post 
The London Gazette 
London Magazine or Gentleman’s monthly intelligencer 
Mackay, Major General Hugh, Memoirs of the War carried on in Scotland and Ireland 
(Edinburgh, 1833) 
Marchant, John, The History of the Present Rebellion (London, 1746) 
Millner, John, A Compendious Journal of all the Marches, Famous Battles and 
Sieges (Uckfield, 2004) 
Molesworth, Lt. Gen. Richard, 3rd Viscount, A Short Course of Standing Rules, for 
the For the Government and Conduct of an Army (London, 1744) 
  
 
270 
 
The Monthly Review  
Morgan, Major-General, A True and Just Relation of Maj. Gen. Sir Thomas Morgan’s 
Progress in France and Flanders (London, 1699) 
New York Historical Society, Collections, Volume 1 (New York, 1872) 
Newcastle, Margaret, Duchess of, The Life of...William Cavendish ...Earl of 
Newcastle (London, 1667) 
O’Callaghan, E B; Fernow, B, (ed.), Documents Relative to the Colonial History of 
the State of New York (15 vols., Albany, 1853-57) 
Orrery, Roger Earl of, A Treatise of the Art of War (London, 1677) 
Pargellis, Stanley, Military Affairs in North America, 1748-1765, Selected Documents 
from the Cumberland Papers in Windsor Castle (New York and London, 1936) 
Paan, Louis, Den korter weg tot de Nederlandsche Militaire Exercitie, Inhoudende 
verscheide extraordinaire Evolutien ende Bataillons, Mitsgaders de formen der 
Batailles,Vol. 2 (Leuwarden, 1684) 
Parker, Robert, Memoirs of the most Remarkable Military Transactions from the Year 
1683 to 1718 (Dublin, 1746)  
Pouchot, Pierre; Dunnigan, Brian Leigh (ed.); Cardy, Michael (trans.), Memoirs on 
the late War in North America between France and England (Youngstown, 1994) 
Rogers, Major Robert, Journals of Major Robert Rogers (London, 1765)  
Ross, John, Tangers Rescue or a Relation of the Late Memorable Passage at 
Tanger (London, 1681) 
Stevens, S K, Kent, Donald H and Leonard, Autumn L (eds.), The Papers of Henry 
Bouquet (Harrisburg, 1951) 
Rushworth, John, Letter, in Foard, Glenn, Naseby, The Decisive Campaign 
(Whitstable, 1995) 
Winthrop Sargent (ed.), The History of an Expedition against Fort DuQuesne in 1755 
(Philadelphia, 1856) 
Sawle, W, An Impartial Relation of all the Transactions between the Army of the 
Confederates and that of the French King in their last Summer’s Campaign in 
Flanders with a more particular respect to the Battle of Fleury (London, 1691) 
Saxe, Comte Maurice de; Fawcett, Sir William (Trans), Reveries or Memoirs 
concerning the Art of War (Edinburgh, 1759),  
Simcoe, J. G., Simcoe’s Military Journal (New York, 1844) 
Smith, William, An Historical Account of the Expedition against the Ohio Indians in 
the Year MDCCLXIV under the command of Henry Bouquet Esq. (London, 1766) 
Story, George Warter, A True and Impartial History of the Most Material Occurrences 
in the Kingdom of Ireland during the Two Last Years (London, 1691) 
Sumner, Rev. Percy (ed.), ‘General Hawley’s Chaos’, JSAHR, vol. xxvi (London, 
1947) 
Turner, Sir James, Memoirs of His Own Life and Times (Edinburgh, 1829) 
  
 
271 
 
Turner, Sir James, Pallas Armata (London, 1683) 
Waddell, Louis M. (ed.), The Papers of Henry Bouquet (Harrisburg, 1994) 
Walker, Sir Edward, ‘Brief Memorials’, in Young, Peter, Naseby 1645 (London, 1985) 
Ward, Robert, Animadversions of Warre (London, 1639) 
Watson, Lionel, A More Exact Relation of the Late Battell Neer York (London, 1644) 
C. H. Firth, ‘Marston Moor’, in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, New 
Series, vol. XII (London, 1898) 
Watts, William, The Swedish Discipline (London, 1632) 
Watts, William, The Swedish Intelligencer, The First Part (London, 1632) 
Webb, Rev. John (ed.), Military Memoir of Colonel John Birch (London, 1873) 
J Clarence Webster (ed.), The Journal of Jeffrey Amherst, 1758-1763 (Toronto, 
1931) 
Whitworth, Maj. Gen. R H, ‘Some unpublished Wolfe Letters’, JSAHR, vol. LIII , pp. 
65-86 (London, 1975) 
Willson, Beckles, The Life and Letters of James Wolfe (London, 1909) 
Wilson, John, ‘The Journal of John Wilson’ in David G. Chandler (ed.) Military 
Miscellany II, Manuscripts from Marlborough’s Wars, the American War of 
Independence and the Boer War (Stroud, 2005)  
Windham, William, A Plan of Discipline for the Use of The Norfolk Militia (London, 
1759) 
Wishart, George, The History of the Kings Majesties Affairs in Scotland (The Hague, 
1647) 
Wolfe, James, General Wolfe’s Instructions to Young Officers (2nd edition, London 
1780, reprinted 1967) 
 
 
  
 
272 
 
4: Secondary Sources 
 
Abbreviations 
JSAHR; Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research 
 
Anderson, Fred, Crucible of War (New York, 2000),  
Atkinson, C. T., ‘Wynendael’, JSAHR, vol. 34 (1956), pp. 26-31  
Atkinson, C. T., ‘Gleanings from the Cathcart Mss’, JSAHR, vol. 29 (1951), pp. 20-
25, 64-68, 97-103 
Bailey, Geoff B., Falkirk or Paradise (Edinburgh, 1996) 
Bennett, Martyn, The Civil Wars in Britain and Ireland (Oxford, 1997) 
Black, Jeremy, Warfare in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1999) 
Blackmore, David, British Cavalry of the Mid-18th Century (Nottingham, 2008) 
Blackmore, H. L., British Military Firearms, 1650-1850 (London, 1961) 
Brumwell, Stephen, Redcoats, The British Soldier and War in the Americas, 1755-
1763 (Cambridge 2002) 
Bulstrode, Sir Richard, Memoirs and Reflections upon the Reign and Government of 
King Charles the Ist and K. Charles the IId (London, 1721), 
Carlton, Charles, Going to the Wars, The Experience of the British Civil Wars 1638-
1651 (London, 1992) 
Chandler, David, The Art of War in the Age of Marlborough (London 1976)  
Chandler, David, Marlborough as Military Commander (London, 1973),   
Childs, John, ‘The English Brigade in Portugal, 1662-68’, JSAHR, vol. 53, (1975) 
Childs, John, The Nine Years War and the British Army (Manchester, 1991) 
Cooke, Dave, The Forgotten Battle – Adwalton Moor (Heckmondwike, 1996) 
Charles Dalton, English Army Lists and Commission Registers, 1661-1714 (London, 
1898) 
David, Saul, All the King’s Men, The British Soldier from the Restoration to Waterloo 
(London, 2012) 
Duffy, Christopher, The ’45 (London, 2003) 
Duffy, Christopher, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason (London, 1987) 
Firth, Sir Charles, Cromwell’s Army (first published London, 1902) 
Foard, Glenn, Naseby, The Decisive Campaign (Whitstable, 1995)  
Fortescue, The Hon J W, A History of the British Army (13 volumes, London, 1899-
1930) 
Fraser, Antonia, The Weaker Vessel (London, 1984) 
  
 
273 
 
Fuller, Colonel J F C, British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century (London, 1925) 
Gates, David, The British Light Infantry Arm, c. 1790-1815 (London, 1987) 
Gentles, Ian, The New Model Army in England, Ireland and Scotland, 1645-1653 
(Oxford, 1992)  
Griffith, Paddy, Forward into Battle (revised edition, Swindon, 1990) 
Harding, David F., Smallarms of the East India Company, 1600-1859 (London, 1999) 
Hibbert, Christopher, Recoats and Rebels, The War for America, 1770-1781 
(London, 1990) 
Hill, Christopher, The World Turned Upside Down (London, 1972) 
Holmes, Richard, Redcoat, The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket 
(London, 2002, paperback)  
Houlding, John, Fit for Service, The Training of the British Army, 1715-1795 (Oxford, 
1981) 
Hughes, Major-General B. P., Firepower, Weapons Effectiveness on the Battlefield, 
1630-1850 (London, 1974)  
Hunter, William A (ed.), ‘Thomas Barton and the Forbes Expedition’, in The 
Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, vol. 95, No. 4 (1971) 
Kishlansky, Mark A., The Rise of the New Model Army (Cambridge 1979) 
Kopperman, Paul E., ‘Braddock, Edward (bap. 1695, d. 1755)’, Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Jan 2008 
[http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/3170, accessed 6 April 2012] 
Lowe, William C., ‘Amherst, Jeffrey, first Baron Amherst (1717–1797)’, Oxford 
Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford University Press, 2004; online edn, Sept 
2010 [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/443, accessed 6 April 2012] 
Lytton Sells A. (ed.), The Memoirs of James II (Bloomington, 1962), 
MacKinnon, Daniel, Origin and Services of the Coldstream Guards (London, 1833) 
Marix Evans, Martin, Naseby 1645, The Triumph of the New Model Army (Oxford, 
2007) 
McLynn, Frank, 1759, The Year Britain Became Master of the World (London, 2005) 
Mollo, , Uniforms of the Seven Years War, 1756-1763 (New York, 1977) 
Montgomery of Alamein, A History of Warfare (London, 1968) 
Morrill, John, The Nature of the English Revolution (Harlow, 1993)  
McCulloch, Ian M and Todish, Tim J, British Light Infantryman of the Seven Years’ 
War, North America, 1757 – 63 (Oxford, 2004) 
Nosworthy, Brent, Battle Tactics of Napoleon and His Enemies (London, 1995) 
Nosworthy, Brent, The Anatomy of Victory, Battle Tactics 1689-1763 (New York, 
1992)  
Oman, Sir Charles, A History of the Peninsular War (7 volumes, Oxford, 1902-1930) 
  
 
274 
 
Pargellis, Stanley, ‘Braddock’s Defeat’, The American Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 
2 (1936) 
Pocock, Tom, Battle for Empire, the very first world war 1756-63, (London, 2002),  
Pollard, Tony (ed.), Culloden, The History and Archaeology of the Last Clan Battle 
(Barnsley, 2009) 
Reid, Stuart, 1745, A Military History of the Last Jacobite Rising (Staplehurst, 1996) 
Reid, Stuart, Wolfe, The Career of General James Wolfe from Culloden to Quebec 
(Staplehurst, 2000) 
Roberts, Keith, Cromwell’s War Machine, The New Model Army, 1645-1660 
(Barnsley, 2005) 
Rogers, H. C. B., Wellington’s Army (Shepperton 1979) 
Roots, Ivan, The Great Rebellion (London1966) 
Rothenberg, Gunther E., The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Staplehurst, 
1997) 
Routh, E. M. G., ‘The English at Tangier’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 26, No. 
103, (1911) 
Ruthven, Patrick Gordon of, A Short Abridgement of Britane’s Distemper (Aberdeen, 
1844) 
Scott, C. L.; Turton, Alan; Gruber von Arni, Dr Eric, Edgehill, The Battle 
Reinterpreted (Barnsley, 2004) 
Selby, John, The Road to Yorktown (New York, 1976) 
Spencer, Charles, Blenheim, Battle for Europe (London, 2004) 
Spring, Matthew H., With Zeal and with Bayonets Only (Oklahoma, 2008) 
Stapleton, John, Forging A Coalition Army: William III, The Grand Alliance, And The 
Confederate Army In The Spanish Netherlands, 1688-1697 (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, Ohio State University, 2003),  
Stephenson, Michael, Patriot Battles, How the War of Independence Was Fought 
(New York, 2007) 
Stern, Walter M., ‘Gunmaking in Seventeenth Century London’, Journal of the Arms 
and Armour Society, Vol. 1 No. 5 (1953-56) 
Sumner, Rev. Percy, (ed.), ‘General Hawley’s “Chaos”’, JSAHR, vol. 26, pp.91- 94 
Tomasson, Katherine and Buist, Francis, Battles of the ’45 (London, 1987, 1st pub. 
London, 1962) 
Turner, Pierre, Soldiers’ Accoutrements of the British Army 1750-1900 (Marlborough, 
2006) 
Whitworth, Rex, Field Marshal Lord Ligonier (Oxford, 1958) 
Whitworth, Rex, William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland (Barnsley, 1992) 
Young, Brigadier Peter, Edgehill, 1642, The Campaign and the Battle (Kineton, 
1967) 
